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INTRODUCTION 
Cacao is the agricultural raw material for the 
manufacture of chocolate bars and cocoa drinks, and an 
assortment of cosmetic products and oil derivatives in 
industrialized countries. Most tropical agrarian societies 
produce cacao. For its nutritious qualities, the crop has 
attracted such vivid descriptive terms as the "magic bean," 
"the golden pod" and "food of the gods.Cacao, however, 
suffers from a wide variety of plant diseases estimated at 2.6 
billion dollars in financial losses to farmers annually.% 
Ghana, which dominated world cacao output from 1911 to 1978, 
experienced the crippling Swollen Shoot plant epidemic in the 
1930s. Today, cacao cultivation is declining in Ghana partly 
because farmers lack the means to control certain pests and 
pathogens.^  
The dangers of cacao plant pestilence and disorders have 
long historical precedents. Diseases destroyed cacao trees in 
the western hemisphere, the gene-center of the plant, and 
where the earliest plantations flourished. For this reason, 
cacao production shifted from the neotropics to West Africa. 
In the modern world, a crisis of plant diseases confront all 
cacao growing countries. Some of these countries like Ghana 
and Nigeria, have faced formidable problems of pathogenic 
attacks in their cacao plantations for decades. 
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The menace of plant diseases holds implications for 
Ghana's economy which has since colonial times relied heavily 
upon cacao export revenues. Until 1978, the largest cacao 
plantation system in the world was. concentrated in Ghana's 
tropical rain forest of some 30,000 square miles.^  These 
plantations are costly long term investments which has since 
the 1890s earned hard currency from world markets to 
underwrite economic improvements in Ghana. Since independence 
in 1957, cacao export revenues have paid for capital goods and 
raw materials for domestic manufacturing plants. This means 
that the crop provides income to rural populations, and 
created jobs for urban industries.^  
Moreover, manufacturing enterprises in many 
industrialized countries depend upon regular supplies of cacao 
beans to sustain production. Hence, if diseases and pests are 
able to impair cacao plantations, supplies to overseas 
industrial plants would diminish significantly. Ghanaian 
cacao farmers would lose their source of livelihood. The 
government of Ghana, because of its heavy dependence on cacao 
export revenues, would also forfeit its economic viability. 
In industrialized countries, manufacturers of cacao products 
would languish and face ultimate collapse. Accordingly, as 
this project aims to demonstrate, the Agricultural Department 
in Ghana has sought to contain cacao plant diseases in the 
country's forest belt since the early twentieth century. 
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These endeavors improved with advances in the state of 
technical knowledge on cacao plant pathogens over time. This 
project also discusses the significance of cacao diseases in 
Ghanaian society, economy and politics from 1910 to 1966. 
This shows that apart from their biological and economic 
dangers, monocultures could potentially generate political 
difficulties as occurred in Ghana after World War II. The 
political repercussions produced two inter-related turning 
points in Ghanaian history. First, the event contributed 
significantly to Ghana's decolonization process. Above all 
else, it focused the energies of the Ghana government to 
design and concentrate research and extension services after 
1948 to cope with cacao pathogens in Ghana. 
Despite their economic significance, plant diseases have 
remained an unexplored field in African historiography. The 
neglect of Agricultural Science in African historical research 
has probably derived from the assumption that the Natural and 
Physical Sciences bear little interaction with the Social 
Sciences and the Humanities. Scholarship in the Social 
Sciences and Humanities to date, has overlooked possible 
intersections with the Natural and Physical Sciences when 
explicating social phenomena in Africa. This work on cacao 
plant pests and pathogens offers a departure. It blends 
material from the Humanities and Natural Sciences to deal with 
an important aspect of Ghana's major agricultural export 
commodity. 
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Analytical Framework 
An adaptation of the concept of "Induced Institutional 
Innovation," in agricultural economics and development 
provides an analytical tool for this work. This analysis 
considers the colonial and post-independent politicians, 
bureaucrats and technocrats as "political entrepreneurs" who 
responded to compelling biological and economic forces through 
public research and extension services. The political 
entrepreneurs encompassed the executive and legislative 
branches of government which formulated policies, and used 
bureaucratic institutions like the Department of Agriculture 
and Agricultural Research Stations to contain cacao diseases 
in Ghana. The technocrats comprised of virologists, 
mycologists, entomologists and plant pathologists in the 
service of the Agricultural Department in Ghana.* 
The national policy makers innovated Ghana's cacao 
economy as an investment designed to maintain Ghana's 
competitive position in world markets.^  In the Ghanaian 
context, the state intervened to protect the nation's cacao 
crop from pathogens since the national livelihood depended 
directly upon this monoculture. Advances in biological 
research at the Central Cacao Station from 1938, and that of 
the West African Cacao Research Institute from 1944 to 1966, 
5 
occurred because the government was determined to pre-empt the 
pre-mature decline of Ghana's cacao economy. 
This study posits that before the introduction and 
development of cacao plantations in 1879, the external sector 
of Ghana's agriculture was extractive in character. At this 
historical stage, this sector was tied to foreign markets 
based on the extraction and export of indigenous produce like 
palm oil, palm kernels, timber and wild rubber. After 1879, 
two sets of innovation occurred in the external sector, 
resulting in the emergence and preservation in Ghana of the 
world's largest cacao plantations. 
As defined in this study, the two facets of development 
involved the indigenous sphere and the scientific sphere. The 
major actors in the indigenous sphere were migrant agrarian 
entrepreneurs who secured land and used family members and 
kinship connections to transform the external sector into the 
country's exported-oriented cacao economy. As Robert 
Szereszewski, an economist explained, "the adoption of cacao 
represented the innovating activities of African 
agriculturists ... cacao ... was the real revolutionary 
element of the economy" and its adoption created "new enclaves 
of innovation on the margin of the traditional economy."® To 
this, Polly Hill, an anthropologist, has added, "The migrant 
cocoa farmers of southern Ghana were real economic innovators, 
people who bent their energy and intelligence to the business 
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of cocoa fanning with supreme success."' The indigenous 
sphere of Ghana's export agriculture, as defined in this 
analysis, has attracted considerable literature and requires 
no further elaboration here. 
The onset and spread of cacao morbidity induced an 
institutional innovation in the scientific sphere of Ghana's 
cacao economy. Here, the major actor was the state, operated 
under politicians, bureaucrats and technocrats. Between 1910 
and 1943, the entomologists, mycologists, virologists, and 
travelling inspectors in the Department of Agriculture, 
initiated efforts to combat cacao diseases in Ghana's rain 
forest. The political entrepreneurs and bureaucrats also 
enacted statutes to protect the industry and created public 
research institutions to examine the dynamics of plant 
pathology and the most efficient means to eradicate them in 
Ghana. With the onset of the Swollen Shoot cacao virus in 
1936, the government intervened decisively to protect cacao 
plantations from disease because a large proportion of most 
rural dwellers and the national livelihood rested heavily upon 
the cacao crop. 
Organization of work 
This study has nine chapters. The first deals with the 
problem of cacao plant diseases from an international 
perspective. The chapter identifies and discusses a variety 
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of fungi, micro-organisms and insect-borne diseases that have 
afflicted cacao farms in Ghana and elsewhere in the tropics 
over time. The chapter also offers a comparative survey of 
plant diseases that have ruined cacao estates in selected 
tropical regions in the past. Also considered are the 
theoretical and chronological origins of plant morbidity in 
general to determine whether cacao diseases in Ghana or 
elsewhere were endogenous or exogenous. This chapter also 
evaluates the gravity of pest and disease menace to the cacao 
crop and examined the economic implications of plant diseases 
for agrarian societies. 
The second and third chapters focused on the beginnings 
of cacao disease control programs in Ghana from 1910 to 1943. 
These chapters analyzed the initiatives of the colonial 
Department of Agriculture to extirpate cacao diseases in Ghana 
from 1910 up to 1943. These preliminary ventures laid the 
groundwork for the Cacao Research Station of 1937-1938 to 
build its research work on Capsid insects, the Black Pod 
fungus and after 1936, the cacao Swollen Shoot virus. The 
strategies which the Agricultural Department recommended to 
farmers to suppress these biological hazards provided the 
basis for examination in this part of the study. 
Chapter four considers the emergence and objectives of 
the West African Cacao Research Institute in Ghana between 
1939 and 1944. This section dealt with British initiatives 
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during World War II to eliminate cacao pathogens from its 
Ghanaian colony and British West Africa in general. The 
analysis outlines the dynamics of state involvement in the 
fight against cacao pathogens in Ghana. The government's use 
of trained research personnel, particularly biochemists, 
entomologists, agronomists, mycologists and virologists were 
examined to show the changing patterns of state efforts to 
curb cacao plant diseases in the West African rain forest. 
Chapter five explains the government's post-war emergency 
programs to eradicate the cacao Swollen Shoot epidemic. 
However, as chapters six and seven have shown, Ghanaian 
nationalists politicized the government's Swollen Shoot 
control programs because of the rising tide of nationalism in 
the colony. Political disturbances in Ghana after World War 
II arose in part from government recommendations to cut out 
diseased trees. The cut-out order, to some degree, determined 
the course of Ghanaian rural and nationalist politics prior to 
self rule in 1957. The dynamics of rural unrest and their 
significance in the nation-wide political agitation for self 
determination is therefore explicated within the context of 
the cacao plant virus problem. Decolonization in Ghana was 
therefore not uniquely urban in character. There were strong 
undercurrents of agrarian discontent in the movement towards 
self rule in the former British Gold Coast colony that is 
today Ghana. 
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The political upheavals created a turning point in the 
government's program of cacao disease control. In 1948, 
commissions of enquiry from Britain, the Food and Agricultural 
Organization of the United Nations and that of Justice Arko 
Korsah in 1951, outlined research possibilities and stressed 
the best means to eradicate the cacao plant pathogens in 
Ghana. This crucial turning point in the agricultural history 
of Ghana paved the way for the suppression of cacao pathogens 
in Ghana under state auspices up to 1966. 
The rest of this study —chapters eight and nine— 
considered the flow of research findings from the Cacao 
Research Institute through the Ministry of Agriculture to 
cacao cultivators in Ghana's forest belt. The dissemination 
of research information, the movement of chemicals, spraying 
equipment and compensation payments to farmers who lost their 
cacao trees to the cutting out programs are some of the issues 
addressed in this segment. The extent to which the Cacao 
Research Institute and the Department of Agriculture assisted 
the state to overcome the destructive effects of cacao 
diseases have received critical evaluation in the final 
chapter. 
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Endnotes 
T^he gene-center of the cacao plant is the Upper Amazon 
valley in South America. According to an Aztec legend, the 
cacao tree originated in paradise where it grew in the garden 
of one of the gods. From here the tree reached the earth for 
man's delight. For this reason, a Swedish scientist gave the 
plant its botanical name, Theobroma Cacao, the Greek for "Food 
of the Gods." See for example, L. A. Are, Cacao in West Africa 
(New York & London: Pergamon Press, 1975), 5-6; R. Whymper, 
Cocoa and Chocolate : Their Chemistry and Manufacture (London: 
J.A. Churchill, 1912), 4; C. J. J. Van Hall, Cocoa ( London; 
McMillan and Company Limited, 1941), 1; Eileen M. Chatt, 
Cocoa (New York; Interscience Publishers Incorporated, 1953), 
5; and "Golden Harvest." Information Services Department 
(Accra, Gold Coast; Government Printing Press, 1953), 1. 
For its special delicacy, cacao has attracted various 
epithets such as the "Golden Bean," see John Phillips, Kwame 
Nkrumah and the Future of Africa (New York: Frederick Praeger 
Publishers, i960), 84; another author has described it as "the 
magic of the golden pod of cocoa," see S. La Anyane, Ghana 
Agriculture - Its Economic Development From Early Times to the 
Middle of the Twentieth Century (London; Oxford University 
Press. 1963). 4, 38-39, and 100. 
Perhaps, the most vivid terms are those of Michael Dei 
Anang. Parts of his narrative reads: "These gold-bearing 
trees,"; "[t]hese golden pods make a drink surpassing all 
beverages in richness and sustaining power. This is an 
ambrosia of the gods celebrated in ancient song," and "These 
far-fetched seeds of Gold,"; "These pods that bear the colour 
of gold...are by the Spanish called cacao." See his, "Cocoa 
Comes to Mampong," in Part VIII of Wavwardlines From Africa. A 
Collection of Poems (Nendeln-Liechtenstein, Germany; Krause 
Reprint, A Division of Krause-Themison Organization Limited, 
1970), 11, 20-21. 
One poem compares the cacao beverage in glowing terms 
with tea and coffee. According to one Enrique Perez 
Guitierez: 
Beside a cup of tea we chat, 
Beside one of coffee, we argue; 
With a cup of chocolate, we all—children, 
adults, and older folk - feel the 
pleasure of life. 
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In Sarah Jeannette Scheer, The Oil Syndrome and Agricultural 
Development (New York: Praeger Special Studies, Praeger 
Scientific Publications, 1985), 66; see also Arthur W. Knapp, 
The Cocoa and Chocolate Industry (London: Sir Isaac Pitman and 
Sons Limited, 1923), 6. 
T^wo agricultural scientists provided this estimate: H. 
C. Evans and C. Prior, "Cocoa Pod Diseases; Causal Agents and 
Control," Outlook on Agriculture (hereafter O. A) 16 no.l 
(1987): 35. However, the financial loss to Ghana from cacao 
diseases cannot be measured accurately: see for example, 
Harrison G. Wehner, Jr., "The Supply Function of Ghanaian 
Cacao: A Comment," Journal of Farm Economics (Hereafter J. F. 
Ei) 18 no.2 (May, 1966): 467. 
Nigeria, like Ghana, has historically confronted severe 
cacao diseases: see Michael Watts and Robert Shanton, in "The 
State and Agrarian Transformation in Nigeria," in The 
Politics of Agriculture, ed. Jonathan Parker (London: Sage 
Publication Incorporated, 1984): 176. 
A^lan B. Mountjoy and David Hilling, Africa: Geography 
and Development (London: Barnes and Noble Books, 1988), 238-9. 
G^hana's total land area under cultivation has changed 
over the years. In 1944, estimated acreage of land in Ghana 
amounted to 59,000,000, with 29 percent in the rain forest. 
H. B. Waters, "Agriculture in the Gold Coast," Empire Journal 
of Experimental Agriculture (Hereafter E. J. E. A.). 12 no.46 
(April, 1944): 8. 
In 1956, another source indicated that of Ghana's 91,843 
square miles of territory, only 9 percent of the 31,000 square 
miles of rain forest was under cacao planting: D. H. Urquhart, 
Cocoa (London: Longman's Green and Company, 1958), 103. Two 
years later. The United States Department of Agriculture (U. 
S. D. A.), placed Ghana's total land area under cacao at 
3,954,000 acres: see, "Ghana's Agricultural Trade in Farm 
Products," Foreign Agricultural Service (Hereafter, F. A. S.) 
U. S. D. A. M. 34 (Washington D. C.: Government Printing 
Department, April 1958), 13; (available at the Land Tenure 
Center, University of Wisconsin, Madison). 
In 1981, the acreage under cacao had grown to 4,100,000: 
see "Ghana - Hopeful Signs," The Courier no.66 (March-April, 
1981), 28 (available at the Land Tenure Center at the 
University of Wisconsin at Madison) The latest available 
estimate is 1.87 million acres: see Mountjoy et al. Africa 
(1988), 238-9. 
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Land acreage devoted to cacao planting in Ghana has been 
estimated regionally as follows: Ashanti Region: 1,580,635; 
Brong Ahafo: 1,003,992; Eastern: 549,201; Central: 424,333; 
Western: 317,653; and for the Volta Region: 348,463. The 
total resources in land under cacao production is 4,224,227: 
cited from E. N. Omaboe and I. Neustadt, The Economy of Ghana. 
Vol I. (London: Alex and Darwin, London 1966), 237. 
In 1976, Ghana's land area was estimated at 91,843 square 
miles. The formal incorporation of the former British 
mandated Trans Volta territory after World War I accounted for 
the difference, although the two colonies were administered 
jointly after World War I. See, for example Ghana ; Background 
Notes (Bureau of Public Affairs, U. S. Department of State, 
January 1976), 3. (also available at the Land Tenure Center, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison). 
5Ghana's economic well being is historically tied to 
cacao. See for example. Anonymous, "The World's Cacao," 
Agricultural News (Hereafter A. N.) 16 no.406 (November, 
1917), 363; and Anonymous, "The Gold Coast Cacao Industry," 
Tropical Agriculture (Hereafter T. A.) 12 no.12 (July, 1935): 
311-2. These sources have shown that between 1923 and 1932, 
the cacao crop accounted for 77 percent of Ghana's total 
exports. The commodity also represented 95 percent of the 
nation's agricultural exports. This trend still applies today. 
By 1966, cacao was still the major source of taxation to 
finance development programs in Ghana. 
*Paladino Paolo, "Science for Whom?": Agricultural 
Development and the Theory of Induced Innovation, Agriculture 
and Human Values (Hereafter A. H. V.) (Spring-Summer, 1987): 
53-64. Yujiro Hayami and Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural 
Development. An International Perspective (The John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore & London, 1985), 79. 
T^he concept of state which appears here synonymously as 
"political entrepreneurs," is an operational definition 
derived from Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Maunsbach, The 
State. Conceptual Chaos and the Future of International 
Relations Theory (Boulder & London: The University of Denver, 
1989), 54-60. 
In the "Many Meanings of the State," the analyses 
perceive the state among dozens of other definitions, as 
"government," "bureaucratic politics" and "executive." 
®The concepts, scientific sphere. external sector etc. 
are the author's own formulations based on a re-appraisal of 
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the analytical approach adopted in A. G. Hopkin's, ^  Economic 
History of West Africa (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University 
Press, 1973), chapters 1 & 2 which dwelt on "The Domestic 
Economy: Structure and Function," and "The External Trade: the 
Sahara and the Atlantic." 
See also, Robert Szereszewski's Ph.D dissertation 
submitted to the University of London, England in 1964, 6-9, 
12, 34, & 54 and Jan S. Hogendorn, "Economic Initiative and 
African Cash Farming: Pre-Colonial Origins and Early Colonial 
Developments," in Colonialism in Africa, ed. Peter Duignan and 
L. H. Gann 4 (1975): 284. 
'Polly Hill, Migrant Cocoa Farmers in Southern Ghana 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 21. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The role of indigenous Ghanaian farmers in the creation 
of Ghana's cacao economy has attracted considerable 
documentation.' However, government-sponsored projects to 
eradicate cacao plant diseases have virtually remained a terra 
incognita in African historiography. On this account, sharply 
contradictory views have appeared in the existing literature 
regarding state support, particularly under colonial rule, to 
cacao production. 
Kwame Nkrumah, a Ghanaian nationalist politician in I 
Speak of Freedom (1957), and George Padmore, a noted Pan-
Africanist, along with several social scientists including 
Polly Hill, Barbara Ingham and G. B. Kay have ascribed the 
emergence in Ghana of the world's greatest cacao economy 
solely to migrant farmers. This school of thought failed to 
explore literature in the natural sciences to explicate social 
phenomena in Ghana. This omission has entrenched the view 
that the state restricted itself solely to the collection of 
cacao excise taxes and left the cultivation of the crop to 
rural Ghanaians in the forest belt.^  A second category of 
sources, including Kwamina B. Dickson's Historical Geography 
of Ghana and Alan McPhee's Economic Revolution in British 
West Africa have viewed government involvement as crucial to 
cacao growing. 
Despite their apparent adversarial position with the 
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aforementioned school of thought, this latter group of social 
scientists like the former, excluded evidence from scientific 
sources to support their perceptions.^  Scholarly publications 
in the natural sciences provide detailed and reliable data on 
state-sponsored research into the most dependable means to 
extirpate cacao diseases in Ghana. These scientific sources, 
however, have their limitations. Though readable, they tend 
to be extremely technical for the average reader. 
Government ordinances and reports from Ghana's 
Agricultural Department and the erstwhile West African Cacao 
Research Institute (WACRI) have examined various facets of 
cacao pathogens in the period under review. But while the 
legal enactments impressively spelt out the laws governing 
disease control policy, they failed to present any evidence on 
their impact in Ghana. The yearly reports of the Agricultural 
Department helped to evaluate the department's beginnings, 
progress and difficulties in controlling cacao diseases in 
Ghana from the early twentieth century to date. These reports 
could not be evaluated independently with other primary 
sources of comparative depth and have remained at best as a 
lop-sided presentation on the role of the state in fighting 
plant pests and diseases in Ghana. 
The aforementioned deficiencies were not altogether 
irremediable. Accounts from various farm magazines, 
especially Foreign Agriculture. World Crops. Agricultural 
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News. Tropical Agriculture. and The Gold Coast Farmer and The 
Ghana Farmer have served to evaluate various government 
policies and projects on cacao pathogens in Ghana from the 
early twentieth century. World Bank reports and publications 
from the Food and Agriculture Organization also provided 
independent evaluations on the cacao disease problems after 
1945. These sources considerably counter-balanced the 
inherent dangers of depending heavily upon colonial and post-
colonial government documents on Ghana's cacao disease control 
programs. 
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Endnotes 
T^he outpouring of literature on various aspects of 
Ghana's cacao economy is extensive. A sample of these sources 
proved useful for this work. See, for example, C. G. 
Bhatacharya and P. N. Potakey, "A Study of Cocoa Farming and 
Cocoa Farmers in the Eastern Region of Ghana Using an 
Integrated Household Survey," Technical Publication Series 
no.18. Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research 
(Accra; University of Ghana, 1969); Polly Hill, Studies in 
Rural Capitalism in West Africa (London; Cambridge University 
Press, 1970); Raymond Bixler, The West African Cocoa Story 
(New York, N. Y: Vantage Press, 1972); and more recently, 
Christine Okali, Cocoa and Kinship; the Matrilineal Akan of 
Ghana (London; Kegan Paul International, 1983). 
K^wame Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom (New York, N.Y; 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 83. See also the author's Ghana; 
The Autobioaraphv of Kwame Nkrumah (New York, N.Y; Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1957), 23. 
S^tate-sponsored scientific agricultural research to 
protect cacao pathogens in Ghana has attracted a myriad of 
controversial views. Apart from Nkrumah, George Padmore, a 
Pan-Africanist stated similar views. See, George Padmore, The 
Gold Coast Revolution (London: Dennis Dobson Limited, 1958), 
197. 
Until his death in Ghana in the early 1960s, he remained 
a close confidant of Ghana's first President, Kwame Nkrumah. 
Over the years, these perceptions assumed the forms and 
force of ex cathedra statements and several social scientists 
have willy-nilly supported these assertions. See for example, 
Polly Hill, Migrant Cacao Farmers in Southern Ghana (London; 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), 11.; G. B. Kay, The 
Political Economy of Colonialism; A Collection of Documents 
and Statistics; 1900-1960 (London: Cambridge University 
Press), 6; Barbara Ingham, Tropical Exports and Economic 
Development (London; McMillan Press, 1981), 13-14. 
The same views have appeared in the underlisted works, 
which like all other sources, completely ignored government 
initiatives to eradicate cacao pathogens from Ghana's rain 
forest; Andrejs Krassowski, Development and the Debt Trap 
(London: Croom Helm Limited, The Overseas Development 
Institute, 1974), 5; Christopher Gunnarson, The Gold Coast 
Industry; 1900-1939 ; Production Prices and Structural Change 
(Printed in Sweden: A. V. Centralen Lund, 1978), 14; see also, 
R. H. Green and S. H. Hymer, Cocoa in the Gold Coast: A Study 
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in the Relations Between African Farmers and Agricultural 
Experts," Journal of Economic History. 31 (September 1966): 
299-319; Crawford Young, Neal P. Sherman and Tim H. Rose, 
Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana 
and Uganda (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 
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Dewey and A. G. Hopkins, (London: Athlone Press, University of 
London, 1978), 397. 
Other scholars whose works appear below, have viewed 
state participation as crucial to cacao growing in Ghana. The 
reader is warned that like their opponents, their 
interpretations were not derived from any in-depth analytical 
studies on the incidence and control of cacao diseases in the 
country. See for example, Alan Mcphee, The Economic 
Revolution in British West Africa (London; Frank Cass and 
Company Limited, 1971), 41; Arthur W. Knapp, The Cocoa and 
Chocolate Industry (London: Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited, 
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University of Wisconsin, Madison). 
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Earliest Times to the Middle of the Twentieth Century (London: 
Oxford Universities Press, 1969), 169-170; Kwamina B. Dickson, 
A Historical Geography of Ghana (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1969), 169-170. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Prior to the actual research, the author systematically 
searched for biological terms in entomology, mycology, 
virology and plant pathology in order to delineate the 
technical terms entailed in this project with accuracy and 
precision. Using this tool as a starting point, the author 
closely studied the available literature on Ghana's 
agricultural history and politics from 1910 to 1966 in order 
to place the role of the state on cacao disease control into 
its precise chronological and socio-economic context. 
The collection and analysis of data for this study 
involved the identification of relevant primary documents on 
Ghanaian agricultural and administrative history. These 
documents included British Colonial Office records and 
correspondence pertaining to cacao plant diseases, annual 
reports and bulletins of the Gold Coast Department of 
Agriculture (later Ghana's Agricultural Ministry) Ghanaian 
parliamentary debates on Swollen Shoot control and the 
findings of committees of enquiry into cacao diseases in 
Ghana. Pertinent information in secondary sources on cacao 
pathogens were matched with a wide variety of primary source 
materials from farm magazines and journals, agricultural 
reports, and colonial office records. This methodology helped 
to approach the containment of cacao diseases from the 
perspectives of both the natural sciences and the humanities. 
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The procedure also served to determine and build an accurate 
picture of government perceptions and response to the cacao 
disease menace in Ghana from 1910 to 1966. 
The author then integrated, synthesized and organized the 
assortment of sources chronologically, paying particular 
attention to historical turning points. These turning points 
included the period when the state acknowledged the disease 
problem in the first decade of the twentieth century. In this 
phase, the government's department of agriculture advised 
farmers on disease eradication without any scientific backing. 
After 1925, modest research efforts into entomological and 
mycological hazards in the cacao plantations commenced in the 
Eastern Province of Ghana. Similarly, virologists in the 
colonial Department of Agriculture intensified research after 
1936 into the bionomics of the cacao Swollen Shoot virus in 
Ghana. Generally, the period from 1925 to 1943 may be 
characterized as the era of scientific research without 
practice. A significant turning point in the fight against 
cacao disease occurred after 1944 with the creation of the 
West African Cacao Research Institute. At this historical 
stage, the state sponsored research into cacao morbidity and 
implemented the results in the field with remarkable 
consistency. 
The highlight on turning points held a distinct 
advantage. It helped to sharpen the analysis on how the 
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application of scientific research into the larger society 
unleashed political turbulence in Ghana after 1948. The 
creation of commissions of enquiry directed and focused 
research on how best to cope with the public relations 
component of the application of research findings in the 
larger Ghanaian society. 
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I THE PROBLEM OF CACAO PLANT DISEASES FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
Cacao in the World Economy 
Cacao has been an article of international commerce since 
the sixteenth century J In the modern world, the crop 
provides a classic example of global labor specialization and 
economic inter-dependency. Today, cacao is produced in 
tropical agrarian societies and manufactured in temperate 
industrialized regions. From the production side, millions of 
farmers cultivate cacao in tropical countries. The 
geographical zone of West Africa is the major cacao producer 
in the world. Nearly 80 percent of global output comes from 
Ghana, Cote D'Ivoire, Brazil, Nigeria and Cameroon. 
Production in these countries, along with those from Papua New 
Guinea, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, accounts for 90 
percent of world output.% The rest emanates from the 
neotropical countries of Ecuador, Panama, Columbia and 
Venezuela along with the Caribbean countries of Grenada, 
Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago. In Asia, cacao farms also thrive 
in Ceylon, Indonesia, the Philippines, Samoa and lately 
Malaysia. 
Cacao cultivation in agrarian cultures depends upon 
markets in industrialized nations for its viability. North 
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America and Western Europe import about 80 percent of the 
world's raw cacao. Eastern European and Far Eastern markets 
absorb the rest. Historically, the United States, commanding 
about 25 percent of the market, has remained the world's 
foremost importer and consumer of cacao. The former Federal 
Republic of Germany, Holland, the United Kingdom, the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European states are also important 
consumers.^  
A few industrial companies dominate the manufacture of 
cocoa products in each of the main consuming countries. In 
the U.S., the biggest cacao manufacturing corporations have 
been Hershey Foods Corporation, Mars Incorporated, General 
Foods Corporation and W. R. Grace and Company. In the United 
Kingdom, Cadbury-Schweppes Limited, Rountree Mackintosh 
Limited and the U.K. Biscuit Holdings Limited are the major 
producers. In Switzerland, the established cocoa 
manufacturers are Nestle and Interfood Corporation.* 
A chain of subsidiary firms service these manufacturing 
plants. These firms purchase cacao from producer nations, 
cover the costs of insurance, freight, warehousing and the 
eventual distribution of the commodity to manufacturers. A 
network of brokers buy manufactured cacao in bulk for shipment 
to distributors and consumers throughout the world. These 
diverse economic operations provide employment for hundreds of 
thousands of individuals world-wide. To Ghana and other major 
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producers, cacao is a cash crop that earns hard currency from 
world markets to finance internal economic programs. Since 
colonial times, cacao revenues have virtually underwritten 
most of Ghana's development projects.^  The crop's 
significance as an international commodity is therefore 
apparent from the production and consumption aspects. 
Consequently, if plant pests and diseases are able to 
restrict cacao output significantly, producer countries like 
Ghana, would face considerable economic insolvency. Given the 
intricate network and mechanisms of the global economy, 
enterprises that purchase, manufacture and redistribute the 
cocoa products in the larger world economy, would undergo 
economic stagnation.* Indeed, cacao cultivation in tropical 
countries, over the last three hundred years, has also 
signified a permanent struggle to overcome numerous cacao 
plant pests and diseases. Originally considered as "Food of 
the Gods", the cacao tree, is subject to a variety of insect, 
fungi and virus attacks. Rodents, particularly monkeys, birds 
and many zoological forms have caused havoc to the crop, 
reducing this idealized "Food of the Gods" to food for vermin. 
Thus, cacao conforms to an unwritten biological law that every 
organism is subject to its genetic condition and the external 
environment.^  
Cacao diseases fall under four major categories: 
entomological, virological, vertebral and mycological. Of 
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these, fungal (mycological) diseases are perhaps the most 
varied and complex. Insect attacks on the cacao tree are no 
less significant. An entomologist, P. F. Entwistle, has 
indicated that over 1,500 different insect species feed on 
cacao.® Of these, however, probably less than 2 percent have 
become major pests of economic importance. Capsids or mirids, 
have been the most dangerous insects whose feeding habits 
severely damage the stem tissue of the cacao tree. Capsids 
are prevalent in the rain forest of Africa, the Caribbean, 
Central and South America where cacao grows.' 
Several viruses also afflict cacao. One such example is 
the virulent Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus. First noted in Ghana 
in 1936, this plant virus is now present in Nigeria, Cote 
D'Ivoire, and Liberia, though less significant in the Western 
Hemisphere and Asia. Other cacao plant viruses are listed as 
the Cacao Mottle Leaf Virus, Cacao Yellow Mosaic Virus, the 
Ceylon Cacao Necrosis Virus and the Cacao Trinidad Virus. 
These viruses vary in terms of disease symptoms, 
characteristics, geographical spread and economic 
significance. In the main, however, these plant pathogens are 
tree-killing diseases against which few cacao species have any 
form of resistance.^  
Vertebrates, or rodents, represent another category of 
cacao plant pests in tropical countries. Vertebrates that 
have historically ravaged cacao farms to the present, have 
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been bats, birds, the field mouse and monkeys. Parrots, 
woodpeckers, rats, squirrels and flying foxes have especially 
caused considerable spoliation among cacao trees in the 
tropics." The problem arises because many animal groups find 
the sugary pulp surrounding the raw beans in the cacao pod 
attractive.12 In 1912, for example, squirrels fed intensively 
on cacao in Sri Lanka. In 1914, rodent attacks on cacao in 
the Portuguese West African island of Sao Thome proved 
particularly extensive. In 1952, Sierra Leone cacao suffered 
an unprecedented 25 percent loss from monkey depredations. 
In Ghana, rodents have continually damaged cacao pods 
since the plant's introduction in 1879. In the 1961-2 crop 
season, the percentage of loss to rodents came to 11 percent 
of total annual yield. Nigeria, Ghana's West African 
neighbor, has reported similar yearly losses to rodents 
ranging up to 15 percent.^  These West African examples of 
vertebrate damage to cacao is also true of the Pacific. In 
Sabah, now part of modern Malaysia, yearly losses due to 
rodents have ranged between 3-6 percent.^  
Most cacao diseases have emanated from fungal attacks, 
resulting in an economic loss of about 30 percent of the crop. 
In Cameroon, the Black Pod fungal disease is an ever-present 
problem, afflicting between 20-80 percent of the pods. 
Nigeria, like other cacao producers, has suffered 
persistently, especially in 1955, from the Black Pod fungal 
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d i s e a s e I n  19 3 4 ,  H .  R .  B r i t o n - J o n e s ,  a  Br i t i s h  p l a n t  
pathologist, published pertinent findings on cacao fungus 
diseases. This publication confirmed that, the Phytophthora 
Palmivora, the fungus which caused the Black Pod disease, was 
common in cacao growing nations. The Palmivora afflicted 
every part of the cacao plant. This fungus have also attacked 
most crops of economic importance, especially coconuts, cotton 
and citrus trees. 
The list of fungal diseases Briton-Jones and others have 
discussed is extensive.^ ® One more example of a fungus disease 
is the Thread Blight fungus. In 1925, H. A. Dade, a 
government mycologist in Ghana, expressed concern about the 
heavy infections it caused to some cacao farms, sometimes to 
the extent of 100 percent.There is also the Pink Fungal 
Disease which has attacked cacao and over one hundred and 
forty other plants on a global scale. On cacao, the fungus 
grew on the bark of the tree and then penetrated the plant 
tissue. The cacao bark would then split and slough away from 
the wood. When old, the tree would develop numerous cracks. 
Malaysian plant pathologists have described the disease as the 
"Writing Fungus," because to them, the fissures it creates 
resembled hieroglyphic writing. 
Two other authors, G. Frolich and W. Rodewald have 
discussed other fungi types which have damaged cacao and other 
economically important plants over time. Three of these 
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pathogenic fungi were the Diplodia, Anthracnose and the 
Thielaviopsis Pod rot. Diplodia, or the charcoal rot cacao 
disease arises from a fungus, Diplodia Theobromae. 
Distributed world-wide, the fungus parasitized several plant 
hosts. In cacao, Diplodia destroyed cacao plant budding and 
shoots. A heavy infection usually defoliated the tree 
completely.21 The Thielaviopsis fungus, caused the 
Thielaviopsis cacao pod rot disease. The pathogen, first 
noted in Ecuador, is present in Costa Rica. This fungus has a 
much wider geographical distribution. Bird activity in cacao 
plantations, and infrequent harvesting helped the disease to 
take a heavy toll of the crop. The fungus would usually 
penetrate the cacao fruit through any wounds birds might have 
inflicted. In the process, the wall of an infected pod 
rapidly would weaken and could be crushed like an egg-shell. 
Other fungus types attacked the cacao roots. H. A. Dade, gave 
the name "collar crack" to the Armillaria Root fungus after a 
careful study of it in Ghana and Togo after World War I. The 
affliction here is basically root rot. By this means, the 
fungus destroyed the root system which eventually killed the 
cacao tree. 
Apart from the plantations, cacao stored away in 
warehouses was subject to fungal and insect damage. In 1963, 
a mycologist from the Food and Agricultural Organization 
discussed diseases among cacao in warehouses awaiting shipment 
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to manufacturers overseas. The insects involved, the Ephestia 
Elutella, Cadra Cantella, the Cigarette Beetle and their 
larvae have persisted in both tropical and temperate 
warehouses. Since stacked cacao re-absorbed water at room 
temperature, they generally developed molds. These in turn, 
have jeopardized the commercial quality of the raw cacao beans 
from past to present. 
Because of its value as an international commodity, cacao 
diseases have global economic implications. Diseases destroy 
crop quality. Bacteriological agencies might trigger 
undesirable enzymic processes and chemical reactions within 
the plant's tissues. Fungi and other forms of bacteria 
distort the appearance, color, odor, and flavor of the 
produce, and might render it altogether worthless to the 
consumer. Moreover, the presence of other micro-organisms in 
the crop, may pose a public hazard because they produce toxic 
metabolites within cacao which induced enteric diseases. 
Financially, it must be reiterated, that crop loss due to 
cacao fungus disease alone range from 10 to 30 percent or 1.8 
million tons, the equivalent of $2.6 billion yearly. If 
successfully controlled, cacao producer nations, like Ghana, 
would be assured of steady incomes for economic improvements. 
The economic implications of plant diseases on a global 
scale are enormous. In the mid-1960s when this study ends, 
pests, insects, weeds and mammals of all kinds destroyed about 
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35 percent of the world crop output. When post-harvest losses 
are added, the figure rose to 48 percent. For Africa and 
other societies dependent upon export agriculture, the need to 
control plant diseases is paramount. 
The origin of plant diseases is not certain. From 
Pliny's Natural History in 79 A.D., agriculture in the ancient 
world took a toll from plant diseases.^ * This means plant 
morbidity has a long history. What is clear is that plant 
diseases generally arise from endogenous and exogenous 
factors. An entomologist, R. C. Shaddock, has maintained that 
ecosystems always attain a balance among diverse animal and 
plant species in the natural forest. However, when farmers 
clear the land to farm a single crop, pathogenic micro­
organisms that previously fed on several plants in the natural 
forest now consume the farm crop. In essence, the planting of 
a vast extension of terrain with selected crops, always 
offered favorable conditions to the pests to multiply. 
Plant diseases could also be exogenous. Though plant 
pathogens occur in natural plant communities, they seldom 
reach epidemic proportions. The co-evolution of the host and 
parasite over a long time frame always produced some degree of 
co-existence among plants and animals in the natural forest. 
The introduction of exotic pathogens into the natural forest 
often resulted in plant epidemics because no natural 
equilibrium has emerged between the new host plant and endemic 
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diseases.Conversely, some pest problems have occurred when 
exotic crops reached new biotic communities. The new crop 
usually attracted predators or parasites in the new ecosystem. 
These parasites or predators may become serious pests mainly 
because the newly introduced species lack natural resistance 
to potential diseases. Again, human commerce and migration 
helped to transfer crops, and in the process, inadvertently 
introduced plant pests and diseases across time and space. 
Also, vertebrates have disseminated plant morbidity 
geographically when they fed on the crop and dispersed the 
seeds along with the disease.28 
This overview has shown that plant pests and diseases 
pose serious difficulties to cacao growers in the tropics. 
The impact of cacao diseases in Central and South America and 
the Caribbean lends further support to these assertions. 
Cacao originated from the tropical forest of the Upper Amazon 
basin in South America. The demand in Europe for cacao in the 
seventeenth century encouraged European planters to develop 
cacao plantations in the neotropics and in the Asian islands 
of Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
Because of the slave trade, no European nation encouraged 
cacao planting in Africa until the nineteenth century. During 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when zoological and 
biological forms spread across the world, Europeans emphasized 
plantation systems in the tropics to support exotic crops. 
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These agricultural operations, in turn, required labor inputs 
which generally came from African slave labor.From the 
sixteenth to the early nineteenth century, African kingdoms 
remained in a state of war to satisfy European demand for 
slaves. The pre-occupation to secure African manpower for 
farm work in the neotropics voided the emergence of commercial 
cacao farming in Africa until colonial rule in the 1880s. 
The introduction of cacao to the West African island of 
Fernando Po dates to 1822 when African manpower export was in 
abeyance and Europe required agricultural raw materials for 
industrial purposes. Despite the late start. West Africa 
later dominated world cacao production. The ruinous impact of 
diseases in the older cacao growing countries of the Western 
Hemisphere made this possible. For example, by the early 
twentieth century, over 80 percent of the world cacao crop 
came from the neotropics and less than 1 percent from Africa. 
Today, West Africa produces nearly 80 percent of the crop. 
A brief historical survey of the nature and impact of 
specific cacao diseases from selected countries in the Western 
Hemisphere is offered here. Ecuador provided a classic 
example. From 1740 to 1895, this country was the world's 
principal cacao producer. However, by 1950, Ecuador, with 
15,000 tons could only supply 3 percent of world output 
compared to 37,000 tons at the beginning of World War I. This 
sudden drop in output emanated from two deadly cacao fungal 
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diseases: the Monilia Pod Rot, which struck in 1917 and the 
Witchbroom disease, officially noted in 1927. The two plant 
pathogens caused such havoc that many cacao planters 
inevitably abandoned their farms.^  ^
The Ecuador example compared with similar developments 
among cacao plantations in Surinam. Surinam, also in South 
America, originally exported small quantities of cacao in 
1725, and reached an annual average productive capacity of 
10,000,000 pounds from 1870 to 1895. But within the period 
between 1905 and 1912, Surinam cacao almost vanished from the 
international market. The destructive effects of the 
Witchbroom plant disease was the causative factor. Eventually 
as in Ecuador, farmers cleared their cacao fields in favor of 
banana and coffee plantations.^  ^
Such was the gravity of Witchbroom cacao disease in the 
Western Hemisphere that the state government of St. Lucia and 
other countries in the Western hemisphere enacted ordinances 
against the introduction of cacao diseases from neighboring 
Latin American countries. The introductory part of the legal 
instrument stated: 
Whereas it has been represented to me by the 
Imperial Department of Agriculture for the West 
Indies that a fungoid disease known as the 
Witchbroom is a serious enemy to cacao plantations 
and it is important that the disease should be kept 
out of all cacao growing areas in the West Indies... 
The proclamation, then detailed the gravity of the blight and 
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its intended remedy with the words: 
And, whereas the same disease has lately appeared in 
Surinam, and it is believed to be gradually 
spreading over cacao cultivated areas of the 
continent of South America, now therefore, I, Harry 
Langhorne ... Administrator of the Island of St. 
Lucia, in virtue of the power and authority in me 
vested by the Plant Protection Ordinance, 1895, do 
hereby prohibit from the date hereof until further 
notice, the importation into this colony directly or 
indirectly from the continent of South America, and 
East and South of the Isthmus of Panama, of any 
cacao plants or parts or portions whatever of the 
cacao tree. 
The recourse to legal enactments failed to stop the 
spread of biological hazards to cacao in the neotropics. The 
Witchbroom disease destroyed several South American cacao 
economies. Venezuela provided one such example. This country 
was then the world's leading supplier of cacao until Ecuador 
later out-produced it. Production in Venezuela peaked between 
1923 and 1925, when it exported approximately 22,000 tons of 
cacao. But owing to the Witchbroom disease, Venezuelan cacao 
exports fell drastically.^  ^ The same experience applied to 
cacao farms in British Guiana. Also an important cacao 
producer, exports from British Guiana declined gradually from 
1923 to 1930. As in Venezuela, the incidence of the 
Witchbroom cacao fungus disease was chiefly responsible for 
the decline.'® 
Further examples abound. In Colombia, a cacao disease, 
described as "Buba" or "Cushion gall" became prevalent in 
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1938. The disease appeared in ten other countries in South 
and Central America. The "Buba" which sterilized the plant's 
floral cushion, created concern in western Colombia, Nicaragua 
and Costa Rica, where it was most visible. The cause of the 
cushion gall disease is unknown. However, it is attributed to 
a variety of causes ranging from virus infections, the 
depredations of eriophyid mites, genetic abnormalities, 
mineral deficiency, mineral toxicity, bacterial and fungal 
infections.^  
A similar situation applied to Brazil. Here, the 
Portuguese introduced cacao in 1749 into the state of Bahia, 
which to date produces 96 percent of the country's yearly 
output. But Brazilian cacao, as in Ghana, has suffered from 
Capsid pest attacks. The Monalion Bondari and Molanion 
Parviventre Bahiense Capsid species have been the most deadly. 
Graf ants, or the Azteca paraensis, and leaf-cutting ants, the 
Alta Cephalotes, along with leaf beetles like Wodonota 
Theobromae and Cacarema, have continually destroyed cacao 
fruits and defoliated the plant's branches. Brazilian cacao 
also suffers from the Black Pod disease. Locally known as 
Brown Rot, this disease is historically the worst cacao 
pathogen in Brazil accounting for some 30 percent of crop loss 
in the country. 
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Cacao Disease in Central America and the Caribbean 
In Central America, the six main cacao producing 
countries are Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa 
Rica and Panama. In fact cacao farming in Central America, 
especially in Mexico, had long ante-dated the voyages of 
Christopher Columbus in 1492. As elsewhere in the tropics, 
cacao from these countries has suffered interminably from 
diseases. As in Brazil, the major disease in Central America 
is the Phytophthora Palmivora, a fungal disease that accounted 
for 40 percent of production loss per year in the region. 
While plant diseases have posed difficult problems to 
cacao growers in South and Central America, their dangers in 
the Caribbean have been just as formidable. The older cacao 
growing centers in the West Indies, namely Haiti, Martinique 
and Guadeloupe lost their importance in cacao growing because 
of plant diseases.^ ® Trinidad and Tobago which grew more than 
90 percent of cacao in the British West Indies offers a 
standard example. Lying off the coast of Venezuela, Trinidad, 
along with Grenada and Jamaica produced fine grade cacao. 
Such cacao came from large estates that ranged from 5 to 1,000 
acres." But between 1911 and 1920, the Island's yearly 
average production of 32,500 tons slumped to 18,000, and after 
1946, averaged only 20,000 per annum. The decline in output 
resulted partly from soil exhaustion but principally because 
of the Witchbroom fungus disease which afflicted cacao estates 
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from 1928.'^ ° Beetles added to the havoc when they bored small 
holes through the branches which caused the boughs to fall in 
windy weather. In short, owing to plant pathogens, cacao 
planting in the West Indies declined. 
Introduced to the West African mainland in the 1880s, 
African cultivators produced cacao with family labor, which is 
still the mode of production today. Unlike paid workers, 
family labor minimized the cost of production, which in turn, 
reduced world cacao prices especially in the 1930s and 1940s. 
Cacao producers in the neotropics could not compete partly 
because they used paid wage labor on large plantations. Such 
a mode of production proved unprofitable when cacao diseases 
ravaged the farms. Cacao diseases discouraged new plantings 
and rather compelled many farmers to abandon thousands of 
hectares of valuable land. Most planters actually cleared 
their cacao fields to support other farm crops like fruits in 
Trinidad and coffee in Guatemala. Meanwhile, as cacao trees 
grew older in the Western Hemisphere, they became more 
vulnerable to diseases and cultivators did not replace them 
when they died. 
While African cacao exports increased, disease and lack 
of replanting diminished output in the neotropics. Whereas by 
1800, Latin America produced 80 percent of world cacao, by 
1938-9, the percentage had dipped to 30 percent to date.4% 
Because it was free of cacao diseases, only the area of Bahia 
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in Brazil has remained a major producer of cacao in South 
America. The fate of cacao growing in the Western hemisphere 
clearly illustrates the dangers of plant morbidity and their 
potential economic repercussions. 
The Problem of Cacao Diseases in Africa 
Although the greatest cacao growing region in the world, 
West Africa is also subject to the dangers of cacao plant 
diseases. When introduced into Western Africa in the late 
nineteenth century, cacao for sometime remained free from 
pests. Before World War 1, however, a different situation 
emerged.^ " Since 1910, three Capsid insect species, 
Sahlbergella Singularis, Sahlbergella Distantiella and the 
Helopeltis have extensively impaired cacao trees in Ghana. 
From 1936 to date, a plant disease, the Swollen Shoot virus 
heavily destroyed cacao plants in the country. This 
phenomenon compelled the government of Ghana to order the 
destruction of more than a 100,000,000 trees from 1944 to 
1962.44 
To eradicate the disease, the government resorted to 
several devices, involving agricultural science research, the 
use of pesticides and a disbursement of funds to compensate 
affected cacao farmers in rural Ghana. This cut-out campaign, 
resulted in considerable economic discontent and political 
disturbances in Ghana especially in 1948. The Capsid, Black 
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Pod and Swollen Shoot diseases are the focus of this work and 
require no elaboration at this stage. 
Suffice it to reiterate that Cacao diseases are not 
peculiar to Ghana. In Cameroon, cacao plantations developed 
on volcanic soil at the foot of the Cameroon mountains. From 
1904 to 1906, the cultivation of the crop in this erstwhile 
German protectorate passed through a crisis when the Brown Pod 
disease ruined about 40 percent of the cacao plants. A 
contemporary farm magazine reported that, "The people became 
discouraged and rubber began to be substituted for cacao... 
As in Ghana, Capsid pests, notably, Sahlbergella Singularis, 
and Sahlbergella Distantiella and the Helopeltis also caused 
extensive ruin.** 
Similarly, Nigeria, a former British West African colony 
possessed by 1949, over 25,000,000 cacao trees spread over 245 
square miles of farmland. Like Ghana, these farms became 
infected with the Swollen Shoot cacao virus which destroyed 
about 10 percent of the trees. Again, Nigeria, like other 
countries in the West African rain forest, has encountered 
difficult problems with the Black Pod and Capsid pest diseases 
up to modern times. 
The former Portuguese West African islands of Sao Thome 
and Principe probably experienced the worst cases of Capsid 
and fungal attacks. The Portuguese introduced the crop to Sao 
Thome in 1822 where farmers took up the plantings vigorously 
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in 1870. The island reached its highest production level of 
32,000 tons in 1912. The figure gradually decreased to 7,200 
per year. The cause of the problem was plant diseases. In 
March, 1909, cacao planters in the island met to discuss the 
issue with considerable concern.^ ® The Colonial Council of 
Lisbon, requested the Portuguese Minister of Colonies to 
dispatch a technical mission to study the diseases and the 
best means to eradicate them. The Portuguese government 
delegated two agronomists, Jose de Almeida and A. Cannas 
Mendes to Sao Thome. They were able to identify the etiology 
of diseased pods and the putrefaction of cacao roots in the 
island. In their view, the fungus Phytophthora Faberi, 
particularly active under wet conditions, was the principal 
cause of cacao pod diseases.^ * 
Henri C. Navel, another agronomist, also examined insect 
pests in Sao Thome and Principe in 1920. He reported that the 
Heliothrips Capsid extracted the juices of the cacao leaves at 
feeding thereby killing the trees. Navel also discovered that 
rodents, especially rats and monkeys were also destructive of 
cacao in the islands. These vertebrates were most active at 
night when the farmers vigilance was most relaxed. The 
creatures generally broke the ripe pods open to suck the 
sugary pulp surrounding the seeds. This activity which 
incapacitated the crop's ability to ferment, subsequently 
resulted in the loss of its commercial worth. Navel also 
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confirmed the presence of the Phytophthora Faberi fungus in 
Sao Thome. The fungus accounted for the Black Rot cacao 
disease. By means of vegetative structures called filaments, 
the fungus penetrated and fed upon the internal tissues of the 
fruit which the produce required for its development. In this 
way, the fungus ultimately rendered the cacao beans altogether 
worthless for commerce.^ " 
The problem of cacao diseases also exist in Cote 
D'Ivoire, the leading cacao exporter in the world today. 
Cacao reached Cote D'Ivoire from Ghana in the late 1890s. But 
unlike Ghana, European concessionaires operating on private 
estates, took up its cultivation for export. Like Ghana, the 
country belatedly established its first agricultural research 
station in 1944. Henri Alibert, an entomologist, researched 
and published his findings on plant diseases in 1951. 
Typifying the West African forest belt, Alibert determined 
that the Heliothrips Capsid insect often damaged cacao trees 
in the country. Such insect depredations permitted the entry 
of the fungus Calonectria Rigidiuscula to wreak further 
havoc. SI 
Historical Case Studies of Cacao Diseases in Asia 
Asian cacao exports have derived mainly from the 
Philippines, the Indonesian island of Java and Sri Lanka. 
Malaysia, Oceania (Samoa) have also exported cacao. It is 
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true that Asian cacao output, compared to the world average, 
has remained insignificant. But it is important to note that 
like the rest of the tropical world, Asia is not exempt from 
the bane of cacao plant pests and diseases. 
In 1680, the Spanish introduced cacao into the 
Philippines. The archipelago until 1898, remained a Spanish 
colony. By 1902, no information existed in print about cacao 
plant diseases in the islands. In 1903, under American rule, 
the Bureau of Government Laboratories in Manila issued a 
bulletin on insect diseases to cacao farmers. The foreword 
of this document noted that, "The publication of this material 
at this time is in response to an urgent demand on the part of 
growers that will help them to combat the more serious 
pests.The injurious insects ranged from those attacking 
cacao roots to those that ravaged the tree's trunk and leaves. 
Large and ferocious black ants, a species of the Cicada 
family, came up as the most destructive insects. The adults 
gnawed the bark from the large roots and caused decay. At the 
same time, the insects created openings for the entry of 
insidious white ants locally known as the Anay, to effect more 
damage. 
Another predaceous insect of the Philippines was the 
culiclic, capable of "destroying nearly every conceivable 
class of material except articles made of metal.The adult, 
measuring about 43 millimeters, has forefeet specially adapted 
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to burrow the ground to the tender roots of the cacao plant. 
The mouth parts of the culiclic served as a lancet which 
pierced the epidermis to suck the plant's sap into its 
stomach. The insect deposited its larva about 10 to 12 
centimeters below ground surface, preferably near the cacao 
roots. The larva gradually worked further downward to about 
80 centimeters clinging tenaciously to the roots. The young 
rootlets are the principal food gathering organs of the tree. 
When the larva consume the moisture in the roots, they 
impaired the plant's ability to secure nutrients and moisture 
for their nourishment.^ " 
Also destructive were lamellicorn beetles which lived 
underground where the cultivator could not disturb them. 
Measuring about nine millimeters, and described as "the 
hardest of insects to combat," the effects of its work only 
became apparent when the tree turned flaccid and totally 
unable to bear fruit. This eventually warns the grower that 
"the tree is being killed by an unseen enemy.Insects that 
have attacked the trunk of the cacao tree also came up for 
discussion. The agricultural bulletin identified the flat-
headed borer of the Ceramycidae family as a major threat. The 
insect gnawed the inside of the tree and was able to reduce 
the trunk to "fibrous sawdust. 
In Java, where the Dutch initiated commercial cacao 
farming, a report appearing in 1908, affirmed that many 
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planters have given up cacao cultivation because of cacao 
diseases. Neither was the disease situation any different in 
the island of Sri Lanka. Here the Helopeltis insect of the 
Capsid variety, attacked the island's cacao farms as they had 
previously done in Madras, South India, and in Malaysia.®® In 
1906, the prevalence of diseases was such that cacao in Sri 
Lanka declined. On June 3, 1907, Herbert Wright, a fellow of 
the Linnean Society (an agricultural association), and the 
controller of the Sri Lanka Experiment Station at Paradeniya, 
declared to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, that over fifty 
insect and fungoid pests are known to attack the cacao 
plants.®' 
Overall, the problem of cacao plant pests and diseases is 
not peculiar to Ghana. This brief historical overview of 
cacao growing countries in the tropics shows that plant 
diseases deserve attention in agricultural historical studies. 
The chapters that follow focus on the effects of the Capsid, 
Black Pod and Swollen Shoot cacao diseases in Ghana from 1910 
to 1966. 
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II "AN INCIDENTAL ADJUNCT." THE BEGINNINGS OF THE CAPSID, 
BLACK POD AND SWOLLEN SHOOT CACAO DISEASE CONTROL IN GHANA, 
1910-1925 
Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, became a British colony 
in 1874. The cacao tree, introduced from the off-shore island 
of Fernando Po in 1879, immediately seized the imagination of 
Ghanaians, and the country's Eastern Province witnessed a 
phenomenal expansion of cacao farming/" From 1911 till 1978, 
Ghana remained the foremost cacao exporter in the world. The 
mainstay of the country thereafter centered on cacao exports, 
though important minerals like gold, manganese, diamonds and 
bauxite brought in revenue. By 1910, however, cacao diseases, 
as will be seen later, became prevalent in Ghana's rain 
forest. The extent of the damage to the nation's cacao 
economy, compelled the colonial administration to respond 
since the technical expertise and financial resources the 
project required lay beyond the capabilities of the cacao 
growers. 
Ghana's Department of Agriculture formally devised strat­
egies in the early twentieth century, especially from 1910 to 
1943, to minimize the danger of Capsid pests, fungal attacks 
and the Swollen Shoot cacao virus disease. These efforts pro­
ceeded along two well-defined historical phases: the era of 
"restrained involvement," which straddled the period from 1909 
to 1943, and the period of "aggressive interventionism" which 
characterized the 1944-1966 time-frame. In the period of "re­
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strained involvement," (the subject of this and the next 
chapter) the Agricultural Department initiated directives in 
an advisory capacity, leaving cacao farmers to implement them. 
However, when in 1936 the Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus threatened 
to obliterate cacao plantations in Ghana, the Department of 
Agriculture intervened more directly to extirpate the plant 
virus disease from the country's forest belt. 
The Policy of Restrained Involvement 
The Agricultural Department initially pursued a 
"restrained involvement" approach to cacao diseases partly 
because the problem was an incidental adjunct to the depart­
ment's original program to introduce, propagate and dissemi­
nate commercial crops in Ghana. The colonial administration 
originally aimed to promote export agriculture. The policy 
conformed to a major tenet of British policy that required 
each colony to pay its way.^  Each dependency had to develop 
internal resources to generate revenues to run the government. 
In Ghana, the colonial government promoted cacao farming while 
minimizing administrative costs. This meant using a small 
body of trained expatriate personnel, with the support of 
lesser skilled local personnel.' 
Both in theory and practice, the colonial administration, 
predicated on indirect rule, provided a two-tiered 
governmental structure. The centralized administration 
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remained at Accra, the capital. The government divided the 
country into the Eastern, Central, and Western Provinces, 
collectively referred to as the Colony. The Ashanti Region 
and Northern Territories occupied Ghana's middle belt and 
northern regions in that order. These five territorial 
divisions were further divided into 152 districts, covering a 
land area of 91,843 square miles. Apart from a few square 
miles of Savannah grassland along the coastal belt and the 
midlands, much of the Colony and Ashanti lay in the forest 
belt, ideally suited for cacao growing. The predominantly 
savannah vegetation in the Northern Territories precluded 
cacao cultivation.* 
The principle of private entrepreneurship guided colo­
nial agricultural policy. The government provided a framework 
of law and order to permit market mechanisms to regulate 
Ghana's cacao economy. The government initially restricted 
its participation in agriculture to the taxation of the cacao 
produce and the provision of smidgen scientific advice to 
farmers.5 The Department of Agriculture was an administrative 
arm of the colonial government along with the departments of 
Justice, Defence, Finance and External Affairs.* 
A Director of Agriculture supervised the Head office of 
the Agricultural Department, first established at Aburi in 
1890, but later transferred to Accra in 1904. The director of 
the Department was a member of the colonial Executive and 
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Legislative Councils. He advised the Governor on agricultural 
policies. He also introduced agricultural ordinances in the 
Legislative Council. The Director toured the countryside to 
appraise farm-related issues. His Deputy became Acting 
Director whenever the substantive director went on leave. A 
clerical staff and an office superintendent, supported the 
Head Office.^  
Below the Head Office level, the professional staff fell 
into two categories. There were technocrats concerned with 
research and experimental work and a field staff of 
agricultural officers. The research staff divided into 
sections: soil chemistry, botany, and plant breeding. Later, 
plant pathology, entomology and mycological divisions were 
added. The technical staff served at all Agricultural Exper­
iment Stations which the colonial government located in each 
soil zone in Ghana.® 
Agricultural Experiment Stations 
The government established a number of agricultural 
stations throughout the country to promote export agriculture. 
The premier experiment station in Ghana emerged at Aburi in 
the Eastern Province, located in an agricultural district 24 
miles north of Accra.' From 1890 to 1929, the Agricultural 
Department established more botanical stations. These 
experiment stations in chronological order of appearance, were 
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Tarkwa, in the Western Region (1903); Kumasi, in Ashanti 
Region (1906); Asuantsi in the Central Province (1907); and in 
1919, one station appeared at Tamale in the Northern 
Territories, other farm experiment stations emerged at Kibi 
and Peki-Blengo both in the Eastern Province in 1912 and 1913 
in that order. Agricultural stations emerged at Wiawso in the 
Western Region (1915); Juaso (Ashanti Region, in 1916) along 
with two others, at Wa and Gambaga in the Northern Territories 
in 1918. 
Each station specialized in propagating suitable 
commercial crops in the locality. In this venture, the 
scientific staff of the Royal Botanical Garden at Kew, and the 
Imperial Institute in England assisted the Agricultural De­
partment to promote exotic and indigenous plants in the 
various Agricultural Experiment Stations in Ghana.The 
variety of commercial crops which the agricultural experiment 
stations distributed to Ghanaian farmers were numerous. Some 
of these plants were palm oil, cola, cinnamon, sisal, hemp and 
soya beans. Others were rubber, rice, peanuts, ginger, 
coconuts and cacao.^  The experiment stations developed the 
crops with the expectation that, "these (plants) would develop 
rapidly if at some future date any of them should give promise 
of a profitable extension."^  Up to 1930, the botanic stations 
experimented with indigenous and exotic plants and seeds in 
Ghana, and encouraged local farmers to plant them. 
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At each experiment station, both in theory and practice, 
a curator, with the help of an overseer and a gang of 
laborers, implemented the Director's orders on plant and seed 
experiments. Itinerant instructors at each botanic station 
visited and instructed farmers on the technique of growing 
economic crops for export. The itinerant instructor in each 
village was accountable to an Agricultural officer who 
represented and promoted the Department's agricultural polic­
ies. The district's agricultural officer also took 
directives from the Provincial Agricultural executive. 
The Director of Agriculture was the overall policy-maker. 
He drew up the itinerary of farm inspection tours in 
consultation with the Commissioner of the Province where the 
tour was scheduled. The itinerant instructor submitted a 
diary at the end of the month showing the work accomplished, 
which his superior officer approved and confirmed. 
The Awareness of Cacao Diseases in Ghana by 1910 
From its inception in 1890, the Agricultural Department 
did not anticipate plant pathogens in any of the crops it pro­
moted, and therefore had no clear-cut policies to protect 
Ghana's plantations from diseases. Research training in 
mycology in British universities were in its primary stages. 
Accordingly, British colonial response to cacao plant 
pathogens began when these diseases occurred on agricultural 
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experiment stations and in private farms. In 1913, the 
agricultural field staff noted of the Asuantsi Botanic Station 
that, "two cacao trees were attacked by true canker and a 
number were cut-out and burned to prevent the disease from 
spreading."^  when private farms suffered from diseases, the 
Department outlined the problem as "due [more] to opening new 
farms than in tending existing ones with the result that 
diseases are getting a firm hold." Yet another explanation 
was that, "considerable damage is being done to the trees by 
various insects and fungoid pests, but too little or no 
attention is paid to them by the owners. 
The fungoid pests were the Black or Brown Pod. A British 
chemist in 1912 considered cacao fungus diseases in Ghana as 
"a matter of no small importance," and considered "canker" and 
"black rot" as the two most deadly cacao diseases in Ghana. 
According to him, the Black Rot arose from a parasitic fungus, 
Phytophthora Infestans which attacked the plant. The tissues 
within the cacao pod or fruit eventually turned into a black 
pulpy mass, while the fungus appeared on the outer surface of 
the pod as a white mold/"* To quote one source, "it is only 
natural to expect in a country such as this, where no 
precautions are taken to guard against pests, that when any 
virulent form of fungoid disease get established, its multi­
plication is almost certain.No systematic studies of 
fungoid diseases among cacao trees under Ghanaian conditions 
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were available before 1914. The Department expressed the hope 
that R. H. Bunting, the first Government mycologist appointed 
in 1914, would undertake the much needed research. 
The Department's major fungal problem was the Black Pod 
cacao disease: 
[T]he disease of most apprehension is the black or brown 
pod disease (Phytophthora Faberi) which is undoubtedly on 
the increase and the measures we have been recommending 
for its control i.e. the burying of the diseased and emp­
ty shells does not meet with much favor because of the 
additional labor entailed.^ ® 
The urgent need to stem the spread of the Black Pod disease 
was apparent, yet the exigencies of World War I, wartime staff 
retrenchment, and the unsettled post-war conditions, delayed 
research. Moreover, after the first global war. Bunting had 
to confront fungal problems pertaining not only to cacao but 
to a variety of crop diseases such as millet, bulrush, garden 
eggs, and corn. Cash crops like sisal, hemp and rice also re­
quired the Department's attention. 
The worst damage to cacao arose from Capsid pests. Be­
fore 1909, the Department gave no attention to Capsid insects. 
In fact, only a few of its officers were familiar with the 
insect's appearance.^ ' In that year, an itinerant instructor 
of agriculture in Ghana discovered Capsid insect depredations 
in the cacao districts he visited in the Eastern Province.^ " 
Agricultural officers further reported that Capsids caused the 
most damage at Bompata, Ashanti, and in the Eastern provinces. 
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particularly at Anum, east of the Volta River, Begoro, Mpraeso 
and Krobo. The travelling instructor also acknowledged the 
insect's presence at Abremposu, eighteen miles east of Begoro: 
Most of them are in new cacao plantations. On exam­
ining the latter, stalks were found perforated in 
many places, causing the bark to burst open and 
expose the dead cambium. Each stalk showed signs of 
attack about one foot along the stalk and before 
death, had a warty and gnarled appearance. 
Sometimes the terminal shoot has been sapped by the 
insect, causing it to wither. If the tree survived, 
no fruit appeared to mature. Dwarfish pods are 
formed and decomposed in a short time.^  ^
The extent of damage and spread of the Capsid menace led 
Gerald C. Dudgeon, the Inspector of Agriculture in British 
West Africa to visit Bompata, Ashanti in January 1910. 
Dudgeon reported that though the "bark-sapper," Sahlbergella 
Distantiella Theobroma, did not seem so plentiful, an allied 
species (Sahlbergella Singularis) was present upon almost 
every tree in badly infested plantations."^  ^
During Dudgeon's farm itinerary in the Eastern Province, 
he found and classified the Helopeltis insect among the Capsid 
insect variety. After touring Peki-Blengo in the Anum-Dis-
trict, Dudgeon reported; 
I found it puncturing the cocoa pods, killing small 
cacao...even if a pod reached maturity, the pulp 
surrounding the seeds are often attacked by fungoid 
growths, which had penetrated the decomposed area 
around the puncture. Puncturing is done with the 
proboscis, to feed upon the juices of the plant. 
Krobo plantations had slightly distorted shapes. 
Dudgeon, the Inspector General of Agriculture cautioned that. 
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Though damage is not great, yet care should be taken 
to prevent the spread of this pest, because it is 
extremely difficult to combat owing to its great 
activity...the insect should be looked for on unpun-
ctured pods and killed whenever found, as upon 
multiplication it might become a most formidable 
enemy to the cacao plants. 
By 1912, Capsids caused the loss of 25 percent of all 
possible cacao output in Ghana.In 1913, the Departmental 
report stated; 
It is widely distributed throughout the cacao grow­
ing districts and it is responsible for an enormous 
amount of damage. Numerous young plantations are 
annually ruined through the ravages of this pest, 
and where the trees are not actually killed, some 
time must elapse before the affected trees will give 
any appreciable crops. 
The Helopeltis Capsid insect species confined its attack 
to the cacao pod or fruit. Its feeding capacity, according to 
Dudgeon, was "prodigious," because "one female made eighty-
four punctures on a pod in fourteen hours." The Helopeltis 
would attack the fruit with the proboscis to suck its sugary 
sap. In the process, it deposited toxins into the pod which 
triggered off a chemical reaction that destroyed the pod's 
internal tissues. Round black spots, two or three millimeters 
in diameter, would then appear on the fruits. The damaged 
tissues would then blacken, dry out, harden, and die, assuming 
the appearance of cancers. 
Young cacao pods, technically denoted as cherelles, 
would similarly wither and fall off when punctured. Immature 
fruits turned grayish when the insect fed on them. It was 
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common to find about fifty spots perforated on the fruit, but 
a lesser number of punctures on the branches. The larvae of 
the Helopeltis was more aggressive than the adults in 
puncturing the pod, which usually wilted along with the cacao 
leaves.^ ® For pods which failed to fall, the insect's attacks 
enabled the entry of harmful fungal spores which often 
resulted in the complete loss of the fruit. 
Two other Capsids (or Miridae) insects also ravaged the 
cacao tree. The two species, Sahlbergella Singularis Haglund 
and Sahlbergella Distantiella were more formidable in their 
destructive capacity than the Helopeltis.^ " The Sahlbergella 
Singularis was a brown Capsid of about half an inch long. The 
Sahlbergella Distantiella, also of the same size, was black. 
Both species fed on cacao pods and young plant shoots. The 
Distantiella preferred young seedlings. The Singularis type 
usually sought mature trees. Like the Helopeltis, the 
Sahlbergellae perforated the tissue of the plants, which 
became infected with the fungus Calonectria Rigidiuscula.'^  
The Origins and Sources of Plant Diseases in Ghana 
Precisely when cacao diseases originated in Ghana cannot 
be established with accuracy. But none of the country's cacao 
diseases were exogenous. Capsids were indigenous to the West 
African rain forest. The Black Pod and the majority of fungal 
diseases have wreaked havoc world-wide among several plants to 
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which Ghana is not exempt.This was also true of the Swol­
len Shoot plant virus which struck in the 1930's. These facts 
underscored the perception that the cacao crop was transferred 
from its gene-center in the Western Hemisphere to meet these 
pathogens in Ghana during the 1880's. A farm journal in the 
British West Indies observed in 1903 that; 
The introduction of a new crop not infrequently 
occasions the finding of new pests. The cultivation 
of any plant on a large[r] scale than usual or the 
sudden introduction of any considerable area to a 
new plant is practically certain to result in insect 
attack. 
The same farm journal explained that: 
When insect pests are found on a new crop, it does 
not necessarily follow that the pest has been 
introduced with the seeds of those crops but that 
the insects of that locality, finding a new plant 
growing in some abundance, will when possible, live 
on that plant and the fact of there being a large 
supply of this plant on the spot tends to aid the 
increase of the insect. 
Briefly stated, insect pests and diseases of agricultural 
crops are inevitable. This biological assessment has proven 
true over time. Henri Alibert, working independently in Cote 
D'Ivoire on cacao diseases, stated the same observation about 
cacao: 
Le cacaoyer est une plante introduite; la plupart 
des parasites étudiés sont donc vraisemblablement 
des parasites indigenes qui se sont acclimates sur 
cette plante...d'autres sont uniquement inféodés sur 
le cacaoyer^ * (Cacao is an introduced plant. The 
majority of the known pests associated with it are 
actually indigenous, and which have adapted 
themselves to the plant. Other [pests] are uniquely 
predatory upon the cacao tree.) 
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Cacao Disease Control Strategies 
Cacao pathogens in Ghana by 1910, was definitely serious. 
When Capsid and fungoid attacks became critical, Ghana's 
Department of Agriculture appointed its first entomologist in 
1910. His duty was to investigate insect pests that were most 
destructive of economic crops in the country, and to devise 
means for their control.'® The Department took on pest control 
as an incidental responsibility because no private research 
organizations with the research expertise and capital existed 
in Ghana for such work.'^  
To be sure, the Department's strategies to cope with 
cacao pathogens had earlier occurred under the governorships 
of John P. Rodger, 1904-1910, and James Thornburn, 1910-1911. 
However, these initiatives appeared mainly in the form of 
administrative directives. For example, a despatch from 
Governor Rodger to the Secretary of State for the colonies in 
1910 indicated the advisory role of the colonial Department of 
Agriculture in disease control in Ghana. Rodger's letter 
contained information which the Director of Agriculture, 
William Steele Dykes Tudhope had prepared that year for cacao 
growers. Tudhope's notice, warned farmers that: 
An insect pest has been discovered to be doing great 
damage to cacao trees and if allowed to spread it 
may destroy the whole industry. Every chief or 
farmer must do his utmost to prevent the spread of 
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this pest and so save the crops from the danger 
which threatens them.'® 
To help farmers identify the insect pest, Tudhope's circular 
explicitly described the pest: 
The insect when young resembled a tick or spider and 
it is reddish in colour: when old it is brown or 
black, and though it generally has wings, it cannot 
fly more than short distances. The insect, young or 
old, had a trunk which when nor feeding is folded 
back along its under side.'' 
To pre-empt the insect's attack, the chief executive of the 
Agricultural Department advised farmers to space the cacao 
trees 12' x 15' apart "to keep them strong and healthy." To 
contain fungal diseases, he counselled farmers to keep the 
plantations free of weeds and dead wood. The farmers had to 
prune the trees to avoid too much shade, and to bury the cacao 
pods when empty. 
In situations where cacao trees appeared moribund from 
attack, the farmer should "cut them eighteen inches from the 
ground, tar the stumps, and burn all the branches and the 
decaying wood about the plantation and turn the soil com­
pletely over."41 The Departmental head also recommended to 
farmers to spray the trees with Kerosene emulsion. The direc­
tives needed to prepare the emulsion were also given: 
Take 1 pound of soap and 4 gallons of kerosene. Cut 
the soap and boil it in two gallons of water, when 
the soap has dissolved remove from the fire and add 
four gallons of Kerosene and mix thoroughly. To one 
bottle of this mixture add nine bottles of water 
before spraying. 
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To this end, the Department in May 1909, ordered sprayers and 
syringes from England. In that year, it printed a circular on 
cacao diseases in English and Twi (the local vernacular spoken 
in the cacao belt) for dissemination among those connected 
with cacao. 
The Department actually sent copies to the Chief Commis­
sioners of the Central and Eastern Provinces of the Colony and 
the Ashanti Region, where the insects were prevalent, for 
distribution to farmers and chiefs. The various European 
import-export firms which purchased cacao for shipment 
overseas, also received copies. These commercial agents in­
cluded F. A. Swanzy, Messrs. Millers; J. J. Fisher, the 
African Association, and the Basel Mission Factory. Since the 
staffs of these commercial firms were in constant contact with 
cultivators, they were expected to "educate [farmers] about 
the dangers wrought by the insects.The Agricultural 
Department despatched the circular to the Director of 
Education for use in every school where agriculture was part 
of the curriculum. The school pupils were expected to apprise 
their illiterate guardians who cultivated cacao about the 
Caps id menace.^ " 
The Department directed farmers to teach children to 
handpick the offending insects at dawn when they are most 
vulnerable to capture. The idea of natural control also came 
up. By this, the entomologist contemplated the introduction 
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of parasites into the colony to combat the insect pests.In 
1911, the Acting Governor, H. Bryan, in a letter to the 
Secretary of State for the colonies, dealt with plant 
quarantine legislation: 
On the subject of disinfection of seeds on delivery to 
the colony, [it is intended] to provide for the 
fumigation of all imported seeds and plants; to train 
selected [local] subordinates of the Agricultural 
Department to implement legislation to provide fumigation 
chambers at such parts at Accra and Sekondi.^  ^
In the bid to cope with plant pests, the technical staff 
of the department systematically searched for, identified and 
then studied the bionomics of a variety of destructive insects 
to determine the best means for their control. By World War 
1, the Entomology section of the Agricultural Department had 
mapped out various Capsid insects and other pests of the cacao 
tree in the colony. These pests were classified into eight 
categories according to their seriousness.^ ® By this date, the 
Agricultural Department still depicted Capsid insects as, "The 
most serious pest in the colony severely crippling thousands 
of acres."*" In his report for the year 1914, the Government 
Entomologist also affirmed that the Capsid, Sankonuabe was 
"the most alarming pest and that many thousands of acres 
planted to cacao have been rendered worthless through the 
activities of this insect."®" 
The Agricultural Department identified the Big Bug, 
scientifically noted as Homoeocerus, among those insects that 
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ravaged the cacao tree. The Big Bug usually fed on young pods 
but also attacked larger ones. Its feeding habits often 
killed young growing pods leaving older ones severely 
distorted. The Big Bug was capable of causing an estimated 
50-70 percent of crop loss on each tree.^  Among the variety 
of cacao pests stated in this report, the Grey Moth deserve 
mention. Also known as a pod borer, the Gray Moth was a 
caterpillar. It generally bored through the wall of the cacao 
pod inviting fungal decay." 
The Slate Grey Leaf Beetle or the Coleoptera, and another 
bark borer, the Coleoptera Cerambycidae also proved de­
structive. The former generally attacked young leaves in a 
fashion that left only the veins and the leaf edges. The 
latter, on the other hand, was described as, "[c]apable of 
destroying an area of bark 5" x 5", and if as many as ten is 
found in one tree, may girdle the stem. Termites tunnelled 
the ground to consume the roots of the cacao tree. Squirrels 
and rats also gnawed holes into the pods to extract the beans. 
Other listed diseases were generally fungal debilities, such 
as canker, horse-hair blight and leaf curl. 
The impact of Cacao Disease Control by World War I 
Until the outbreak of World War I, travelling instructors 
demonstrated to farmers how to prepare kerosene emulsion as a 
capsidicide. The agricultural instructors either sold, lent 
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or presented syringes and sprayers to farmers for use against 
Capsids. These initiatives had no effect. In 1914, the De­
partment reported after a year's work with cacao growers that, 
"it is extremely rare to find a farmer using the remedy and up 
to the present this means of control must be considered a 
failure."^  
Cacao plantations generally averaged about an acre in 
size. On this account, most farmers received paltry incomes 
for their overall produce. For most cacao growers, the cost 
of insecticidal equipment was prohibitive. Second, farmers, 
unaccustomed to the equipment, applied them ineffectually. 
Often, the plantations suffered severe insect damage before 
the farm owner considered spraying. In response, the Agricul­
tural Department suggested cooperative work among cacao 
farmers because, "the insects leave badly damaged farms to 
attack neighboring ones. It is folly for isolated individuals 
to spray farms as these are quickly invaded from surrounding 
untreated trees.Such cooperatives, as will be seen later, 
emerged only in the 1930s, and were actually ineffectual 
against Capsid pests until the late 1950s. 
Other methods of cacao pest control proved unsuccessful. 
For example, in 1914, the Agricultural Department identified 
the silk cotton tree, (Eriodonodron anfractuosum) as the 
original host tree of the Capsid. This explained the wide­
spread nature of the pest. The Department recommended the 
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destruction of all silk cotton trees in proximity to cacao 
farms to reduce the Capsid populations. The idea was 
impracticable because cacao trees had become important host 
plants themselves. Considering too that the Sahlbergella was 
polyphagous, further underscored the ineffectiveness of this 
line of defense.®^  
The idea to handpick or spray insect pests with kerosene 
emulsion failed. The recourse to insect parasites as a remedy 
hardly took off the ground. Before World War I, the De­
partment had considered using lizards and spiders, and 
breeding the red tree ants (Oecophylla) to prey on Capsids.^ ® 
But as the Department later acknowledged, the cultivation of 
these natural parasites, "under prevailing conditions does not 
appear possible."®' Moreover, the available travelling 
instructors could not disseminate the disease control 
strategies widely and effectively because of transportation 
difficulties. 
The response of the farming communities to cacao disease 
control was lukewarm. In specific locales, cacao farmers and 
local chiefs warmly welcomed and attended the instructor's 
lectures and demonstrations on how to combat insect and fun­
goid pests. However, they generally ignored the instructor's 
ideas because such work entailed extra labor, "which appears 
to the farmer to be of no practical value."'® 
Following Dudgeon's suggestions in 1910, the Department 
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had recommended the spraying of Bordeaux Mixture against cacao 
fungus diseases. Alternately, farmers were encouraged to 
excise the diseased parts of the tree and to burn or bury 
fungus-infected material with quick lime. The advise also 
cautioned them to heat knives applied in removing diseased 
material before using them to prune healthy trees. The 
Department's field agents also advised cacao farmers to tar 
wounds on the tree to prevent the entry of the Diplodia Cacao-
. icola fungus.^  The Government mycologist, R. H. Bunting, who 
initiated these controls, assumed that the susceptibility of 
cultivated plants to fungoid attacks arose from unprotected 
tree wounds, lack of farm drainage and the neglect and aban­
donment of diseased farms.'^  But the cacao growers did not 
heed any of his prescribed remedies until the first global war 
broke out in 1914. 
World War I certainly aggravated the incidence of Capsid, 
Black Pod and other fungoid diseases among cacao trees. When 
war broke out in 1914, farmers felt apprehensive that cacao 
would not be purchased. This fact predisposed farmers to 
neglect their farms.^ ' These developments reflected a portent 
of events to unfold. The commencement of hostilities actually 
restricted overseas markets for cacao. Markets in Germany and 
her allies disappeared completely. 
Transportation barriers in wartime also posed formidable 
difficulties. In 1915, the colonial office initially reported 
72 
that cacao shipments from Ghana, "under the sure shield of the 
Navy had suffered little from the hands of the enemy.But 
that was only in the short term. In the long-run, merchant 
marine shortage impeded cacao shipment to the available 
overseas markets. The colonial reports affirmed that, "during 
1916 the [German] submarine menance (sic) was growing in 
seriousness."^ " The Legislative Council in Ghana on 9 February 
1915 passed the Trade With Enemy ordinance, and in February 
1917 all licenses for the export of cacao to whatever des­
tination ceased. 
The need for strategic raw materials became urgent. 
Corn, copra, palm oil and palm nuts were in demand for their 
oil, while rubber, required for tire manufacture became 
paramount in Britain's wartime priorities. The emphasis on 
strategic raw materials favored the coastal districts of Ghana 
such as Keta and Ada where such plants grew plentifully. 
Cacao under war exigencies became a luxury crop.^  
When German submarine attacks intensified in 1917 and 
British mercantile losses mounted, the colonial government in 
Ghana only freighted palm kernels, peanuts, and other 
vegetable oils to war-related industries in Britain.^ ' The re­
stricted international markets and lack of shipping space 
reduced Ghanaian cacao prices considerably. In districts 
remote from cacao buying centers, farmers could not market 
their produce. Planters abandoned their cacao farms alto-
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gather, and no new farms were built during the warThe 
general neglect of cacao plantations, as the war progressed, 
led to disaster. Cultivators left ripe pods unharvested and 
the farms became saturated with diseases.^ ' To quote one 
source: 
The almost invincible apathy of cacao farmers during the 
war could not be overcome, and the bulk of the cacao in, 
Kwahu, Birrim and upper portions of the Akwapim districts 
was not realized and plants around those districts were 
neglected and presented on all sites a melancholy 
aspect. 
This description was true of the Eastern, the Western 
and Central Provinces as well as Ashanti. In some areas, the 
Sahlbergella, and Helopeltis Capsids and the Marasmus fungus 
wreaked such destruction that in .1919, the colonial report on 
Ashanti noted that, "There are still numerous patches of cacao 
trees in a diseased, neglected and overgrown condition."^  
This then, was the state of cacao farms in Ghana until the war 
ended in 1918. 
In the immediate post-war period, cacao prices shot-up 
from seven shillings and six pence in 1917 to £2 and ten 
shillings per load of 60 pounds. In the Eastern Province, 
"moribund farms and local associations were galvanized into 
life. Roads were soon thronged with planters and carriers."^  
Cacao diseases, however, still persisted, a situation that ap­
peared sharply pronounced in the Ashanti cacao belt. The 
colonial report on that region for 1919 stated, 
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[T]he year had been exceptionally dry and the trees 
have suffered considerably. The insect pest had 
been very severe and in numerous cases the young 
growth had been ruined by Sahlbergella and 
Helopeltis and the leaves destroyed by Thrips.^  
Of the four cacao varieties, namely Amelonado, Cundeamor, 
Ocumare and Criollo, Capsids preferred the Amelonado, which 
formed 90 percent of the cacao grown in Ghana. 
The years between 1920 and 1924 were no different 
regarding the cacao situation. Writing of Ghana cacao in 1923 
one source observed that, "whereas by 1910, one heard little 
of diseases in the Gold Coast, [now] those that are trou­
blesome are a long one.The 1923-24 colonial report on 
Ashanti affirmed that, "Diseases and Pests are all too common 
in Ashanti and the difficulty is to find economic means of 
control which the farmers can and will apply systematically."^  ^
Indeed, the variety of cacao fungal diseases had multiplied. 
By 1924, Collar Crack, a new fungus disease first discovered 
in Togo, was widespread in the Eastern Province. Other fungal 
disease types included the horsehair blight, leaf-curl, 
Phytophthora thread blight, Marasmus Cadens, Diplodia 
Cacaiocola and the Loranthus mistletoe.^  
The crippling impact of insect enemies of the cacao tree 
was evident. Capsid pests (Sahlbergella Singularis and 
Sahlbergella Theobroma Distantiella) known for their destruc­
tive effects, were rampant. The Cacao Mosquito (Helopeltis 
Bergrothi), and various borers, namely the Glenea borer 
75 
beetles, the Armastoterma baquetiana and characoma 
stictigrapta were prevalent. The Thrips insect and moths, 
(Megalopygid and Eulophonotus myrmelion) also wreaked havoc. 
As one author wrote, "The list is formidable, but one knows 
that everything that can be done in an advisory capacity is 
being done by the energetic Department of Agriculture and its 
provincial staff. 
The post-war disease menace did not escape the attention 
of the Agricultural Department. In 192 0, it stressed the 
urgency, "to start propaganda work on the cacao belt without 
delay to promote sanitary measures to preserve the cacao crop 
upon which so much, of the wealth of the colony depends."^ ' But 
the rhetoric remained only a statement of intent. The 
Department could not commence work immediately because of war­
time dislocations among its top administrative personnel who 
determined policy. Before the war, William Steele Dykes 
Tudhope was the Director of Agriculture. Robert H. Bunting, a 
Fellow of the Linnean Society, served as Assistant Director of 
Agriculture and Government Mycologist, while W. H. Patterson 
remained as the substantive Government Entomologist. During 
the War, Tudhope went on leave to England. R. H. Bunting, the 
Government Mycologist also left the country on 26 June 1916. 
On that account, W. H. Patterson, the Government Entomologist 
became Acting Assistant Director of Agriculture and Acting 
Government Mycologist up to 1923.®° 
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The administrative re-adjustments and wartime priorities, 
derailed the treatment of cacao diseases, and rendered 
continuity in the post-war era difficult. In 1919, the 
Department acknowledged that, "since the appointment of an 
entomologist and a mycologist very little opportunity for 
continuous research has been possible, much of those officials 
having been occupied by other duties than those of their 
substantive offices."^  The situation remained the same in 
1920. The Department's technical staff, now comprised of two 
mycologists, two entomologists and two chemists who had to 
cope not only with cacao, but with the entire crop system in 
Ghana. 
Again, in that year, the Director was absent in England 
until October on "special missions... so that the remaining 
staff especially the administrative branch had its energies 
taxed to the utmost.The departure of the Government Entom­
ologist, W. H. Patterson from May to July 1920 to attend a 
conference of Entomologists in London did not alleviate 
matters, and, "Under such circumstances, no research work 
could be undertaken, a matter of great regret, as an officer 
thus loses opportunities of making progress in which he may be 
interested."^  Even, the appointment of Godfrey Sturge Cotter-
ell that year as Assistant Entomologist, stationed in the 
Eastern Province, could not register any improvements in the 
cacao pest situation.** 
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Such then were realities of Ghana's plant health position 
in 1920. The Department's only remedial initiative in this 
period was the introduction of plant quarantine regulations in 
Ghana. Two enactments, "Proclamation #26 of 29 October 1921" 
and "Proclamation Number 10 of 14 November 1924," empowered 
the Department's Agricultural Inspectors to enter any farm 
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. to enforce laws on farm 
sanitation.® Such inspectors could order any farm owner to 
treat diseased plants on his farm. The farmer, after 
inspection, had to maintain his plantation in a prescribed 
manner. If a farm was prevalent with injurious pests, the 
Agricultural Inspector, with the approval of the provincial 
Superintendent of Agriculture, could order the destruction of 
pathogenic plants on the plantation.®^  
The statutes enjoined farm inspectors to keep a register 
showing the identity and location of each farm inspected, the 
name(s) of the occupier(s) of such farm(s), the injurious 
pest(s) found on them, the treatment(s) administered, and the 
date of inspection. The Plants' Ordinance forbad the removal 
and transfer of any diseased plants, apart from purposes of 
destruction, from any farm. Penalties were enforceable 
against farmers who obstructed the Department's field staff 
from implementing the legal provisions. Such offenders became 
liable to a fine of £25.00 or a three month spell in jail.®^  
Ghana's plant pests' ordinances went into immediate 
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effect, especially in Ashanti, which suffered the worst forms 
of insect pests and fungoid diseases.®® The Department also 
trained a special staff to deal with various plant diseases in 
the* country.®' But here again, the impact of the plant disease 
laws were marginal. The effective enforcement of these plant 
quarantine laws was difficult, especially when farmers could 
inadvertently move pathogenic plants easily from neighboring 
farms in the vast forest belt. Indeed, as of 1924, only 1,225 
acres of cacao land had complied with the Injurious Pests 
enactment in Ashanti.'" In the Eastern Province, like the rest 
of the cacao belt, the plant sanitation order proved difficult 
to practice. The measures required labor and expense, but 
owing to under-population, hired labor was both expensive and 
hard to come by.'^  These then, were the initial attempts to 
confront the menace of the Capsid and Black Pod cacao 
pathogens in Ghana from 1910 to 1925. The next chapter 
discusses what improvements and changes occurred in the fight 
against these biological hazards to the cacao crop up to the 
end of World War II. 
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III PRELIMINARY RESEARCH INTO THE BIONOMICS AND CONTROL OF 
THE CAP8ID, BLACK POD AND SWOLLEN SHOOT CACAO DISEASES, 
1926-1943 
Introduction 
In the early 1920S, two agricultural scientists joined 
the Agricultural Department. The first to do so in 1920, was 
Godfrey Sturge Cotterell, who became Assistant Government En­
tomologist. The other was Harry Arthur Dade, who served as 
Assistant Mycologist in 1921. These two farm scientists 
initiated research into the Capsid and Black Pod cacao 
diseases from 1926 to 1930. But their research findings were 
not implemented in the field partly because of financial 
stringencies emanating out of the depression of the 1930s and 
the onset of Word War II. 
In 1936, a new plant disease, named the Swollen Shoot 
virus reared itself in the cacao belt. Its impact debilitated 
cacao plantations. Despite the creation of a Central Cacao 
Research Station in the rain forest, and notwithstanding 
promising scientific research into the plant virus, wartime 
exigencies pre-empted large scale disease control. The period 
under review, 1926-1943, may be characterized as the era of 
"science without practice." 
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Discussion 
The seriousness of Capsid attacks after World War I was 
paramount. In 1926, year, W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore, Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for the colonies, during a visit to 
Ghana, observed of the Eastern Province that, "There are signs 
of a falling off in the production per acre due in part to a 
development of disease among the older trees.The need for 
immediate action was never in doubt. Actually, some effort 
was already underway to deal with the Capsid menace. Earlier 
in the decade, Cotterell visited the United States on a 
Carnegie Research program from August to December 1922 to 
upgrade his expertise on plant entomology. W. H. Patterson, 
the chief Government Entomologist, proceeded to the Portuguese 
West African island of Sao Thome on 6 January 1923 on a 
similar mission.^ But it was not until 1926, that any 
research on the Capsid menace commenced. 
Capsid Research 
The Assistant Government Entomologist, Cotterell, spent the 
first half of the year 1926 in the Department's sub-station at 
Asamankese in the Akim-Abuakwa district of the Eastern 
Province. Here, he studied the life histories and habits of 
the Sahlbergella Singularis and the Sahlbergella Theobroma 
Distantiella. Cotterell also included the insects Helopeltis 
Bergrothi, Heliothrips Rubroncincta, and the Earis biplaga in 
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his work. He also tested the efficiency of various liquid 
sprays and dusts capable of eradicating such pests. He de­
termined that Nicotine Sulphate, though expensive, effectively 
destroyed the Sahlbergella species.^ 
In 1927, Cotterell made more progress in Capsid research. 
Based on proposals at the first West African Agricultural 
Conference held at Lagos, Nigeria in 1927, he headed a mission 
to Fernando Po, Sao Tome and Belgian Congo to investigate 
Capsid parasites.4 From April 1928 to March 1929, after his 
return, Cotterell researched the bionomics of the Braconid 
Euphorus Sal which parasitized the Sahlbergella. If workable, 
the Entomology Division of the Agricultural Department would 
breed insect predators on a large-scale to minimize Capsid 
populations. ® 
In 1929, the Agricultural Department established a second 
entomological center at Kwahu, also in the Eastern Province, 
to obtain more information on the Sankonuabe. then "the most 
serious of crop diseases" in the district. But up to July 
1931 the only positive development in the Department's pest 
control program was its experiment work with the Dasvscapus 
parvipenis parasite to kill insects destructive of cacao in 
Ghana.^ 
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Black Pod Fungus Research and Control 
Despite these difficulties, the Government Mycologist, Henry 
Arthur Dade conducted a series of studies Black Pod fungus 
disease. Because they seriously affected plants of economic 
importance in both temperate and tropical regions, plant 
f u n g u s  s t u d i e s  a l r e a d y  e x i s t e d  b e f o r e  W o r l d  W a r  I B u t  n o  
fungus research under Ghanaian ecological conditions was 
available. 
In 1926, Henry Arthur Dade, the Assistant Mycologist, se­
lected the Anyinam district in the Eastern Province for his 
Black Pod studies. As he put it, "it was well known as an 
area in which loss from pod disease had been estimated as 
being very great."® The Anyinam district was situated in the 
Birrim river valley. Numerous streams intersected its 
extensive but uniformly flat plains. The Birrim plains were 
also heavily forested. These environmental factors easily 
promoted fungal diseases in the area which the Government 
mycologist selected for his work. 
In his work, Dade kept close contact with the Imperial 
Bureau of Mycology in England, drawing upon their expertise 
and data collections and reference libraries. This was 
feasible because Kew Botanical Gardens maintained and compared 
collections of plant pests from all British colonies. The 
results of this work became invaluable in correlating the work 
of plant pathologists throughout Britain's overseas 
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territories. Furthermore, literature on plant disease control, 
published in all parts of the world, were obtainable on loan 
from the Bureau, which Dade found useful for his work on cacao 
fungoid diseases.' 
In his report, Dade later maintained that air currents 
were negligible in transmitting fungoid pathogens, because 
surrounding brush and trees obstructed wind movement in cacao 
farms. By implication air currents did not easily dislodge 
viable sporangia which tend to cling strongly to the pods. On 
the other hand, man spreads fungus disease. Dade explained 
that a higher proportion of trees that bordered narrow, 
frequented tracks showed greater rates of infections than the 
others. This was so because the clothing of passers-by 
usually brushed off sporangia from fungus-infected cacao and 
transmitted them to healthy pods.^° 
Insects were however mainly responsible for transmitting 
the Black Pod fungus. Insects of many varieties which 
frequented the cacao trees, walked over the pods, and thereby 
carried the spores from one tree to the other. Within the 
same tree, insects disseminated the disease among cacao pods 
in the same fashion. "Contact" and "Drip" also accounted for 
a large proportion of infections. Cacao pods grow in 
clusters, and always in contact with one another. In this 
situation, if one pod is diseased, drops of water containing 
zoospore from the diseased pods often dripped onto healthy 
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pods and caused infect ion.^ Dade also established that when 
the pods suffer from machete wounds or insect punctures, the 
openings enable the parasite Phytophthora Faberi to penetrate 
and destroy the internal tissues of the pod, which nurture the 
beans. Deprived of nutritive material, the cacao fruit loses 
its vigor and ceases further growth 
Apart from the Phytophthora Faberi, Dade in September 
1927 examined the (Armillaria Mellea) cacao fungus. The 
Armillaria Mellea, or Collar Crack, emerged in the post-war 
period as a destructive fungal disease. It was widespread in 
the forest belt of Ghana and British mandated Togoland. Its 
major characteristic were the longitudinal and radial cracks 
it produced in the collar of the tree. A virulent parasite, 
Armillaria Mellea did not depend on previous wounds or infec­
tions to penetrate the host. Collar Crack infections began in 
the lateral roots and extended to the main axis where they 
produced fissures. Excessive humidity correlated with the 
severity of attack. According to Dade, Collar Crack was 
controllable if humidity could be reduced and if the material 
it infected were destroyed. To ensure that farmers complied 
with these measures, the colonial administration instituted 
ordinances in Ghana to ensure effective control.^  But here 
again, as in Capsid control, farmers did not respond. 
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The Means To Resist the Black Pod Fungus 
H. A. Dade also considered artificial controls for pod 
rot. In his view, "dusting," or the spraying of fungicidal 
chemicals, would best stem Black Pod growth on cacao trees. 
Hence, under the auspices of the Agricultural Department, two 
American firms, the California Sprayer Company of Los Angeles 
and the Niagara Sprayer Company of Middleport, New York, along 
with a British concern, W. H. Brown and Company of London, 
tested various dusts among cacao plants in Ghana. 
Laboratory experiments indicated that dusts prepared 
from copper sulphate lime and copper carbonate lime were, 
"effective preventives of infection by Phytophthora Faberi and 
its spore production." Dade added that calcium arsenate, an 
insect stomach poison, may be an important additive in dust 
preparation to prevent insect damage.^  But these chemical 
solutions did not prove beneficial. The dusts had to be 
applied in the morning when the pods were wet with dew to en­
able the chemicals to set successfully. However, chemical 
adhesion to the pod was poor, and could be washed off easily 
during rainfall. Wrote Dade, "This defect alone renders the 
method unworkable.When between 1925 and 1930, the 
Agricultural Department's personnel toured cacao districts, 
often for months advising farmers on cacao disease management, 
the effort made no impact for reasons noted earlier in this 
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study. 
Plant Quarantine Laws 
In 1936, the government demonstrated its resolve to stave 
off the threat of plant diseases from the outside world. In 
two acts, "The Importation of Plants Regulation Ordinance of 
28 March 1936" and the "Importation of Plants Regulations of 6 
May 1936," the colonial state aimed to forestall the 
inadvertent introduction of plant pests from outside sources. 
The Witchbroom fungus disease was striking disaster among 
cacao estates in the western hemisphere.^® The two ordinances 
specifically prohibited the importation of plants from Central 
America and South America as well as Trinidad, where the 
Witchbroom cacao disease was most active. The law restricted 
inter alia cacao plants, and seeds, along with those of 
cassava, cotton, oil palms, citrus fruits, and sugarcane. The 
Department of Agriculture could however import exotic plants 
for scientific purposes. 
Plant importation from neighboring West African countries 
came under the regulation of the Plant Interchange Schedule. 
The Interchange Schedule referred to West African countries 
which had reached agreements with Ghana on plant and seed 
exchange/"* Under the law, exchanges should be allowed only 
under permit, set out in prescribed form, bearing the signa­
ture of the Director of Agriculture.^ Persons requiring to 
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import plants had to apply for permission in writing to the 
Director of Agriculture, stating the name(s) and address(es) 
of the applicant(s) and of the person(s) from whom the plants 
would be obtained. The importer(s) must state the botanical, 
popular and varietal name(s) of the plant(s), the number of 
each variety to be imported and the locality in which the 
plants would be grown. A plant Health Certificate should be 
obtained from agricultural authorities to accompany plant 
imports. Finally, the law restricted the importation of 
plants and seeds (except by postage) to the ports of Accra, 
Winneba, Cape Coast, Saltpond, and Takoradi. At these ports, 
a Customs Officer administered screening tests, and could 
order such plants to be disinfected, fumigated or destroyed. 
Plants imported illegally could be confiscated outright and 
burnt.21 Plant quarantine legislation formed part of the 
defenses the government employed to safeguard cacao from 
pathogenic attacks. But apart form the ports of entry, their 
enforcement nation-wide, as earlier stated, was arduous. 
A New Plant Disease: The Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus 
The Department's most historic, path-breaking cacao 
disease studies started in 1936 when the technical staff in 
the Agricultural Department initiated research into the Cacao 
Swollen Shoot virus (C.S.S.V.) Hitherto, Capsid and fungal 
pests along with slaty, weevily and defective beans in the 
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nation's warehouses had preoccupied the Agricultural Depart­
ment from its inception in 1904 until 1935.^^ 
In 1936, a farmer from Effiduase, in the New Juaben dis­
trict of the Eastern Province, took cacao branches showing 
peculiar swellings to the district's Division of Agriculture 
for examination. W. F. Steven, a mycologist and plant 
pathologist, was the first to investigate the disease. He 
isolated no pathogens. But his field investigations led him 
to conclude in November 1936 that the branch swellings evinced 
the presence of an infectious disease which he termed the 
Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus. (C.S.S.V)^ 
Testimonies from local farmers in the Eastern Province 
suggested that the onset of the disease was by no means 
sudden. Preliminary surveys revealed that C.S.S.V was already 
established in the oldest cacao-growing districts of the East­
ern Province. Here, such farms extended over several hundreds 
of square miles especially in the Nankese district. In this 
area, where cacao farms had started in 1907, patches of dying 
cacao trees typifying a Swollen Shoot epidemic were present 
before 1922. 
C.S.S.V. posed unique difficulties. While Capsid 
pests and Black Pod diseases were costly to farmers and the 
state, those diseases had not destroyed whole trees. Swollen 
Shoot by comparison killed the trees outright and could 
obliterate whole cacao plantations altogether. This plant 
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virus, as one source explained, became, "a major concern of 
cacao in Ghana [and] Farmers... recognized a definite time 
limit to the economic life of their farms...Under those 
conditions, it became imperative for the Department of Agri­
culture to implement remedial steps against the virus. 
The Department immediately started a cutting out 
campaign, destroying over 81,000 virus-infected trees in three 
hundred farms. Also, Dr. A. F. Posnette, a plant pathologist, 
started a cacao progeny selection program in 1937, to attain 
greater bean size and prolific plant yields to maintain output 
levels since old farms were either dying out or diseases were 
rendering replanting difficult.^ 
The Central Cacao Research Station 
However, a major obstacle confronted the Department. Al­
though the crop represented 98 percent of Ghana's export 
agriculture, up to 1936, no agricultural research station and 
farm scientists existed to treat plant virus diseases. Frank 
A. Stockdale, Agricultural Adviser to the Secretary of State 
for the colonies who visited Ghana in 193 6, accordingly, 
advocated a cacao research station for Ghana. 
The colonial government voted £30,000 to establish a 
cacao research station in 1937 with a maintenance grant of 
£1,200 for the first year. The policy makers later examined 
sites at Old and New Tafo, Bunso and Moseaso in the Eastern 
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Province. Finally in 1938, the government established a Cen­
tral Cacao Research institute at New Tafo, where some of 
Ghana's first cacao farms were built in the 1890s. The 
government charged this research station to investigate and 
determine solutions to cacao pathogens, especially the C.S.S-
.V, Black Pod and Capsid diseases. Plant breeding and hybrid­
ization, agronomy and nutritional problems of the cacao crop 
were also important in the Institute's research programs. 
Swollen Shoot investigations later became by far the most 
prominent in the Department's cacao research agenda at Tafo. 
In 1939, the Department suspended its earlier attempts to 
rogue out virus-infected cacao trees because it was apparent 
that the Swollen Shoot virus was too widespread for such mea­
sures. Besides, cutting out diseased cacao was costly. 
Further investigations were urgently needed either to confirm 
the existing control strategy or to determine a more efficient 
approach. Surveys conducted from 1940 to 1942 in two sample 
areas in the main region of infection, showed that cacao crops 
had died in nearly sixty percent of the farms examined. More 
significantly, an estimated ninety percent of the standing 
mature trees were infected.^® 
The Puzzle of the Swollen Shoot Virus 
H. A. Dade, the Government Mycologist, who had worked in 
Ghana since 1920, after viewing the death of cacao trees over 
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extensive areas in the Eastern Province, opined that the 
C.S.S.V. "phenomena are new to science. They appear to 
indicate a systemic affection, the etiology of which is not 
yet clear [but] the evidence points to a physiological, and 
not a parasitic diagnosis."^' Dade attributed the virus 
disease to environmental conditions particularly drought, 
exposure to dry harmattan winds, and the absence of shade 
trees because of deforestation. Dade's list of causes 
included, "lessening soil moisture," "lessening atmospheric 
humidity," "direct solar effects on the trees" and "the 
ingress of insects."^® 
To support his analysis, Dade cited the dry areas of 
the Eastern Province, namely Bisa, Asuoya, Suhum and Nsawam 
which recorded less than 55 inches of rain annually. In such 
districts, massive cacao infections have occurred. By 
comparison, the Ashanti Region and Western Province had no 
C.S.S.V because of better soil moisture, the absence of 
drought, and rainfall levels of less than 55 inches. 
In Dade's view then, the dying cacao tree arose from 
worsening environmental conditions over the years, and that, 
"Swollen Shoot is a secondary infection of minor, if indeed of 
any significance."^^ In essence, "[Sjwollen Shoot, whilst it 
presents a novel problem whose early solution is highly desir­
able, is only an incident in the general problem of cacao die-
back. As a solution, the mycologist advocated the extensive 
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planting of Samanea Saman trees throughout the cacao belt 
areas to provide shade. 
Based on Dade's recommendations, the Department of Agri­
culture terminated the cutting-out of cacao trees and diverted 
resources into reducing the "drought-dieback" through the 
expedient of planting shade trees.The effort to plant trees 
to provide shelter in all cacao farms did not stem the disease 
which continued to kill off more trees. The problem of 
ascertaining the etiology of the Swollen Shoot disease still 
persisted. 
M. Greenwood, a soil chemist, had earlier investigated 
soils in the Nankese area in 1934. His analysis revealed no 
significant difference in the nutrient status of soil that 
supported flourishing cacao farms and those which the C.S.S.V. 
To determine the etiology of C.S.S.V, Greenwood in 1940, 
repeated the same soil tests, which confirmed his earlier 
findings. These experiments signified that no toxic effect or 
soil deficiency occasioned the Swollen Shoot disease. 
In a collaborative effort, A. F. Posnette of the De­
partment of Agriculture and E. F. S. Shepherd a plant patholo­
gist, began field observations on C.S.S.V. in 1938. The 
effort affirmed that the C.S.S.V disease spreads irrespective 
of environmental conditions. Shepherd also determined that 
the Swollen Shoot was not due to a bacteria. After numerous 
inoculation experiments when he utilized a strain of bacteria. 
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cultured from swollen tissues, he was unable to transmit the 
disease. Other experiments, using phenyl-propionic and Indo-
lyl-propionic acids that promoted bacterial growth in soils 
gave negative results. 
Identifying the Virus Nature of the Swollen Shoot Disease 
However plants budded with virus-infected trees in unc­
aged and caged environments revealed the virus nature of the 
C.S.S.V plant disease. When the tests were repeated in unca­
ged areas, all budded-plants developed Swollen Shoot. Plants 
not similarly treated remained healthy. To confirm these 
laboratory findings, the plant pathologists repeated the tests 
under field conditions at Aburi, ten miles from the nearest 
known case of the Swollen Shoot disease. In this example, 
ninety plants, budded with C.S.S.V infected trees, all re­
vealed typical symptoms, and eighteen developed swellings. 
This scientific breakthrough that traced the Swollen Shoot to 
a virus obtained the support of two other farm scientists, who 
had earlier supported Dade's environmental theories of cause 
and effect.^® 
In 1941, Posnette searched for possible vectors of the 
virus and established a criteria to determine the 
symptomatology of the disease and methods for its control. 
These problems preoccupied him and his colleagues from 1940 to 
1943. In the effort, Posnette established that beans or seeds 
obtained from normal pods on infected trees were not vectors. 
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Also, all available cacao-sucking Hemiptera were collected, 
fed on infected plants, then caged on healthy seedlings. 
Several insect species, including Capsidae, Coreidae, 
Membracidae, Cercopidae, Fulgoridae, Dictyophoridae and Ric-
aniidae were tested as virus vectors. The scientists also 
anticipated that the cacao Psyllid (Mesohomotoma Tessmanii) 
the Aphis (Toxoptera Aurantii) and the Thrips (Heliothrips 
rubrocinctus) which fed aggressively on cacao might be 
carriers of the Swollen Shoot virus. 
In 1943, Cotterell, the assistant government entomolo­
gist obtained transmissions under experimental conditions 
with certain mealy bugs (Coccidae), a Psyllid (Mesohotoma tes­
smanii Aulm) and an Aphid (Taxoptera Aurantii Boye). These 
insects were common and widespread on Ghanaian cacao.The 
tesmanii attacked unshaded cacao the most and therefore most 
capable of transmiting the virus from the original infected 
tree. 
Establishing the Symptomatology of the Virus 
The symptomatology of the virus disease was established 
between 1941 and 1943 after careful, painstaking field obser­
vations. This information was needed to help the Department's 
field staff to identify the disease in the course of treating 
infected farms. A virus infected tree showed several leaf 
symptoms. A distinctive yellowish or white chlorosis appeared 
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in the leaves. The veins remain outlined in normal green 
color, but seemed thickened underneath. Afterwards the areas 
between the main veins would bulge upwards, imparting a wavy 
edge, to the leaf. In severe cases, "the whole leaf is puck­
ered like a cloth in which the stitching but not the fabric 
has shrunk, the stitches representing the veins. 
The areas between the veins may turn brown and drop out 
of the leaf. At this stage, the tree cannot produce healthy 
leaves again. What is worse, steady defoliation would set in, 
the rate of leaf production is reduced, and the foliage would 
appear as small tufts at the ends of bare branches.The 
cacao pods, which bear the beans, became dwarfed and rounded. 
The tree's stems suffer from swellings, usually at the end of 
a shoot whose growing points have been killed. A slow down of 
growth occurs and the tree reveals short internodes. While 
healthy cacao trees have a regular rhythm of flushes, infected 
trees tend to be tardy in generating new leaves. Swellings 
also occurred on cacao roots. But as of 1944, no 
abnormalities had been found in the flowers of infected 
trees. 
How the Virus Epidemic Spreads 
Close observations from 1940 to 1943 enabled the Agricul­
tural Department to determine that the C.S.S.V epidemic 
extended itself in two different ways. First, an outbreak 
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would gradually infect adjacent trees. This form of spread 
was characteristically, "slow, steady and relentless, seldom 
leaving any healthy trees inside the diseased area; more 
healthy trees on the perimeter become infected thereby 
accelerating the epidemic. 
The second type of dispersal occurs with the appearance 
of new scattered outbreaks some distance from the first or 
main outbreak. These eruptions tend to enlarge like the 
first. The rate of spread would then increase until the cacao 
farm is extinct. These subsidiary outbreaks originated from 
the first through agency of vectors, or resulted from fresh 
infections from an alternative host plant of the virus. 
Subsidiary outbreaks usually became fewer as the distance from 
the main outbreak widened.^* 
Methods of Controlling the Virus 
In 1940-1, the strategy used to stem the disease was cutting 
out and stumping all trees showing the characteristic 
swellings. This procedure, however, proved difficult to 
implement. The field staff of the Agriculture Department 
could not identify twig swellings on mature cacao trees during 
the early stages of infection since these were often concealed 
by foliage. Another difficulty was that swellings large 
enough to be detected at a distance were not usually visible 
until the virus had infected the tree for twelve months. 
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Without the transmission experiments which revealed leaf 
mosaic as a reliable symptom, diagnosis for future treatments 
would have been perplexing. Even after mosaic became a 
recognized symptom, it was clear that the removal of obviously 
diseased trees alone could not check the virus. The 
appearance of symptoms on adjacent trees shortly after cutting 
out of infected trees indicated that apparently symptomless 
trees in contact with those showing mosaic were potential 
carriers of the virus. 
The Agricultural Department reverted to the policy of 
cutting-out all diseased trees after these scientific 
findings. The Department aimed to confine the disease within 
the existing limits of the main outbreak and to eradicate the 
isolated outbreaks whenever discovered. From February 1941, 
the Agricultural Department drastically removed rings of 
healthy-looking trees from infected farms. The field staff 
followed this policy consistently because this approach ef­
fectively reduced the radial spread of infection. After May 
1941, the search for new outbreaks became more systematic. 
Infected plots were inspected on a monthly basis, unlike pre­
vious years when outbreaks were uncovered more or less 
accidentally.^ 
To control the known vectors, the Department adopted two 
methods on an experimental basis. One technique was the 
spraying of nicotine solution to kill off the virus before and 
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during the felling of infected trees, and scorching all leaves 
and greenwood immediately after hewing down the tree. The 
agricultural scientists inspected the farms monthly and 
promptly removed all newly infected trees. It must be 
stressed that the Department organized all of these schemes on 
an experimental basis on a seventy acre cacao farm near the 
cacao Research Station. 
The gravity of the cacao plant epidemic can be gauged 
from the fact by May 1942, the disease had engulfed over 250 
square miles of cacao belt under potentially ideal conditions 
for its continuous spread. Within the heart of the cacao belt 
C.S.S.V disease had destroyed about 66 percent of the cacao 
trees. In one village, an agricultural scientist stated, 
"[In] the villages of Akodum (sic) stacks of cacao trunks are 
now seen to be for sale as firewood. This is when we thought 
the cacao had died as the result of repented attacks by Capsid 
bugs. " 
The Department of Agriculture surveyed cacao producing 
areas in the colony and uncovered thirteen isolated cacao vi­
rus outbreaks far distant from the first struck in the Eastern 
Province. Wiawso in the Western Province, and Peki across the 
Volta river in the erstwhile German colony of Togo, provided 
notable examples. By 1943, C.S.S.V was a threat to cacao 
output in Ghana, then the world's major producer and whose 
national income derived largely from cacao exports. By this 
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date, the Department's strategies to eradicate this deadly 
plant pathogen were largely exploratory in character owing to 
lack of personnel and finance. 
An Evaluation of Agricultural Science Administration in Ghana, 
1909-1943 
From the foregone analysis, it is clear that though 
formal British rule emerged in 1874, and despite the in­
troduction of cacao into Ghana in 1879, no over-arching insti­
tution to direct the colony's agricultural operations existed 
until 1904, a time lapse of twenty-five years. But the 
country's agricultural potential was evident to the British 
administrators who noted in 1892 that not more than 5 percent 
of the soil had ever been cultivated in any one year. The 
aim to promote export agriculture explains why colonial ad­
ministration, especially Governor Brandford Griffiths, 
vigorously encouraged cacao farming in the 1890's without the 
benefit of an agricultural department. The absence of this 
institution automatically voided any cohesive program to 
identify and map out policy-decisions concerned with plant 
health. 
It was not until the governorship of John Pickergill 
Rodger in 1904 that the colonial administration conferred the 
post of director of agriculture on the senior officer of the 
Aburi Agricultural Experiment station. The drive to promote 
export agriculture explains why the administration established 
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agricultural stations in various climatic regions of the colo­
ny, so These experiment stations only aimed to ascertain which 
crops would produce the most prolific yields under Ghanaian 
conditions for international commerce. Disease con­
siderations, for any of the numerous crops it promoted, did 
nor figure in the agenda of the Agricultural Department. As 
indicated earlier, the Department's attention to plant 
pathogens arose only as an incidental adjunct to the 
Department's primary goal of promoting export agriculture. 
Barely equipped to cope with plant diseases, the 
Department suffered interminably from shortage of agricultural 
experts. The Department was unable to recruit skilled 
manpower from abroad. Recruitment in Ghana for agricultural 
duties also failed. The available staff suffered from 
resignations and long leaves of absence. Two world wars, and 
depression in the 1930's led to further staff cuts. Some 
personnel were invalided out of service. These problems 
truncated work in progress and precluded the initiation of new 
lines of research. 
The supporting evidence for this analysis is 
considerable. For example in 1913, I. D. Koranteng, a 
Ghanaian travelling instructor resigned. The Department's 
first entomologist, W. H. Armstrong died in 1911, a year after 
his appointment. His replacement went on a extended leave of 
absence from 1 July to 17 December 1913. A travelling 
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instructor, recruited from the West Indies, was also absent 
from duty for five and half months. R. H. Bunting, the 
government mycologist, similarly spent 158 days on leave of 
absence in 1913. Under such conditions, the Department's 
ability to safeguard plant health became especially diffi­
cult.The situation with the department's top-ranking 
personnel was not different. By 1914, and throughout the era 
of colonial rule only two mycologists, R. H. Bunting and H. A. 
Dade, were available to the Department. Ghana with 91,843 
square miles of territory, had a technical staff of twelve 
Europeans and thirty-eight indigenes. In reality, some of 
these positions remained vacant due to recruitment 
difficulties.^ 
The staffing problem was not peculiar to Ghana. From 
the outset, the number of qualified agricultural scientists 
the British appointed to its colonial agricultural service 
never exceeded a thousand, a number altogether inadequate for 
their immense task." In 1925, the entire British colonial 
agricultural service comprised of 150 officers. The number 
broke down into 80 specialists and seventy other appointments 
to serve the colonies which covered nearly 2,000,000 squares 
miles, with a population of 51,000,000.^" 
Recruitment and training of suitable staff to fill 
professional positions in the colonial agricultural service 
presented problems. In the 1890s, British universities 
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provided no training in agricultural science, a trend which 
continued until 1910. The newly created colonial departments 
of agriculture recruited the available manpower. The shortage 
of skilled personnel became especially critical in 1913. In 
that year, the number of agricultural officers the British 
recruited for the colonies totaled only eleven. This included 
one entomologist, W. H. Patterson, for Ghana, but no 
mycologists. The First World War depleted the available staff 
and recruitment ceased for several years. When after the war 
colonial governments wanted to expand the agricultural 
departments, hardly any graduates were available.®® 
Meanwhile, British officials in 1923, insisted upon using 
trained scientific personnel because second rate officers were 
"worse than useless," and may lead the respective colonies to 
disaster, "when scientific aid is in question"The manpower 
problem, however, still persisted. Even manpower training 
services in tropical agriculture at the Imperial College of 
Tropical Agriculture (I.C.T.A), at Trinidad, British West 
Indies, did not alleviate matters. Though the demand for 
agricultural scientists had increased threefold, the Institute 
could only make sixteen appointments per year from 1919 to 
1924.57 
In Ghana, because of personnel shortage, the Department 
accommodated itself to an advisory role in disease control. 
Shortage of qualified staff also meant agricultural 
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instructors were usually unavailable to implement policies on 
plant disease control in farm districts.®® Attempts to recruit 
staff from among indigenous Ghanaians failed. Applicants who 
wished to train as instructors lacked the requisite academic 
credentials. Those with the required qualifications pursued 
professions in medicine.®' Lack of recruitment for farm 
supervision posed several difficulties. The few available 
travelling instructors were over worked. Some averaged 
b e t w e e n  2 5 8  a n d  2 9 0  d a y s  o f  t r e k k i n g  e a c h  y e a r T h e  
itinerant instructors covered an enormous stretch of territory 
which was taxing. For an officer to visit the same district 
more than once a year was rare.^  ^
Ghana by 1925, carried over 180,000,000 cacao trees on 
900,000 acres.The Head Office of the Agricultural 
Department at Accra found the administrative capacity for this 
scale of operations taxing. The Department acknowledged that, 
"The task of directing the numerous lines of work, many of 
them of a highly specialized nature which are required of the 
Department, and of making and keeping the Department an 
organic whole is not an easy one. 
Over the years the Department of Agriculture 
acknowledged its apparent lack of progress in disease control. 
In 1914, the Agricultural Department expressed frustration 
over its "microscopic" efforts to control Capsid pests; "As 
the efforts to control these pests have been on such a minute 
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scale, it may be stated the pests have had an almost 
undisputed field of operations since the work was first 
brought into prominent notice in 1909."^  This situation never 
improved in the period under review. 
The Department from 1910 to the mid-1930s emphasized farm 
instruction without much local research. To quote one source, 
"It is difficult to see how any agricultural officer of the 
Department could be expected to offer correct advise on cul­
tural or other treatment as he had no opportunity to acquire 
knowledge under local conditions.Even with an adequate 
staff, it was doubtful whether the Agricultural Department 
could have controlled plant diseases any better. Labor 
shortage, made the cost of hired farm workers expensive for 
most cacao farmers.For example, the instruction to farmers 
to handpick insects from cacao trees failed. In 1914 the 
Department reported "no progress in destroying insects because 
the collection of insects though congenial in India and Java 
is not congenial for the (Ghanaian farmer).Moreover, this 
advice was impracticable because it economized on land which 
was plentiful, but not on labor which was scarce.^  
Another problem was that most farmers had no knowledge 
of English. Under these circumstances, they could not benefit 
from English language instructions. The use of ex tempore 
translations did not get the message across. Where such 
translators were available, farmers preferred instructions 
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from the few older staff, a cultural trait of deferring to the 
elderly, and scarcely to the younger ones.^ ' 
The absence of research facilities and skilled manpower 
to check cacao diseases worsened during the depression of the 
1930s. In 1931, the administration, for economic reasons, 
reduced the senior and junior staff in the Agricultural 
Department. In that year, the Director of Agriculture abol­
ished the post of chemist and entomologist. When two vacan­
cies occurred in the technical division due to retirement, the 
Director refused to fill them. Despite the manpower 
redundancy exercises, Graham Auchinleck, then Director of Agr­
iculture, felt compelled in 1932 to counter public perception 
that the headquarters of the Department was over-staffed. To 
use his own words: 
I wish to correct the impression current among some 
sections of the community that [the] Head office is 
over-staffed relatively (sic) to other branches of 
the Department or to other Departments of 
Government. Three officers above the long-scale are 
not only not excessive but are inadequate, and in 
this respect the Department does not compare 
particularly with other branches of Government 
Service.^  
Funding for the Department, also underwent severe cut­
backs. The working conditions of the technical staff 
accordingly suffered. By 1932, there were only two 
laboratories for the Department's four technical divisions at 
Aburi. None of them was commodious. The Entomological 
Division operated in one small room in the chemical laboratory 
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which severely limited available space for the chemist. The 
Botanical Division had no accommodation whatsoever. 
Auchinleck, the Director of Agriculture, observed that, "while 
it is unlikely that Government cannot face special expen­
ditures of this kind just now, I wish to press for consider­
ation of these needs, and to ask that they be filled as soon 
as possible.Not only did the government leave these needs 
unfulfilled, but also denied funds to replace the electric 
light batteries at the Aburi Agricultural laboratories and 
staff bungalows. Auchinleck wrote; 
It is hardly necessary to stress the inconvenience 
they will cause to the officers there. Much of the 
apparatus is now dependent upon electricity as a 
source of light, heat or power, and unless the 
dynamo and battery can be repaired I shall be 
obliged to find funds for converting the 
laboratories and apparatus for using oil lamps. The 
officers themselves will be put to inconvenience and 
expense in having to change the lighting system of 
their bungalows.^  
The director went on to demand that the Department of Agri­
culture, and not the government, should run the batteries. 
This though, failed to materialize. 
Meanwhile, the laboratory's water-supplies became, "hope­
lessly insufficient."^  Experiments closed down for long 
periods each year because water was always in short supply for 
ordinary laboratory operations.^  As one political scientist 
has observed, "Looking back over the early years of the story 
of cacao's development one cannot but regret that it was not 
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properly organized from its very beginning."^  He could not 
have been more apt. With a dearth of skilled personnel, poor­
ly equipped and under-funded, technical research on 
entomological and mycological hazards to the cacao crop 
suffered severe constraints. 
Comparisons with the Outside World 
Most of these limitations were not peculiar to Ghana. G. 
B. Masefield, a well placed official, who served in the Brit­
ish Colonial Agricultural Services, has acknowledged that 
appointees to the colonial Agricultural Departments were 
always, "handicapped by scientific isolation, trying climate 
and frequent ill-health and money was short.Parsimonious 
British colonial spending largely accounted for inadequate 
cacao disease control programs. Under colonial rule, Ghana's 
Department of Agriculture ran a tiny annual budget of £18,0-
00.^  Most of these went into salaries and sundry adminis­
trative expenditures. In 1929, when the Colonial Office in 
London organized the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture 
in Trinidad to research plant diseases, the financial re­
sources to operate the college did not come from the British 
treasury. The cacao producing colonies in the West Indies and 
West Africa, and some cacao manufacturing interests in the 
United Kingdom provided the funding.^ ® Like Ghana, the 
Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture worked with a limited 
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staff of five scientific officers. In addition to cacao 
problems, the officers dealt with general problems related to 
agriculture in the British West Indies.^ ' 
If under colonial rule agricultural research and 
extension services in Ghana to control cacao diseases were 
poor, the same was true of other cacao-growing countries. 
Cacao research had expanded in Brazil, Dutch-Guiana, Belgian 
Congo, Columbia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico and Haiti. But 
before World War II, the cacao research institutes of any 
importance were the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture 
in Trinidad, and the Central Cacao Research Station at Tafo, 
Ghana. The Turrialba Cacao Research Institute in Costa Rica 
emerged only in 1947, to improve cacao production in the 
Western hemisphere. It is interesting that Turrialba was 
charged to resolve short-term research projects and to leave 
problems of longer range to the older and larger cacao 
research center of Trinidad and Ghana•s Cacao Research 
Institute.®" 
Most of the problems entailed in cacao disease controls 
lay beyond the resources of Ghana's Agricultural Department. 
Indeed, the nature of tropical plant pathology, particularly 
viruses, was largely unknown elsewhere in the world before the 
mid-1930's. The British agricultural research centers in­
cluding Rothshampstead Experiment Station at Harpenden, Herts, 
knew "very little" about virus diseases generally. British 
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agricultural scientists have actually characterized the period 
before the 1930s as the "Middle or Dark Ages" of plant virus 
research, and that, the more scientific attack upon the plant 
virus problem occurred during the 1930s.By implication, 
work on the Swollen Shoot virus conducted between 1936 and 
1943 at the Central Cacao Research Station in Ghana, placed 
the country among those which pioneered plant virus diseases 
before World War II. 
It is doubtful, whether Ghana's Department of Agriculture 
without its difficulties, could have accomplished more than it 
did on cacao disease controls under colonial rule. In 
England, the Imperial Bureau of Entomology had since 1890 
produced the Review of Applied Entomoloav. which dealt with 
insects injurious to plants, man and beasts. These were ab­
stracted from about 1,200 Swedish, Japanese, Danish and 
Norwegian articles. The Bureau identified insects it received 
from entomologists and veterinary officers from British colo­
nies. However, only a staff of three and one part-time worker 
prepared these research findings and journal abstracts for 
publication in the Imperial Bureau of Entomoloav Ouarterlv. 
Since these publications dealt with the technical and 
taxonomic aspects of the subject, they proved unsuitable for 
use in the various Departments of Agriculture in Ghana and 
other British colonies. 
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Conclusions 
For its limited impact on controlling cacao diseases in 
Ghana, the colonial Agricultural Department has attracted 
criticisms from African nationalist politicians and several 
social scientists. In the light of the available evidence, 
these perceptions demand serious modification. The colonial 
Department of Agriculture fulfilled its primary objective to 
introduce, experiment with, and instruct farmers to propagate 
exotic plants for international commerce. Using agricultural 
experiment stations, the Department disseminated seeds either 
gratis or in exchange for a nominal fee. The effort 
undoubtedly helped farmers to transform Ghana's rain forest 
into the world's most prolific cacao producing country from 
1911 to 1978. Declining output in the Western hemisphere, due 
to the Witchbroom fungus disease, rendered the Department's 
role in promoting cacao growing in Ghana, a landmark in world 
agricultural history. 
It must be reiterated that the control of cacao diseases 
was however incidental to the Department's original agenda. 
The Department offered advise on disease and pest control 
strategies without any scientific support from a viable 
research station. However, as will be seen later, the 
Department's lines of research in entomology, fungoid and 
virus diseases, along with recommended control measures 
remained a valuable knowledge base for the West African Cacao 
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Research Institute which emerged in 1944. From this 
perspective, the Department's long term impact on cacao 
diseases represented a significant historical legacy. 
The Department of Agriculture undoubtedly exhibited major 
weaknesses. Such flaws, however, must be attributed to the 
dynamics of British colonial rule. British administration, 
and its parsimonious spending failed to envision a research 
station to protect colonial economic plants from disease. Few 
qualified plant pathologists served the Agricultural 
Department. Poorly equipped as they were, this technical 
staff dealt with difficult plant diseases, over an extensive 
geographical area, under hard conditions. 
Laboratory facilities, when available were mediocre. 
When war exigencies and financial depression occurred, the De­
partment of Agriculture suffered cut-backs in personnel. This 
fact, among other factors voided continuity of research and 
precluded the initiation of new ones. From 1910 to 1943, 
these constraints were the decisive elements upon which the 
progress of the Department depended. The Department's initial 
accomplishments in cacao in virus research and controls broke 
new ground, but the administration of agricultural science 
experienced severe limitations. Such constraints, however, 
were not peculiar to the Ghana but to all British colonies. 
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IV WARTIME CACAO DISEASE EPIDEMIC AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
WEST AFRICAN CACAO RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 1939-1945 
Cacao diseases multiplied intensively during World War 
II to the extent of threatening a national catastrophe in 
Ghana. The farm crisis compelled the British colonial 
administration to intervene directly to curb the epidemic. 
Such was the ruinous impact of cacao diseases by 1944 that the 
Secretary of State for the colonies re-organized Ghana's 
Central Cacao Research Station to the status of an inter-
territorial cacao research institute embracing the four 
British West African colonies, of Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
and Gambia. This posture marked a major departure from the 
restrained involvement policy which Ghana's Agricultural 
Department had pursued until then. 
Though officially recognized in 1936, D. H. Urquhart, 
the director of Agriculture in post-war Ghana, opined in 1956 
that the earliest outbreak of this plant virus disease 
occurred between 1910 and 1935, soon after the first farms 
were established.^  A tree-killing disease, the cacao virus 
had defied solution until the outbreak of the second global 
war. Before World War II, approximately 3,000 acres of cacao 
farms in the zone lying between Tafo, Koforidua, Mangoase and 
Amanase in the central portion of the Eastern Province 
suffered from Swollen Shoot. In 1939, the disease was present 
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at Eisa in the Manya Krobo district. By 1940, Swollen Shoot 
had destroyed many cacao farms in an area of 200 square miles 
as a result of progressive devastation when war began. In 
1942, the Swollen Shoot epidemic had extended to the Atewa 
range, north-east of Peki in the Volta region, Awenade, Wiawso 
and Kobriso. The plant virus was also prevalent in the 
Ashanti Region, Central and Western Provinces up to the border 
with Cote D'Ivoire, having taken over thirty years to 
establish itself throughout the extent of Ghana's cacao belt.^  
The worst hit area, was the Eastern Province where the first 
cacao plantations were built. 
Wartime Priorities Supersede Cacao Farming 
The gloomy pre-war outlook on cacao worsened during the 
war when the crop lost its markets in Europe. The German 
military occupation of continental Europe restricted cacao 
exports only to the United Kingdom, Canada and the United 
States. It is true that Ghana was then the world's leading 
producer of the crop. But cacao from this source competed with 
those from the rest of Africa, Central and South America, Asia 
and the Caribbean for the few available wartime markets. 
As a British colony, the war diverted resources in Ghana 
to war-related economic pursuits. Output subsequently 
declined during the war. The 1939-1940 cacao season, yielded 
242,000 tons of cacao compared to 300,000 in 1937. In 1941, 
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Ghana produced 222,000, tons of the produce. The 
corresponding production figures for 1942, 1943 and 1944, were 
126,000, 190,000 and 193,000 tons in that order. By 1946-7, 
the country's cacao output had slumped to 192,000 tons.^  The 
neglect of the cacao economy contributed significantly to the 
incidence of plant diseases, especially the Swollen Shoot 
virus in the wartime period. 
When the war broke out, the British government demanded 
strategic raw materials and food. These priorities took 
precedence over cacao which was always in surplus supply. 
With the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Japan occupied 
Southeast Asia and interdicted the outflow of primary 
resources to Europe. African primary commodities, notably 
oil-seeds, palm oil and the Hevea Funtumia rubber variety 
assumed a strategic significance.^  in fact, from 1941, copra, 
palm kernels and mineral products topped the priority list 
over cacao in British commodity shipments.® Timber became 
highly prized. The demand for it led to intensive timber-
felling in Ghana throughout the war. The mining of bauxite, 
manganese ore and industrial diamonds also became pronounced.* 
Ghana's capital, Accra, became a U.S. strategic outpost 
for military operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean. 
The army needed supplies of edibles from Ghanaian farms. In 
1942, the colonial administration appointed a full-time 
Director of Supplies to emphasize local food production and 
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procurement.^  Food farming subsequently assumed a major 
significance to meet the wartime military demand for 
foodstuffs. The Department of Agriculture diverted efforts 
from the control of cacao diseases to establish pig farms 
while encouraging the production of tobacco, honey, jam, 
marmalade, fruit and juices for local use. The Department 
also created cooperatives to produce and market yams at 
Atebubu in northern Ashanti under contract to the army.® The 
Department fixed prices for government procurement agencies to 
secure supplies for the military. Farmers accordingly 
cultivated food crops especially rice, corn, millet groundnut, 
shallots, palm oil, fresh vegetables and livestock. In some 
cases, planters uprooted dying cacao trees to make room for 
food crops because cacao prices had since the 1930s been 
meager.' These developments had serious implications for the 
subsequent neglect of cacao plantations and the spread of 
diseases that followed. 
Moreover, merchant firms which had hitherto purchased and 
marketed cacao overseas could not operate because war 
conditions rendered European markets virtually inaccessible. 
Cacao could not be shipped abroad because shipping space was 
restricted to strategic resources. Meanwhile, German U-Boats 
lurked in African surf ports and preyed on British cargo ships 
anchored off-shore.Admittedly, the British colonial 
government did not altogether abandon cacao. The 
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administration, unlike pre-war years, created the West African 
Produce Control Board (W.A.P.C.B.) to centralize cacao 
marketing in lieu of the free marketing system of the pre-war 
years." Even under war conditions, the crop was the mainstay 
of thousands of peasant farmers and the country's source of 
hard currency earnings. Ghana's budget position also depended 
upon the prosperity of cacao exports. Above all else, cacao 
was a valuable dollar earner to the colonial power. Great 
Britain, which usually re-exported the commodity to the United 
States and continental Europe.^  
Even then, the British faced problems. Under war 
conditions, vehicles and spare parts were unobtainable in the 
colony to cart cacao from rural settings to Ghanaian harbors. 
The complications of shipping cacao overseas compelled the 
British in 1942, to order the destruction of surplus cacao up-
country after purchase.^  Throughout the war, the W.A.P.C.B 
could only ship 48 percent of its cacao stocks. Given, these 
realities, cacao deliveries at the beginning of 1943, 
slackened in Ghana. Part of the problem was manpower 
shortage. Cacao harvesting was dependent upon wage labor. 
The strong demand for manpower for war-related activities 
inevitably reduced the labor available to harvest cacao. 
What was worse, the government pursued a low price policy 
for cacao to avert inflation. The Agricultural Department 
never paid more than £3 per ton for cacao compared to £2 for a 
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load of 60 pounds in peace-time. Higher prices, it was 
claimed, when imported commodities were not forthcoming, would 
have placed excess income into farmers' hands, thereby fueling 
inflation.^ ® Surplus cacao was either burnt in heaps or used to 
produce cacao butter, cooking fat, lighting oil, soap and 
candles to make up for commodity shortages/"* 
Staff from the Agricultural Department who could have 
handled cacao diseases were for the most part engaged in other 
pursuits. When war struck in 1939, some of the staff 
performed military duties overseas. Those available in Ghana 
assumed responsibility for government procurement.^  ^ On 13 
July 1943, the Agricultural Adviser to the Colonial Office 
observed that, "Research had to go by the board to a large 
extent... we may find ourself rather bankrupt of research 
results which are a necessary prelude to secure planning for 
the future."^ ® This perception was hardly open to dispute. In 
sum, labor shortage, poor cacao prices, lack of shipping 
space, demand for strategic resources and food for the army, 
as well as better-paying alternative labor opportunities 
voided wartime cacao disease control. The relative 
disinterest in cacao farming advanced the spread of cacao 
pathogens in Ghana's rain forest. Destructive Capsids and 
fungi, hitherto dispersed, became concentrated in the cacao 
plantations. Combined with the debilitating effects of 
Swollen Shoot, the phenomenon "threatened a national 
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catastrophe" in the country/"* 
Given the nature of the Swollen Shoot virus, the relative 
wartime disinterest in cacao plantations proved particularly 
dangerous. The virus devastated plantations in two ways. The 
virus epidemic usually began sporadically among a few trees. 
By a process of tree to tree spread, these isolated outbreaks 
gradually extended beyond their immediate locales to engulf 
the farm.^ ° The two types of spread varied from farm to farm 
and from district to district. But they both accelerated as 
the virus built up and gathered momentum each year. The 
number of trees infected in a single outbreak usually 
increased about three-fold in three years, eleven times in 
five years, and eighty-eight times in seven.By the end of 
the war, 90 percent of virus-infected cacao was concentrated 
in an area of 600 square miles in the Eastern Province, called 
the "Special Area." Most cacao in this "Special Area" was 
planted before 1920. But due to the virus and wartime 
neglect, production slumped to below 50 percent of their pre­
war average.^ ! 
The statistics cannot convey adequately how the Swollen 
Shoot virus devastated hundreds of square miles of established 
cacao during and after the war, leaving villages derelict and 
hamlets abandoned.Two villages in the Eastern Province, 
Koransang and Akotuakrom may perhaps illustrate the Swollen 
Shoot menace in post-war Ghana. The Department of Agriculture 
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had surveyed Koransang cacao farms in 1936 when the virus was 
first discovered, and again in 1939 when the war broke out, 
and finally in 1944. The Department designed the surveys to 
monitor the effects of the virus on the typical cacao farm. 
Built in 1904, the Koransang farm was over thirty years old 
before the first survey. A casual re-inspection in 1942, 
revealed that Swollen Shoot had killed 20 percent of the trees 
and infected about 45 percent of the farm.^  ^ In 1944 when it 
was re-surveyed, the Swollen Shoot disease had crippled about 
74 percent of the trees in the oldest fields planted between 
1904 and 1914. The virus had also killed 43 percent of the 
medium-aged fields planted between 1915 and 1922. The farm's 
1926 production tonnage dropped from 30 tons to 6 tons in 1944 
solely because of the disease. 
The cacao farms of Akotuakrom in the Akim district of the 
Eastern Province, provided another example of a post-war 
devastated area. In 1944, farmers resorted to "Appeal Farms." 
This meant they replanted their derelict plantations in hopes 
of re-vitalizing them. This attempt however failed to remedy 
the jeopardy.Generally, output in the Eastern Province that 
had previously averaged 325 pounds per acre, dwindled to 200 
pounds after the disease surfaced. To quote one agricultural 
scientist, "The analogy between the spread of Swollen Shoot 
and fire is close. The sooner both are attacked the easier 
the control, but left for long both become out of control. 
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Shifting Cacao Farming from Ghana to the Southern Pacific 
Such was the gravity of the Swollen Shoot threat in the 
immediate post-war years that British manufacturing interests 
considered building cacao plantations in the South and Western 
Pacific. D. H. Urquhart, one of Ghana's post-war directors of 
agriculture, toured the Western Pacific on behalf of the 
Cadbury cacao manufacturing company and the South Pacific 
Commission to consider the feasibility of developing cacao 
estates in Papua New Guinea, the Netherlands New Guinea, New 
Hebrides, Western and American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji and 
the Solomon Isles. 
Considered as a unit, these territories comprised of 
some 560,000 square miles, adequate to satisfy overseas' 
demand for cacao. In a similar venture, another emissary. Dr. 
E. E. Cheeseman, visited Malaya and Borneo in Southeast Asia, 
and some East African territories including Zanzibar where an 
estimated 3,000,000 acres of land were deemed suitable to 
cacao planting. In fact, in Western Sri Lanka, for example, 
about 1,300 hectares of dying rubber trees were promptly 
converted to cacao planting in the post-World War II 
situation.^ ® These developments might perhaps illustrate the 
catastrophic nature of the cacao crop epidemic in Ghana. 
The cacao Swollen Shoot menace in West Africa was 
reminiscent of South and Central America and the Caribbean 
where the Monilia Pod Rot and Witchbroom diseases destroyed 
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cacao estates in the 1930s. It is pertinent to reiterate that 
in 1895 Latin America had furnished 86 percent of world cacao 
output compared to only 1 percent from Africa. However, 
because of disease pathogens, cacao in the Western hemisphere 
declined to 28 percent between 1935 and 1938 with much of the 
rest coming from Africa. It was ironic then, that by 1944, 
the Swollen Shoot virus threatened the extinction of African 
cacao as had earlier occurred in the neotropics. The 
seriousness of Ghana's cacao situation prompted the official 
realization that, "The rehabilitation of the [cacao] industry 
to its former level of production must be a matter of prime 
importance after the war."^ ' 
The West African Cacao Research Institute 
The creation of the West African Cacao Research Institute 
therefore arose in response to cacao diseases which spread 
like wild-fire in the region during the Second World War. 
Ghana's situation was probably the most acute. These concerns 
compelled the Agricultural Adviser to the Colonial Office, Dr. 
H. A. Tempany, to tour Ghana and Nigeria's cacao growing 
districts as early as October 1943 to obtain a first hand 
appraisal of the farm crisis. Dr. Tempany came away convinced 
of the need to employ agricultural scientists to control these 
virulent cacao pathogens.'" 
Under these considerations, an agricultural institution 
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to resolve the cacao problem emerged in the form of the West 
African Cacao Research Institute (WACRI). The British 
Colonial Office selected the pre-war Central Cacao Research 
Station at Tafo, Ghana, as the headquarters of the Institute. 
The major consideration was that the research station stood in 
close proximity to the center of the cacao farm belt where the 
Swollen Shoot disease was paramount. Also, the Central Cacao 
Research Station which had since 1938 investigated the Swollen 
Shoot virus bequeathed its research findings to the newly-
created West African cacao research body.^ i WACRI came under a 
team of agricultural scientists composed of entomologists, 
chemists and agronomists working under a director of research. 
In the interim, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
established in London, a body of scientists to direct research 
policy.^  
WACRI emerged formally on 1 April, 1944, superseding the 
Central Cacao Research Station of 1938. The West African 
Cacao Research Institute, however, was an international body 
designed to eliminate cacao pathogens from West Africa 
generally. Funding for the Institute came from the profits of 
the West African Produce Board which had accumulated some 
£3,676,253 in wartime trading. From these profits the British 
endowed one and a quarter million pounds sterling to the 
Institute to finance the survey of cacao farms in Ghana and 
Nigeria in July 1944.33 Three years later, the newly created 
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cacao marketing boards in Ghana and Nigeria allocated a 
further £1,000,000 in financial support to WACRI.s* 
Furthermore, the British government invested £800,000 of this 
funding in home government securities to accrue an interest 
rate of £70,000 in six years.Evidently, quite unlike the 
depression years, funding for cacao research after the war, 
started on a sound financial footing. 
Funding aside, the research institute inherited the 
agricultural science personnel and laboratory facilities of 
Ghana's pre-war Central Cacao Research Station. More 
importantly, the Station's staff of five research officers, 
made up of a botanist, a plant pathologist, an entomologist, a 
chemist and agronomist had already made considerable progress 
on the bionomics of the Swollen Shoot virus between 1938 and 
1943. To this experienced body of scientists, the Cacao 
Advisory Board in London later recruited a corps of qualified 
and reputable agricultural science personnel for the 
institute. 
In addition to securing skilled manpower, the Secretary 
of State for the colonies at the behest of its Agricultural 
Adviser, widened the scope of the research institute to meet 
the threat of Capsid and Black Pod pathogens as well. WACRI 
aimed to concentrate research into pests and diseases which 
posed immediate threats to West African cacao. The overall 
policy-objective required a rigorous investigation into the 
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bionomics of cacao Capsids and the Black Pod fungus disease. 
Second, the program required a thorough examination of cacao 
virus problems, their vectors and the alternative host plants 
in order to determine practical measures of control.^ " 
Finally, the institute also had to fully address the problem 
of cacao fungoid pests. 
Although investigations into the Capsid, Black Pod and 
Swollen Shoot topped its agenda, WACRI's other lines of 
research included plant-breeding, fertilizer trials and 
fermentation techniques to improve cacao growing methods.In 
sum, the West African Cacao Research Institute from its 
inception was geared to investigate all matters affecting the 
crop from the cultivation stage to the preparation of the crop 
for international commerce. The WACRI report for 1946 noted, 
"It was one of those rare occasions in which the urgent need 
for a research to maintain the production of a crop has been 
recognized".^ ® This development also marked a rapid departure 
from past when funding cuts took priority over agricultural 
research. 
The structure and Functions of WACRI 
To effectively implement its research programs, the 
Institute, like the Central Cacao Research Station it 
inherited, had four divisions: entomology, botany/pathology, 
chemistry/soil science and agronomy. 
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[a] The entomology division determined the bionomics of Capsid 
bugs, the toxic action of these insects, their parasites and 
predators. This unit also tested the relative effectiveness 
of insecticides and spraying techniques against insect vectors 
of cacao viruses in collaboration with the botany and 
pathology division. 
[b] The botany and pathology division dealt with virus 
research, the fungal diseases of cacao and specialized in 
theobroma introductions, plant breeding and progeny trials. 
[c] The chemistry and soil section investigated mineral 
deficiencies of cacao and conducted soil surveys in the West 
African cacao belt. This division also emphasized cacao root 
development, according to soil conditions and examined the 
possible correlations between soil types and the incidence of 
Swollen Shoot diseases and Capsid attacks. 
[d] The agronomy section on the other hand undertook 
experimental replanting of cacao in areas devastated by virus 
disease and to rejuvenate cacao trees close to centers of the 
Swollen Shoot outbreaks. This division also observed clinical 
symptoms and the relative importance of pests and diseases in 
the field before cutting out began." 
The Institute enjoined the agronomy section to observe 
methods designed by local farmers to control the plant virus 
and Capsid attacks and to assess the scientific value of each. 
The agronomy division, formerly a part of the Department of 
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Agriculture, was designed to fill the gap between research and 
practice. Each division has a head responsible to the 
director of the institute. However, no research unit operated 
independently. The Institute's work required inter-divisional 
cooperation. Therefore each research officer had to be 
familiar with work in all research units. The Institute also 
has a principal research officer who guided details of 
research in all divisions and acted in the director's 
absence. 
WACRI had a much wider international dimension outside 
West Africa. The Colonial Office established in London, a 
Cacao Advisory Committee to advise on cacao research. This 
body, actually a branch of the post-war Colonial Agricultural 
Research Advisory Board fostered links between the West 
African Cacao Research Institute and leading scientific bodies 
in Britain.41 
The first director of the Institute, 0. J. Voelcker, 
arrived at Tafo, Ghana on 20 March, 1944 from Britain to 
implement WACRI's research agenda. On 25 April, 1944, he met 
the local cacao advisory board in Ghana to discuss the future 
of the Institute. The session, which local Ghanaian cacao 
producers attended, unanimously resolved to place WACRI on a 
permanent status, a position the London Cacao Advisory 
Committee also endorsed. 
The organization of the institute assumed a definite form 
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in 1946 when an international management committee replaced 
the London cacao advisory committee/' In 1947 a legislative 
instrument, titled the Gold Coast (Ghana) Ordinance #1 
provided the statutory basis for this international committee 
to run the Institute. The committee comprised of equal 
Ghanaian and Nigerian representation. A nominee of the 
Secretary of State for the colonies chaired the committee. In 
the management of the research institute, the Secretary of 
State for the colonies reserved over-riding powers. WACRI is 
autonomous, but for disciplinary purposes, its staff conformed 
to Ghana's general orders.^ * 
The relationship between the cacao research body and the 
various Departments of Agriculture in Ghana and elsewhere in 
British West Africa was clearly outlined. WACRI was a fact­
finding body. The Institute has no responsibility for 
executive action. Using specialized equipment, WACRI's 
technical staff performed laboratory work on cacao diseases. 
The Institute then subjected the results of these experiments 
to controlled field tests to either confirm or discount 
observations and deductions made in the laboratory. 
After this came the tertiary stage when the Institute 
repeated the field experiments in selected cacao farms under 
local agricultural conditions. Such field tests were designed 
to confirm the results of the first two stages of the 
Institute's work. The trials also gauged the economic and 
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psychological effect of the project on the farmers.^ " It is 
only at this stage that executive action could be taken to 
implement the results in confidence. The final responsibility 
to implement the institute's findings rested with the 
Agricultural Departments in British West Africa. 
WACRI*s Initial Difficulties and Advantages 
The Institute did not enjoy a roaring start. Staffing 
problems, which had long confronted the Departments of 
Agriculture, also faced WACRI. European agricultural 
scientists were unobtainable in the post-war years. To 
resolve this bottleneck, the colonial administrations in 
British West Africa agreed to second their agricultural 
scientists to the Institute. In Ghana, the Central Cacao 
Research Station at Tafo, and the Department of Agriculture 
each released four of their technical staff to work for WACRI. 
By the end of 1945, the total number of agricultural 
scientists at the service of the institute stood at fifteen. 
However, many of the expatriate staff knew little about the 
cacao crop before their arrival in Ghana. As a starting 
point, such personnel were encouraged to visit diseased farm 
districts to obtain a first-hand appraisal of the cacao 
problem.^  
The expanse of territory in Ghana also demanded much 
time during farm inspection tours. This geographical barrier 
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proved particularly difficult because the Institute, after the 
war, could not readily secure light trucks for extensive 
travel. Such vehicles, whenever available, were expensive to 
hire, a by-product of general post-war shortages. Again, 
field inspection trips took staff away from the laboratories 
for extended periods. Above all else, some of the staff 
divided their attention between the Institute and the 
Agricultural Department. One example was the senior chemist of 
the Institute who worked part-time for the cacao research body 
and the Department of Agriculture.^  ^
Furthermore, the recruitment of supporting staff of 
laboratory technicians and research assistants also posed 
difficulties. Candidates available for such work were poorly 
trained in biology and chemistry, the requisite disciplines 
for research into plant pathology, entomology, soil science, 
plant-breeding and agronomy. Here again, the best students 
from the colleges had already set their sights on more 
prestigious vocations, particularly medicine. To surmount 
this problem, the institute decided to train its own 
supporting technical staff and to improve their job prospects 
in order to retain their services.^ ® 
There was also the lingering post-war difficulty of 
obtaining technical scientific literature and equipment from 
overseas. For example, efforts to secure dissecting 
microscopes ran into severe difficulties which handicapped 
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initial entomological research. The problems did not end 
there. The few available personnel from the institute 
experienced sicknesses. Amoebic dysentery, sand-fly fever and 
malaria were the commonest ailments. Water shortages also 
surfaced to hamper WACRI's programs. 
This cacao research unit, however, enjoyed specific 
advantages. As indicated earlier, WACRI inherited previous 
research information on the Capsid, Swollen Shoot and Black 
Pod diseases from the erstwhile Central Cacao Research 
Station. Again, the earlier trial efforts of Ghana's 
Agricultural Department in cutting out virus-infected cacao 
had yielded considerable information on the value of this 
method of control. The difficulty, however, was that the 
cutting-out policy lapsed during the war because of staff 
shortages and wartime priorities. On a positive note, this 
line of plant virus control was nonetheless available to the 
Institute for future use. 
Between 1936 and 1943, the Central Cacao Research Station 
had worked assiduously and extensively on the Swollen Shoot 
virus. Moreover, the Ghanaian staff it seconded to WACRI had 
previous experience in cacao virus research. These 
individuals continued the lines of work on which they were 
previously engaged and formed a valuable nucleus for the 
Institute's later research into cacao plant pathogens. The 
need to train Ghanaian staff to diagnose the virus disease was 
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not acute because most of them were familiar with Swollen 
Shoot symptoms/' 
WACRI's Sub-Stations 
Preparatory to its research work, the West African Cacao 
Research Institute acquired sub-stations for field 
experiments. One of these was the Koransang cacao farm. Built 
in 1904, the farm by 1944 was infected with the Swollen Shoot 
virus on account of its location in a disease-devastated area. 
Other cacao farms which served as sub-stations for the 
institute were located at Akwadum in the Akim district, 
namely, Kukua (30 acres), Nankese (18 acres) and Adunkwanta 
(26 acres). These diseased farms located 16 miles from the 
Institute were rented from local farmers to provide^  pilot 
studies on plant pathogens. By 1946, the institute had 
acquired over 910 acres of land for field research purposes.^  
The Royal Air Force obtained aerial photographic surveys of 
these plots thereby providing the research body with detailed 
topographical, geological soil and forest surveys.^  This 
information, along with funding, an excellent research 
personnel and laboratory equipment facilitated the WACRI's 
onslaught on cacao diseases after World War II. 
The planning that went into the organization, staffing, 
funding, structure, policies and operations of the Institute, 
represented a major transition from the restrained involvement 
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programs that characterized the control of cacao pathogens 
before World War II. Until the mid-1940s, agricultural 
scientists in Ghana's Department of Agriculture acted mainly 
in an advisory capacity. For the most part, they did so 
without the benefit and support of scientific research and 
experiments. The creation of WACRI to determine how best to 
fight cacao diseases represented a significant departure from 
the well-meant albeit largely ineffectual policies of the 
colonial Agricultural Department. 
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V IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PROGRAMS TO ERADICATE THE SWOLLEN SHOOT 
EPIDEMIC, 1945-1947 
The widespread nature of the Swollen Shoot epidemic after 
World War II, compelled the administration to initiate 
emergency measures to eradicate the Swollen Shoot epidemic. 
To await WACRI's research findings before contemplating action 
was dangerous because the disease could destroy Ghana's entire 
cacao economy in short order. At any rate, the government in 
1945 could not realistically expect WACRI recommendations 
before initiating action. Moreover, for the first two years 
of its existence, the Institute itself was engrossed in the 
available studies on the Swollen Shoot and building upon it. 
In the interim, the administration based its decision to 
cut out diseased cacao on the existing information acquired in 
the wartime period. A study of an isolated outbreak at 
Apedwa, eleven miles southwest of Tafo, had amply demonstrated 
the destructive powers of the disease when allowed to progress 
unchecked. F. C. Deighton, the Government Plant Pathologist, 
surveyed the Apedwa outbreak for observation purposes in 1937. 
The diseased area was originally confined to about 1,000 
square miles. By 1943, the Swollen Shoot virus had extended 
across an approximated 20,000 square miles of cacao farms. 
This figure included a number of scattered outbreaks which 
started from it.^  
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To control the Swollen Shoot disease the government 
surveyed all cacao growing areas with WACRI's assistance. 
Started in 1944, the survey defined the major cacao growing 
areas and the severity of the of Capsid and Swollen Shoot 
attacks in these regions.% The survey revealed that the 
original focus of the disease, west of Koforidua in the 
Eastern Province had extended to the boundary of the Central 
Province. In the Volta region, the area of infection centered 
around Peki. A series of small isolated outbreaks also ran 
northwards on both sides of the Volta river. The most 
northerly outbreaks in this series, encompassed northwest of 
Kpandu. In Ashanti, a chain of outbreaks criss-crossed the 
territory, running from Agogo, Konongo and Nyabo, right up to 
the Lake Bosumtwi districts. Cacao producing districts 
similarly affected in the region included Bekwai, Sikamang and 
Dunkwa. In addition, two small isolated outbreaks existed in 
the Pamu district.^  
However, over 90 per cent of the diseased existed in one 
area in the Eastern Province. Only scattered outbreaks could 
be found elsewhere in the country. The virus epidemic was 
most grave in the older cacao producing areas in the Eastern 
Province. In the 1945-46 crop season, the province had 
produced 70,000 tons compared to a production tonnage of 
116,000 eight years earlier.* By 1945, cacao production was 
declining mainly because of the disease, and partly because 
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many farmers shifted to food farming which in wartime, was 
more profitable. The 1945-46 major crop season had amounted 
to 204,000 tons compared to 285,000, ten years earlier. 
In the Western Province, the disease had extended its 
original focus around Wiawso, eastward to the Ankobra river, 
downwards to the Tano river valley, and further westward to 
the border with Cote D'Ivoire. Another could be found about 
twenty miles south of Wenchi, and approximately ten miles 
south of Wiawso. The geographical dimensions of the Swollen 
Shoot epidemic were definitely extensive. The question of 
control received urgent consideration after a series of 
conferences held for agricultural officers in 1945. 
Representatives of the West African Cacao Research Institute 
were present at all the important meetings. Formulated in 
August 1945, the country's disease control program aimed to 
alert farmers and the general public to the depredations of 
Swollen Shoot and the need to effect emergency control 
measures. The Department of Agriculture also aimed to prevent 
the disease from spreading northwards and southward from the 
main area of infection in the Eastern Province. Finally, the 
Department planned to re-survey the area of infection in 
Ashanti and to eradicate the disease in that region. 
In field trials conducted in 1941, agricultural 
scientists from the Central Cacao Research Station removed all 
infected cacao trees along with the surrounding ring of 
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symptomless trees. The method reduced tree to tree contact 
and checked further infections. In essence, the removal of 
contact trees was crucial in controlling the epidemic.® 
The Department of Agriculture in 1945, initiated a policy 
of cutting out all Swollen Shoot infected trees. The chopping 
down of infected trees was then the only method known to 
science capable of checking the plant virus. The procedure 
had in fact received the endorsement of the Cacao Research 
Institute. Not only was there no other known cure for the 
virus, but progenies resistant to the disease were then 
unknown.* The scientific bases for chopping down infected 
trees were clear. A diseased tree could not recover. It died 
within 16 to 24 months. Experiments and experience had also 
indicated that symptomless trees in contact with diseased ones 
usually became infected within a time lag of three months.? 
The location and extent of the Swollen Shoot outbreaks 
and the propaganda to persuade farmers to cut out infected 
trees commenced in March 1946.® Because it lacked sufficient 
staff and financial resources to undertake a comprehensive 
nation-wide cacao treatment programs, the administration 
expected farmers to implement the cut-out policy on a 
voluntary basis. However, government agricultural personnel 
were always on hand to provide guidance and assistance.' 
The Department of Agriculture drew up plans on the 
modalities of the voluntary cut out policy. To this end, it 
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demonstrated how mealybugs transmitted the virus from tree to 
tree. Personnel from WACRI and the Agricultural Department 
toured the devastated districts to explain the control 
strategies to local chiefs and farmers. A pamphlet explaining 
the Swollen Shoot disease and how to eradicate it appeared in 
both English and Twi, the local vernacular in the cacao belt. 
A series of broadcast talks, based on this pamphlet were 
regularly transmitted on the national wireless news. 
The Agricultural Department ordered portable, battery 
operated film projectors to portray visual propaganda to cacao 
villages. One departmental film that dealt with the Swollen 
Shoot was titled, "Cut to Cure." This motion picture that 
dealt with the timely and precise treatment of infected farms 
was shown throughout the cacao areas. A WACRI pamphlet, 
captioned, "SWOLLEN SHOOT DISEASE OF CACAO - HOW TO RECOGNIZE 
AND CONTROL," was distributed to schools and interested 
individuals. F. C. Bawden, a British authority on plant 
pathology gave a radio talk on virus disease at Accra. 
Whenever possible, agricultural officers persuaded farmers to 
visit and apprise themselves of disease control techniques at 
WACRI.Government policy at this stage, required the 
Department of Agriculture to chop down infected trees only for 
demonstration purposes. 
After the Department of Agriculture and the West African 
Cacao Research Institute had demonstrated the effectiveness of 
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the Swollen Shoot program, the government adopted a campaign 
to treat the disease. In the effort, the agricultural field 
staff approached farmers through traditional rulers The 
agricultural field staff also organized demonstrations on how 
to deal with infected farms. 
The Farmers* Response to cutting Out 
Farmers' response to the voluntary cacao rehabilitation 
campaign was not favorable. In areas of land scarcity, and 
consequent demand for foodstuffs, farmers replaced devastated 
cacao fields with food crops.Food farming actually 
increased with intensity along the southern fringes of the 
forest belt and were particularly prominent in areas within 
convenient reach of large consuming centers. 
Cacao farmers remained suspicious and continually 
expressed open hostility to the recommended measures of 
disease control. Under the circumstances, the Agricultural 
Department only registered a marginal impact. Only farmers 
whose plantations suffered severely from the virus responded 
positively to the cutting out program. In the Eastern 
Province, only 101 square miles of cacao plantations were 
surveyed and 516 outbreaks of the disease were recorded. Of 
these, 223 were treated in the period under review. In 
Ashanti, where the disease had affected about 800 acres, only 
about 10 percent of these received treatment. In the Western 
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Province, where a mild form of the virus was present, no 
cutting out came into effect. In the Central Province and 
Northern Trans Volta Togoland, no outbreaks were reported but 
propaganda in these areas were nonetheless insisted upon.^  
The Compulsory cut out ordinance of 1946 
Throughout 1946, the Department carefully monitored the 
progress of the cacao disease campaign. It became apparent 
that the voluntary efforts of the farmers alone would not 
suffice to stem the Swollen Shoot plant virus. With this 
realization, agricultural policy makers decided to resort to 
more direct and vigorous methods of control. With this end in 
view, the government passed the Swollen Shoot Disease of Cacao 
Order of December 18, 1946.^ ® This farm ordinance went into 
effect as of 31 December 1946. The ordinance made it 
obligatory for owners and occupiers of cacao farms to remove 
all virus infected trees. A government-appointed farm 
inspector could enter any cacao plantations to enforce the 
removal of diseased cacao/"* 
In January of 1947, the Department of Agriculture 
implemented the compulsory cutting out policy. The program 
followed set procedures. The regional and district officers 
of the Department of Agriculture engaged African staff for the 
job. Some of this staff were trained to identify infected 
cacao trees. The rest operated in gangs for felling and 
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stacking the diseased trees The efficacy of rogueing out 
diseased cacao and its ring of surrounding trees was never in 
doubt since the virus could not survive for more than 48 hours 
after the tree's death J® 
By 1947, some 46,000,000 of Ghana's 400,000,000 cacao 
trees were infected and doomed to die within the year. Of 
these, 45,000,000 were situated in the Eastern Province. The 
decided policy therefore was to cut them out before they 
spread to healthy trees. In January 1947, the Cacao 
Rehabilitation Department commenced the cutting out project. 
At the end of 1947, it had removed over 2,500,000 diseased 
trees.Meanwhile, the disease was expanding at the rate of 
15,000,000 trees per annum.In response, the Department of 
Agriculture made detailed plans early in 1948 to concentrate 
on the area of mass infection in the Eastern Province where 
45,000,000 of the trees existed. It also planned to 
rehabilitate stricken cacao farms in areas best-suited for the 
permanent cultivation of cacao. 
The urgency behind the Swollen Shoot campaign was clear. 
Cacao prices had risen in 1946 from £28 to £51 a ton, and 
settled at £75 a ton in 1947. Ghana's national income as 
always, depended heavily on cacao exports. Moreover, Ghanaian 
cacao was an important dollar earner for Britain, which 
required financial resources in the post-war world for 
national rehabilitation. Because of wartime neglect and the 
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Swollen Shoot disease, cacao had experienced a substantial 
fall in exports. Cacao production stood at 221,000 tons in 
1946, but dropped to 162,000 in 1947, compared to the 250,000 
ton average in pre-war years. The successful rehabilitation 
of cacao plantations would assure Ghana of its major source of 
livelihood.^  
Nonetheless, from April to December 1947, the voluntary 
cut out policy severely hampered progress towards satisfactory 
treatment of diseased farms. Agricultural field staff could 
treat farms only with the farmer's consent. What was worse, 
farms already treated for the Swollen Shoot continued to 
sustain re-infections from adjacent farms whose owners had 
rejected treatment. 
The Beaton Committee 
Farmers opposed the cutting out crews of the Agricultural 
Department in several areas. The disease control policy came 
to a standstill. The Swollen Shoot situation deteriorated as 
cacao districts that had received treatment became rapidly 
reinfected. On September 18, 1947, the Legislative Council 
adopted a motion to review the Plant Pests and Diseases 
Ordinance of 1937. The government accordingly set up a 
committee to review the existing legislation on cacao diseases 
and how best to administer them. Working on the available 
evidence, the committee in particular, should consider the 
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requisite compensation for cacao trees.W. H. Beeton headed 
the Plants Ordinance review committee. This investigative 
body held its first meeting on 20 September 1947. Nineteen 
witnesses, which included members of the Legislative Council, 
the Joint Provincial Council and the Ashanti Confederacy gave 
testimonies. Other witnesses, drawn from among paramount 
chiefs, chief farmers, personnel from the Department of 
Agriculture, the West African Cacao Research Institute and the 
government received due consideration. 
A member of the Ashanti Farmers Union and president of 
Ghana Farmers' Co-operative Union, also submitted proposals on 
how best to cope with the Swollen Shoot epidemic. These 
suggestions ranged from pruning the obviously diseased parts 
of the tree and then tarring the resultant stumps. Others 
suggested chemical application against the mealybug vectors of 
the Swollen Shoot virus. To still some others, the 
destruction of the alternative wild host plants of the virus 
was the solution. Others wanted the creation of a cordon 
sanitaire around the outbreaks even if this warranted the 
felling of healthy cacao trees for the purpose.The evidence 
that came before the committee from rural Ghanaians revealed 
the unpopular nature of the cutting out program. 
The Beeton Committee considered each proposal carefully. 
Obviously bent upon the destruction of diseased trees, the 
committee predictably ruled that though alternative host trees 
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were pregnant with the virus, their destruction with chemicals 
was not feasible. The committee also ruled that cordon 
sanitaire would not provide the control required. The 
commission, in compliance with government policy, accepted the 
recommendations of a WACRI representative that cutting out was 
the most efficient method to destroy the Swollen Shoot virus. 
This investigative body concluded that on the basis of the 
available scientific knowledge, the most appropriate treatment 
was to remove all infected cacao trees. 
On January 28, 1948, the Beeton Committee recommended 
grant payment to farmers who lost their cacao trees to the cut 
out policy. The monetary grants derived from a draft scheme 
the Government had prepared in July 1947, titled "The Payment 
of Rehabilitation Grants to Cacao Farmers Injuriously 
affected by the Effects of the Swollen Shoot Disease." The 
compensation payment was based on the "Tree Basis" scheme. 
Each farmer would receive seven pence for each diseased tree 
removed, with the proviso that he replanted his field to 
offset the loss of the tree. Compensation was payable in two 
installments. The initial grant would be paid out on the 
basis of the number of cacao trees removed. The farmer would 
receive a total of £12 for every acre lost to the disease.^ ® 
In effect, the farmer would receive £5 for each acre lost to 
the disease and £7 for every acre he replanted.^ ' 
The committee recommended how best to administer the 
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scheme. The disease control project according to the report, 
should go under the Cacao Rehabilitation Division under the 
Department of Agriculture.^ " The Cacao Rehabilitation 
Department could execute these measures without the farmer's 
consent.The committee considered that prior notification to 
farmers would not be necessary before government laborers 
treated diseased farms because "The circumstances were too 
serious..."^ ! The Beeton Committee maintained that, it would 
not be practicable to advise individual farmers of the cut out 
and re-treatment procedures. Rather, the gong, the 
traditional public address system in rural Ghana, should be 
sounded two days before the agricultural field staff entered 
the diseased farms to effect treatment. 
In its final report to the Legislative Council on 23 
March 1948, the committee endorsed the legislation which 
regulated the Swollen Shoot control policy. The report 
advised further that treated farms should be inspected bi­
monthly to remove reinfected trees whenever discovered.^ * Upon 
the advice of the Executive Council, the Governor of Ghana 
adopted the recommendations of the Beeton Committee whose 
report was published in 1948.Beeton's "Tree Basis" scheme 
remained in effect from 1 October 1948 to 31 August 1951 until 
the New Deal of Cacao Policy replaced it.^ * 
Farmers, however, opposed the Beeton scheme. They 
contended that the recommendations failed to make any 
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compensations for any diseased trees removed from the farms 
during the bi-monthly re-inspections and re-treatment by 
agricultural officers.'^  This grievance, as shall be seen 
later, was a major contributory factor to the general rural 
unrest in the cacao belt in the months of February and March 
of 1948. 
In conclusion, the cutting out program between 1945 and 
1947 attracted a lukewarm response at best. Agricultural 
officers who implemented the ordinance encountered opposition 
from farmers. Progress was slow in view of the large area 
involved. The Agricultural Department required a considerable 
increase in staff to cope with the outbreaks successfully. It 
was only in the areas of mass infection in the New Juaben 
district of the Eastern Province where farmers requested 
assistance from the agricultural field staff.In the early 
months of 1948, violent political disturbances interrupted the 
Swollen Shoot eradication campaign. The subsequent chapter 
evaluates the dynamics of rural unrest and the politicization 
of the cutting out order because of the emergent tide of 
nationalism in Ghana after World War II. 
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VI THE POLITICIZATION OF THE SWOLLEN SHOOT CONTROL PROGRAM 
Preliminary Observations 
The imprint of rural movements on Ghana's decolonization 
process after World War II, is under-represented in the 
available historiography. Nationalist agitation in Ghana, as 
presented in the existing literature, exhibits an elitist 
bias. Historians have ascribed Ghana's march to self rule to 
various social forces notably, "European racial arrogance" the 
role of "education," "urbanization," "newspaper attacks," and 
"radical nationalist agitation." But leaving aside the issue 
of cacao diseases, all of the social forces which contributed 
to decolonization after World War II were also present after 
the first global war. From this perspective therefore, there 
is the need to explicate why independence occurred in Ghana 
after World War II but not the first. 
Apparently, the educated African nationalists have 
received sole credit for Ghana's achievement of political 
autonomy. Accordingly, "education" is highlighted because the 
nationalist leaders were its major beneficiaries. "Newspaper 
agitation" is emphasized because the elite used the print 
media as a weapon against colonial policies. "Urbanization" 
is stressed because the educated African leadership were urban 
residents. The marches, boycotts and verbal confrontations 
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and rhetoric organized against colonial administrators 
occurred in the urban centers. These factors are 
indisputable. But they have contributed to the persuasive, 
albeit narrow perception that the decolonization movement in 
Ghana was uniquely urban in character/" Cacao diseases which 
fanned rural unrest, making for a mass movement against 
British rule, is hardly emphasized. As will be seen later, 
Ghanaian nationalists politicized rural discontent in Ghana 
which in turn contributed to the British decision to grant 
partial to Ghana in 1951 and full independence status in 1957. 
The Bases of Rural Discontent 
The reaction of the cacao farmer's to the cutting out 
policy facilitated Ghana's advance to self-rule.% The 
supporting evidence for this assertion is considerable. In 
1946, colonial government ordinances required the obligatory 
destruction of infected trees. Nationalist politicians 
immediately politicized the government's coercive measures 
when these ordinances provoked discontent in rural Ghana. 
Farmers expressed open hostility to the government's cut 
out policy on economic grounds. Cacao farming in Ghana is a 
long term business investment. It took at least seven years 
of uninterrupted toil for each cacao tree to bear fruit. Each 
fruit, in turn took several weeks to mature.^  Farmers usually 
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re-invested cacao incomes into new lands. Such investments 
were risky. The uncertainties ranged from destructive plant 
diseases, drought, excessive rainfall, the dangers of snake 
bites to unstable produce prices. Cacao farming also revolved 
around credit facilities. Prospective farmers often incurred 
loans to acquire lands, seeds, tools and to pay for labor. 
Once built, the farms provided a collateral for credits. Such 
loans usually underwrote the cost of funerals, marriages and 
children's educational expenditure. An Ashanti ditty, as 
quoted below, accurately summarized the cacao farmer's 
economic aspiration: 
If you want to send your child to school, 
it is cacao; 
If you want to marry, 
it is cacao; 
If you want to buy cloth, 
it is cacao; 
Whatever you want to do in this world, 
it is with cacao money that you do it. * 
Since the cacao plantations supported their livelihood, 
farmers have traditionally opposed any threats to these 
investments. In 1921, 1931-2 and again in 1937-8, cacao 
farmers collectively confronted exporters in Ghana for 
allegedly manipulating cacao produce prices. The 1946 
compulsory destruction of infected trees was more sinister. 
Since cacao farming usually took several years of back-
breaking toil and the endurance of heat and dust to achieve 
results, the cut out policy in their view, attested to the 
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insensitivity of an alien government to the economic 
aspirations of rural dwellers. 
The farmers' opposition also derived in part from a 
significant jump in post-war produce prices. Cacao incomes, 
during the depression years was paltry and even worsened 
progressively in the wartime period. In 1946, the value of 
the crop for Ghana, amounted to £9,500,000. In the 1947-8 
crop season, cacao fetched £41,000,000. The price per head-
load of 60 pounds went up from fifteen shillings in 1945 to 
£1. 7s 6d in 1946, and then to £2 in 1947, and settled at £3. 
15s in 1948.5 removal of cacao trees in a period of rising 
prices merely signified the destruction of valuable capital. 
This perception predisposed the farmers to resist. 
Moreover, the 1946 cut out order undermined the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the farmers' pioneering ancestors 
who first built the farms between the 1890s and the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Farmers remembered with 
nostalgia, how they and their forebears had built the cacao 
plantations as a family resource to last from generation to 
generation. Migrant farmers from the Akwapim, Krobo and^ 'GTa 
districts had since the 1890s relocated into northeastern and 
south-central Ghana. As pioneering farmers, the migrants 
brought stubborn tracts of forest land under cacao planting. 
To most planters therefore, the destruction of cacao trees was 
sacrilegious to the memory of their entrepreneurial ancestors. 
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These family assets must be not destroyed, in their view, but 
retained as a heirloom.* 
By 1947, cacao farmers in the southeastern areas of the 
Colony and Ashanti expressed open hostility to the 
administration's cutting out measures. The farmers' anxiety 
was profound. Year by year, the removal of trees continually 
diminished cacao output and profits. To most farmers, the 
prescribed cure for infected farms was worse than the disease. 
Pathogenic trees could still bear healthy pods for at least 
two more crop seasons. To hack them down meant immediate 
total loss, which in their view, was unconscionable.^  When 
the farmers refused to comply, the Agricultural Department 
employed labor gangs to destroy infected trees without 
consulting the farmers.® 
The size of most farms hardly exceeded three acres. 
This meant the trees targeted for removal represented all the 
mature cacao plants of the average farmer. It is true that 
the 1947 Beeton Committee had recommended a grant of £12 per 
acre to the farmer for each treated acreage. Most planters 
found it unsatisfactory compared to the potential profits of 
the farm even with infected trees over the same period.' 
The Character of Rural Opposition to the Cutting Out Policy 
Dating back to the depression of the 1930s, cacao 
farmers had protested against the import-export firms for 
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paying low prices for cacao. The cut out order was yet 
another threat to the cacao plantation system which might 
destroy their livelihood. Cacao growers displayed their 
discontent through verbal and physical opposition to the 
government's cut out ordinance. They counter-argued that, 
"the disease was nothing new and would disappear if left alone 
for a few years." Others opined that to control the 
infection, "it was only necessary to cut out the infected 
parts and not the whole tree, for how could a diseased tree 
bear good fruit.?" An oft-repeated contention was, "What was 
the point of cutting out the cacao trees if the forest trees 
were left to harbor the mealybugs which was said to carry the 
virus? 
The farmers took particular exception to the gang of 
government laborers who entered their farms and 
indiscriminately slaughtered their trees. Clashes occurred 
between individual farmers and the cutting out gangs of the 
Agricultural Department.In the farmers* perception, the 
government was "wicked" because laborers sent into the farms 
chopped down both healthy and diseased trees unless bribed not 
to: "Was there in fact, a secret motive behind government 
action? Did it intend the deliberate destruction of the cacao 
[plantations] and the acquisition of the land for some hidden 
end? "12 
Ashanti, a major cacao producing region provided an 
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example of rural discontent which the compulsory cut out order 
generated. The Swollen Shoot disease was first recognized in 
Ashanti south of Konongo in 1943. A cutting out campaign 
started in October 1945, and by June 1946, 100,000 trees were 
eliminated. The program was intensified with the passage of 
the Beeton Committee Act on cacao disease control in June 
1947. Thereafter, farmers vehemently opposed the cutting out 
strategy. In early 1948, the Ashanti Confederacy Council, 
made up of the region's divisional rulers, convened in an 
emergency session to discuss the Beeton Committee's report on 
the Swollen Shoot legislation. The debate in council, 
reflected a growing alarm to the compulsory destruction of 
infected trees.The traditional rulers, later converged on 
WACRI's experimental farms in Tafo. Here, they endeavored to 
confront the Institute's director. Dr. 0. J. Voelcker, on the 
relevance of the Swollen Shoot control measures. 
Some of the Ashanti chiefs questioned Dr. Voelcker 
intensely and with considerable suspicion. Reflecting the 
notion that the British colonial government aimed to destroy 
cacao plantations in Ghana for some hidden agenda, the Ashanti 
divisional chief for Agogo asked Dr. Voelcker bluntly: "Has 
the opinion of any other scientist, apart from those in 
Britain, been consulted? " Answer: "This is the biggest 
(Cacao) research institute in the world, and it is being 
watched keenly. Let us move to another farm. This evasive 
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and rather obfuscating response hardly satisfied the chiefs. 
To some of these traditional rulers, the destruction of 
infected trees only spread the disease within the farm. To 
this end, the chief of Berekum asked the director, "How do you 
prevent the mealybugs from falling on healthy trees when the 
unhealthy ones are being cut?" Answer: "One healthy and 
strong man pulls the tree during cutting and it is made to 
fall away from healthy trees." The chief of Berekum asked 
further: "Don't you see that these mealybugs drop from the 
leaves at every stroke of the axe and the chances are that 
they fall on healthy trees?" Answer: "Yes. I agree with 
you." Chief of Berekum: "Do you realize that the wind can blow 
the mealybugs to healthy trees? " Answer: "Yes it is 
possible." Chief of Berekum: "What is the use of cutting out 
then?" In his response Dr. Voelcker contended that cutting 
out was the only method of containing the plant virus 
epidemic.^  
The suspicions of the traditional rulers about the 
relevance of the cutting out policy, was active throughout the 
meeting with Dr. Voelcker. For example, the chief of Asamang 
demanded: "Has any of these trees ever been infected?" Dr. 
Voelcker: "One tree was infected but was cut out five years 
ago." Chief of Asamang: (Coming along with a pod). "Aren't 
these mealybugs I see on the pod?" Dr. Voelcker: "Yes. 
Definitely they are." Chief of Asamang: "And you say this 
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farm is not infected?" Dr. Voelcker: "Take it from me that 
this farm is not infected.These exchanges mirrored the 
distrust and discontent felt among the Ashanti leadership 
against the cutting out policy. These traditional notables 
were themselves either cacao farmers or landowners with a 
vested interest in the fate of their investments. 
The organizational structure for the farmers to resist 
the government's Swollen Shoot policy was already in place. 
This structure had emerged from a long tradition of opposition 
to low cacao prices in 1908, 1919, 1931-2, and again in the 
1937-8 crop seasons. For example, when produce prices 
plummeted in 1937-8, cacao farmers in the Colony organized the 
Sika Mpoano Akuafo Fekuw. (The Gold Coast Farmers' 
Association) under the leadership of John Ayew and Ashie Nikoi 
to secure favorable prices. In the Ashanti region, farmers 
also created the Ashanti Farmers Union with identical goals in 
mind.^  
The ability of the farmers organization to succeed as an 
anti-colonial mass movement was never in doubt. The basic 
unit of the organization was an association of farmers in each 
Twi-speaking village under a chief farmer called Akuafohene. 
The organization was transitory in character, but came alive 
in times of perceived emergencies.^ ® Above the village and 
town level the farmers' organizational structure involved the 
district, provincial and national levels. The chief farmer 
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and a few lieutenants represented their respective villages or 
towns at district level conferences. Here the chief farmers 
would elect one or more of their colleagues to represent the 
district at provincial conferences. This system of delegate 
conferences which had existed since 1913, helped to mobilize 
and coordinate the farmers' opinions at the grassroots. 
Resolutions adopted at the higher levels were transmitted back 
to the towns and villages for discussion. The farmers' 
organization, in short, aimed to confront perceived threats to 
cacao farmers. 
Many traditional rulers participated in the farmers' 
associations because apart from being landowners and farmers 
themselves, they depended upon cacao revenues to support their 
local political functions. The paramount chief of Akim 
Abuakwa in the Eastern Province, Sir Nana Ofori Atta I, was a 
major advocate of farmers' aspirations. The farmers' 
organization was actually the only mass movement in Ghana up 
to World War 11. Until then these associations only aimed to 
secure better prices for cacao. They never demanded political 
changes in order to achieve their objectives.But the cut 
out problem was different. 
The Alliance Between the Farm Protest Movements and the Urban-
based Nationalist Politicians 
Throughout 1947 and early 1948, farmers held protest 
meetings in the cacao districts. Most farmers were ready to 
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support the urban-based nationalist politicians to oppose the 
government's cut out policy. Ghana's first nationalist 
political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.), 
formed in August 1947, took up the farmers' anti-cutting out 
campaign. As a quid pro quo, the farmers association 
identified with the U.G.C.C. demand for self-rule.^  
The western-educated professionals had long protested 
some aspects of British rule. In 1896, for example, Ghanaian 
lawyers organized The Aborigines' Rights Protection Society 
(A. R. P. S.) when the colonial government by law, placed all 
"unoccupied" lands in Ghana under the jurisdiction of the 
British crown. This law, as the A. R. P. S. interpreted it, 
would have served to transform indigenous Ghanaian into 
strangers in their own country. The A. R. P. S. protested the 
act and successfully restored the land to Ghana's traditional 
rulers.^  In the 1920s, the urban-based professionals created 
the National Congress of British West Africa (N. C. B. W. A.) 
to seek participation in the British Legislative Council and 
the colonial bureaucracy. But throughout the period, the 
National Congress movement never demanded political freedom. 
It had no power base and no linkage with rural aspirations.^  ^
The linkage between the rural farmers and the urban-
based political agitators after World War 11 is significant. 
The nationalists, particularly, Dr. J. B. Danquah, Thomas-
Hutton Mills Junior and Alf Ocansey had participated in the 
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farmers' movement as legal or commercial advisers. This 
connection had forged no linkage between the political and 
constitutional objectives of the urban politicians and the 
concerns of rural farmers. In fact until the U. G. C. C. 
emerged in 1947, the politician's ability to penetrate and 
influence rural discontent against colonial rule was 
difficult.^  
The coastal based politicians could not influence rural 
movements in Ghana before 1945 because the British policy of 
indirect rule excluded them from active political 
participation. The British established a Joint Provincial 
Council (J. P. C.) as an arm of the colonial Legislative 
Council. The administration limited representation in the J. 
P. C. only to traditional rulers. By excluding the educated 
elite, indirect rule divided the urban politicians from the 
traditional leadership in rural areas. Indirect rule aligned 
the Ghanaian ethnic rulers with the British administrative 
staff which controlled the colonial bureaucracy, the army and 
police. The Ghanaian ethnic rulers who wielded power over the 
rural mass, actively collaborated with the colonial government 
because the system protected their authority from usurpation 
by "arrogant," "self-serving," "presumptuous" educated 
professionals who "represented nobody but themselves."^ " Until 
1945, therefore, both rural and urban anti-colonial protest 
movements historically proceeded along two separate tracks. 
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But colonial policy, erected on divide and rule tactics, 
did not anticipate that kinship connections and economic 
tensions arising from cacao diseases would unify some 
traditional leaders with the country's urban based 
intelligentsia. Since the rural population steeped in 
tradition remained solidly behind their ethnic rulers, the 
linkage between the farmers associations and the political 
agenda of the urban politicians cemented a mass movement.It 
was no accident that Dr. Joseph Boakye Danquah, a lawyer, 
became the doyen of Ghanaian politics. In 1928, Danquah had 
returned to Ghana from England as a lawyer.Educated at 
London University, he was the scion of the paramount chief of 
Akim Abuakwa, Sir Nana Ofori Atta 1. Raised in the 
countryside himself, Danquah was deeply conscious of his rural 
roots. His doctoral dissertation, "The Moral End as Moral 
Excellence," and two of his major publications in the 1930s 
heavily illustrated rural values.^ ® 
Danquah*s ability to forge a common front for both rural 
and urban issues was not unexpected. His direct family ties 
with the royal house of Akim Abuakwa, a cacao producing rural 
state, stood him in good stead among rural folk. His legal 
expertise aside, Danquah had acquired a unique experience in 
the dynamics of colonial politics. In 1942, the colonial 
government had accepted an amendment to elect non-chiefs to 
the Joint Provincial Council, which until then, was the 
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exclusive preserve of traditional Ghanaian chiefs. In July 
1942, the chiefs co-opted two commoners, Christian Gomedo 
Baeta, a reverend minister, and Dr. Danquah into the J. P. C. 
At the same time. Dr. Danquah had gained a first hand 
knowledge of rural discontent because of the 1946 cut out 
order. In 1947, he identified closely with the farmers 
associations in his ethnic state of Akim Abuakwa in the 
Eastern Province. As a lawyer, farmers who bore the brunt of 
the compulsory destruction of their cacao trees sought his 
advise. As Dr. Danquah has explained: 
Tetteh Kene, a Krobo man, a cacao farmer, whose farm is 
situated at Bosuso came to my office in a state of great 
trepidation. He was accompanied by an educated son who 
interpreted for him for he spoke in the Krobo language 
and I do not speak Adangbe. "Sir," he said, "they are 
destroying my plantation..." "Who are destroying your 
plantation?" I asked. "The Agriculture people," he 
said.29 
The aggrieved cacao farmer added: 
One clerk lives at Bosuso and a European lives at 
Bunso and they entered my farm with a gang of 
laborers and they cut the trees—trees in full 
bearing. They cut them down, and when I protested, 
they said they would take me to court if I stood in 
their way. Please, master, save me, save my farm.^ ° 
The farmers were aggrieved because, the Agricultural officers 
simply entered the farmers' plantations without any 
notification. When Dr. Danquah asked Tetteh Kene whether the 
agricultural staff followed such procedures, the farmer 
replied: 
Nothing at all. The clerk and the white man came there 
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many months ago, and marked certain of my cacao trees and 
told me to cut them down, on the grounds that they were 
diseased. The trees had pods on them, yellow pods and 
green pods, but they have come again and again, and this 
time they did not ask me to cut down any trees but they 
cut the trees themselves, every kind of tree, one long 
belt from one end to the other. Can you help me? 
This episode typified the frustration of the cacao 
farmers with the government's commitment to the mandatory 
destruction of infected trees. Moreover, the government's 
compensation payment of £12 per acre was irksome to the 
planters, most of whom farmed tiny acreages. Since it took a 
minimum of five years to bear fruit, the grant paid the 
average farmer five shillings a year until his replanted 
fields yielded revenue. 
After World War II, the government's destruction of 
infected trees, though scientifically sound, was politically 
dangerous. The rising tide of nationalism and higher cacao 
produce prices drew farmers and nationalists resolutely 
together to oppose the cut out order. Wild anti-colonial 
propaganda spread from village to village, purporting that the 
administration only aimed to destroy the country's qacao 
plantations.^  ^ Under the circumstances, farmers physically 
resisted the government-paid labor gangs who entered farms and 
slaughtered cacao plants under legal fiat. In such 
situations, the affected farmers turned to the leaders for 
help. The nationalist politicians gratefully exploited such 
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mass rural discontent to their advantage.^ ' 
In this ferment of rural unrest, Dr. Danquah and other 
urban professionals, created Ghana's first nationalist party, 
the United Gold Coast Convention (U. G. C. C.) on 4 August, 
1947 at Saltpond, a coastal urban enclave. The U. G. C. C. 
had for its agenda the decolonization of Ghana "Within the 
shortest possible time." The party looked for support from 
both urban and rural areas.Because they were professionals, 
the leadership of the Convention could not have mobilized 
rural support that readily. The cut out policy served to 
foment and focus mass rural discontent against colonial rule. 
By 1947, both urban and rural issues in Ghana played into 
the hands of the U. G. C. C. For cacao farmers, the 
compulsory destruction of their cacao trees had to stop. The 
cacao protest movements of the past had demonstrated the 
organizational potential of the cacao growers and their 
ability to threaten colonial interests. After World War II, 
they were convinced that the United Gold Coast Convention 
which involved educated professionals, would pursue their 
interests with vigor. 
John Ayew and Ashie Nikoi, who spearheaded the farmers' 
organization, and the anti-colonial boycotts of 1937-8, joined 
the ranks of the U. G. C. C. The farmers' determination to 
resist the 1946 cut out order, contributed to the strength of 
the anti-colonial forces. The nationalists in return, threw 
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their weight behind the farmers' grievances. The major 
objective was to bring the farmers' associations under the U. 
G. C. C. for the purposes of anti-colonial propaganda.^ " 
The farmers' linkage with the U. G. C. C. was bound to 
occur. For, apart from Danquah, other leaders in the U. G. C. 
C. working committee had been involved with the cacao farmers' 
associations in some districts. One example was William Ofori 
Atta. Like Danquah, Ofori Atta belonged to the royal house of 
Akim Abuakwa at Kibi in the Eastern Province. In the wake of 
the Swollen Shoot campaign, he became the Okuafohene (Head 
Farmer) of the Akim Abuakwa Farmers Union. The formation of 
the U. G. C. C. placed the nationalists in a position to 
politicize the farmers woes and to link them with a growing 
number of urban complaints.^ " 
Meanwhile, a large section of southern Ghanaian rural and 
urban society chafed at two particular issues. In the cities 
of Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi, Kumasi and Saltpond, the 
livelihood of the urbanités had deteriorated because of rapid 
post-war commodity price increases. In 1947-8, money was 
plentifully available because of favorable cacao incomes. But 
since British and other European industries had not fully 
recovered from wartime ruin, imported consumer goods remained 
in short supply. Sugar, a staple commodity, fell short by 46 
percent of its 1937 index; cotton piece goods dwindled to 25 
percent, and kerosene, indispensable for lighting most rural 
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and urban homes, had slumped to 45 percent of the pre-war 
supplies. 
Commodity shortages in turn induced inflationary 
pressures to bear on the economy. The high prices bore 
heavily on daily rated workers and salaried employees, whose 
incomes dropped from an index of 100 in 1939 to only 66 
percent of its real value in the post-war situation. The 
colonial government did not control the country's import-
export trade directly. This was centered in the hands of 
foreign businesses. But it was in the interest of nationalist 
feelings to equate the activities of European firms with the 
government's Swollen Shoot control policy.In addition, the 
urban dwellers faulted the colonial administrators for 
neglecting industrialization, education and urban slum. Here 
again, the nationalists exploited both rural and urban 
grievances as evidence of colonial incompetence.^ ® 
In late 1948, while farmers resisted the Swollen Shoot 
disease, city residents were boycotting European imported 
goods. Meanwhile, demobilized servicemen, who had returned 
home after trudging in Burma, East Africa and European war 
theaters, had no gainful employment. Alleged British promises 
in wartime to rehabilitate the veterans at the end of the 
hostilities had remained unfulfilled. On February 28, 1948, 
the war veterans marched to the seat of government at 
Christianborg Castle, Accra to seek redress. Government 
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guards fired into the crowd. Two of the ex-servicemen fell 
dead. Several of the marchers lay wounded.^ ' Violent riots 
soon followed. Rioters systematically and thoroughly looted 
several European stores. Between February and March, the 
Accra riots extended to Koforidua, Akuse and Nsawam which were 
actually rural towns in the Eastern regional cacao belt. In 
these rural locales, 29 people died and 237 suffered 
injuries. 
These urban and rural developments had serious 
repercussions on the course of Ghanaian politics. The 
leadership of the U.G.C.C. used the opportunity, "To take 
advantage of that day's tragic event and to use that 
advantage as a fulcrum or lever for the liberation of Ghana. 
In this atmosphere of national tension, political propaganda 
encouraged farmers to conceive the notion that competing 
foreign interests were using the Swollen Shoot control methods 
as a pretext to obliterate Ghanaian cacao. The United Gold 
Coast Convention gained support. The population, which was 
pre-dominantly rural, widely acclaimed the U. G. C. C. leaders 
becausee they made every grievance their own. 
The 1948 Watson Commission of Inquiry 
In 1948, the government suspended the cutting out 
operations in the wake of the riots. The British Colonial 
Office appointed a commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
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political riots of that year. Aitken Watson chaired the 
three-man commission. The Committee met on 8 April 1948. The 
virus disease meantime, gained ground.^ ' 
The Watson committee members visited markets, villages 
and country towns. They also toured parts of the cacao belt 
and later visited WACRI and its experimental farms at Tafo.** 
During its deliberations, the committee took in 187 memoranda 
and concluded its work on 9 May 1948. The investigators 
determined that the cutting out programs contributed to the 
1948 political upheavals in Ghana. Dr. Danquah, the founder 
and leader of the U.G.C.C., submitted before the Watson 
Committee that the "government's policy for the eradication of 
the disease was scientifically sound but politically 
inexpedient."^ " As some farmers told the commission, rumors 
suggested that European firms in Ghana like the United Africa 
Company had embarked upon huge cacao plantations in the Far 
East and were anxious to curtail West African production to 
offset competition.Propaganda such as this, helped to 
mobilize rural inhabitants into a state of hostility against 
the government. The alternative suggestions submitted before 
the committee were to "Let Nature take its Course," "Let the 
Land rest for a Year or Two," and "Let Science Find another 
Remedy." But, as the Watson Committee put it, "all these are 
counsels of despair which can only lead to disaster. 
In sum, Ghanaian nationalists politicized both rural 
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and urban issues to press for self determination. The 
widespread confusion among the population resulted from the 
misrepresentation of the government's cutting out policy. 
According to the Watson commission, the U.G.C.C. founded in 
1947, "had endeavored to bring under their banner everyone who 
had a private or public grievance against the government and 
to seize upon every complaint, great or small to inflame a 
population avid for excitement."^ ® 
The committee nonetheless criticized the Agricultural 
Department's methods of dealing with Swollen Shoot. The 
Department had attached more urgency to containing a disease 
that threatened the country's economy, but completely ignored 
the farmers' sensibilities. Furthermore, the Department's 
propaganda to alert farmers on the nature of the disease and 
probable effect was inadequate.^ ' The Commission maintained 
further that because laborers received payment according to 
the quantity of trees they destroyed, such individuals 
ruthlessly slaughtered both healthy and diseased trees. 
Again, farmers received no notification before the cutting out 
squads arrived. Sometimes the squads hewed down the farmer's 
trees without his knowledge. Because these issues galled the 
farm owners, the Watson committee pointed them out to the 
Agricultural Department for consideration and remedy.The 
Watson Committee recommended that cutting out procedures 
should continue. But because of the politically sensitive 
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nature of the issue, the committee asked for a marking time. 
Secondly, the report indicated that a representative of the 
Department of Agriculture should notify the farmer before 
treating a diseased farm. Furthermore, trained agricultural 
officers should mark out the infected trees before they are 
destroyed. The committee proposed an increment from £12 to 
£24-£30 payable within a two-year period, for every acre 
treated.Unlike the Beeton Scheme which offered a block 
grant of £12 per acre treated, the Tree Basis scheme was a 
more liberal system of rehabilitation payment calculated on 
the number of trees removed during treatment. 
U.N. Agricultural Scientists and the Swollen Shoot Disease 
In view of the highly politicized nature of the Swollen 
Shoot disease, the Watson Committee noted that, "We recognize 
that present feelings make it unlikely that further British 
scientific advise will be accepted as impartial."" The 
committee therefore advised the government to invite 
scientists from countries not commercially concerned with 
cacao to investigate and report on a speedy means to eradicate 
the Swollen Shoot virus. 
The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, recommended three plant pathologists for this 
service. The three international scientists which the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations recommended 
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for their expertise on plant virus diseases arrived at Accra, 
Ghana, on 24 October 1948. These agricultural experts were: 
Professor E. Van Slogteren from Holland, Walter Carter from 
Hawaii, U.S.A. and G. H. Berkeley from Canada.®® The 
virologists, toured the cacao growing areas to meet farmers. 
The trip also created an opportunity for all those who had a 
problem to submit their ideas before the commission. The U. 
N. panel of farm scientists met local chiefs and farmers at 
Suhum, Kibi, Akropong, Koforidua, and Kukurantumi, in the 
Eastern Province. In Ashanti, the panel visited Kumasi, 
Konongo and Bekwai with similar goals in mind. Like the 
Watson Commission, the plant pathologists obtained and 
considered many suggestions. Finally, the U. N. agricultural 
scientists held meetings with members of the colonial 
administration and the staff of the Department of 
Agriculture/* 
In its final report, the panel underscored the 
seriousness of the Swollen Shoot epidemic. The plant virus 
disease was no minor foray, "but a full scale invasion which 
has already left some of the choicest cacao producing lands 
devastated and derelict.After examining the research and 
experiment facilities at WACRI, the U. N. panel of farm 
scientists justified the destruction of infected trees as the 
only scientific remedy to Swollen Shoot: "If enforced 
accurately, thoroughly, continuously and without delay."®® The 
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destruction of infected trees along with a number of wild host 
trees would remove the sources of infection. Though cutting 
out may be unacceptable to those who do not understand the 
nature of the disease, the panel stated, "Unfortunately, in 
spite of many years of effort, there is no alternative known, 
and, and so far as can best be foreseen, there is no 
reasonable expectation of finding one."®' 
The U. N. body made several recommendations which later 
focused the cacao disease research and control projects in 
Ghana especially after 1952. There were indications, 
according to the virologists, that the virus existed in the 
wild forest trees and had to be felled with arboricides. The 
plant pathologists recommended the use of disease resistant 
and high yielding Amazonia cacao progenies to rehabilitate 
devastated farms in Ghana. The U. N. scientists encouraged 
research int the possibility of inoculating trees against the 
disease and the importation of predatory insects to kill off 
the mealybug vectors of the virus. The need to streamline the 
country's extension services to improve relations between the 
Agricultural Department and the farmers in the interest of 
rehabilitating Ghana's cacao economy were also highlighted in 
the committee's report.60 
Notwithstanding these approaches to cacao diseases, the 
U.N. plant scientists nonetheless cautioned that Ghana had to, 
"learn to live with Swollen Shoot" because the ability to 
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uproot it completely was "an unattainable ideal." On the 
other hand, "unless much more vigorous measures were 
undertaken, the ultimate disappearance of the cacao industry 
in West Africa in its present form was only a matter of 
time."^ * The chapters that follow, will explore how these 
considerations figured in WACRI's research agenda, and how the 
Agricultural Department implemented them in the field. 
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VII THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICS OF THE CACAO 
SWOLLEN SHOOT CONTROL 
A major political fall out of the 1948 anti-colonial 
riots, was the creation in 1949 of the Convention's Peoples 
Party (C.P.P.). The C.P.P. was a splinter party of the United 
Gold Coast Convention. Kwame Nkrumah, the leader of the new 
political group, received a liberal arts education at Lincoln 
University in Pennsylvania, U.S.A., and later at the London 
School of Economics in the United Kingdom.^  Both the C.P.P. 
and U.G.C.C. sought Ghanaian political autonomy. However, the 
more conservative U.G.C.C. required political emancipation, 
"within the shortest possible time," while the radical C.P.P. 
demanded "self government now.In response to the 1948 
political riots and subsequent political agitation, the 
colonial administration, held general elections in 1950 to 
establish a quasi-African government in Ghana, as a 
preliminary step to self rule in 1957. 
Meanwhile, based on the findings of the 1948 Watson 
Committee of enquiry and the U.N.-appointed Swollen Shoot 
Commission, the colonial Legislative Council re-enacted the 
Swollen Shoot Disease of Cacao Control Regulations on December 
12, 1949.3 The farmers' opposition to a legislative 
instrument that required the destruction of their stock of 
capital and livelihood remained unaltered. In rural areas, 
the C.P.P. gained support from the farmers organizations. 
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Ashie Nikoi, a national leader of the farmers association, 
split from the conservative U.G.C.C. party to join the central 
committee of the Convention Peoples' Party. In December 1949, 
he and John Ayew, a farm organization activist, created the 
Ghana Farmers' Congress as a wing of the C.P.P. 
The Farmers Congress complained that government-paid 
laborers, lacking any scientific training, had ruthlessly 
destroyed healthy cacao trees. The C.P.P. took up these 
complaints and secured recruits from among the cacao farming 
communities. Once the farmers accepted the radical 
nationalist party as the political expression of their own 
grievances, the popularity of the C.P.P. spread throughout 
southern Ghana. While Nkrumah's Convention Peoples' Party, 
mobilized support from farmers, fishermen, petty traders and 
wage earners, the U.G.C.C., an elitist nationalist movement, 
was the party for paramount chiefs, lawyers and other western 
educated professionals. To quote one source, "the United Gold 
Coast Convention was led by elder statesmen ... who were 
unwilling to enter the rough and tumble of politics.By 
December of 1950, cacao farmers had agreed to sponsor 
candidates through the commoners' party, the C.P.P. 
In preparation for the 1951 elections, the C.P.P. 
manifesto stated explicitly that, "Special Attention Will Be 
Given To the Swollen Shoot Disease." The U.G.C.C. manifesto 
by contrast, omitted any references to this virulent plant 
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disease and cacao farmers in general.® In the contest to 
elect African representatives to the Legislative Assembly in 
1951, the farmers' wing of the C.P.P. proved a valuable 
political asset. In Akim-Abuakwa, Dr. Danquah's home district 
and political constituency, Ashie Nikoi mustered support from 
among the area's cacao farming community for C.P.P. 
candidates.* The Swollen Shoot issue still rankled farmers 
who still resented the destruction of their trees. 
Cacao growers supported the C.P.P. because this party 
championed their interest. For example, in October 1950, when 
the C.P.P. addressed the Ghana Farmers Congress at Nkawkaw, in 
the Eastern Province, cacao farmers strongly condemned the 
cutting out policy and resolved to sponsor candidates to the 
Legislative Assembly through the Convention Peoples' Party. 
This party in turn, felt strengthened with the support of the 
farmers' associations.^  In rural districts, the C.P.P. chose 
local farmers in primary elections. The U.G.C.C. on the other 
hand, failed to field candidates in rural areas. In the 
elections that followed, the C.P.P. won decisively with 34 out 
of 38 seats.® 
Under a new constitution drafted in December 1950, and 
which became effective on January 1, 1951, the colonial 
legislature increased from 31 to 84. This, for the first 
time, represented the entire country, unlike the past when the 
colonial government separately administered the Gold Coast 
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Colony, Ashanti, The Trans-Volta Togoland and the Northern 
Territories. In the quasi-African government of 1951, 
Nkrumah, the pacesetter of the C.P.P. became the Leader of 
Government Business. Dr. Danquah served as the opposition 
leader in the newly created Legislative Assembly.' 
The C.P.P. Policy on Swollen Shoot 
In fulfillment of its 1950 electioneering promise, the 
Convention Peoples' Party addressed the Swollen Shoot issue. 
This was crucial because many of the C.P.P. party members 
entered the country's newly created National Assembly with a 
mandate from the farmers' constituency to "safeguard" their 
cacao plantations from the Department of Agriculture.^ " 
Farmers' discontent against the disease was still active in 
many villages during the early months of 1951 in the 
devastated area of the Eastern Province such as Osiem, Osino, 
Bosuso and Suhien. At the start of January 1951, "the 
situation had reached ominous proportions and farmers began 
physically to interfere with personnel of the Department 
e n g a g e d  i n  d i s e a s e  c o n t r o l  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f i e l d . T h e  
farmers wanted the entire cutting out program terminated 
altogether. By April 1951, opposition to the Swollen Shoot 
disease control operations was violent. 
On 3 April 1951, Ghana's Minister of Agriculture and 
Natural Resources, Archie Casely-Hayford, stated before the 
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Legislative Assembly that the quasi-African government would 
review the cutting out program. The nationalist government, 
in the interim, suspended the cutting out operations in the 
cacao belt for a month to enable a commission of enquiry to 
re-examine the disease control policy It is interesting 
that once in power the nationalist government under Nkrumah 
resorted to the colonial expediency of committees of enquiry 
to prepare public opinion to accept hard political choices of 
national importance. 
In mid-April, the Minister of Agriculture, Archie Casely 
Hayford, appointed a commission of enquiry to review the, 
"Existing Organization and Methods for the Control of the 
Swollen Shoot Disease by the Compulsory Cutting Out of 
Infected Cacao Trees.Justice K. Arko Korsah, chaired the 
committee. Ashie Nikoi, the leader of the Ghana Farmers 
Congress, and J. 0. Torto, educated at the U.C.L.A. in the 
United States and with much experience in cacao virus control, 
also served on the committee. 
The committee conducted its investigations from 12 April 
1951 to 17 May 1951. During its deliberations, the Korsah 
Commission held 14 public meetings at eleven urban and rural 
capitals. Some of these places were Accra, Koforidua, 
Nkawkaw, Kumasi, Bibiani, Sunyani, Bechem, Suhum, Adeiso, 
Swedru and Chito. The public sessions aimed to encourage 
interested persons to place their views and grievances before 
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the committee. The Korsah committee, an all Ghanaian 
investigative body, took evidence from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Cacao Rehabilitation Department and 153 
members of the public. The majority of those who testified 
were either farmers or representatives of the farmers' 
organizations. The Korsah Committee also obtained evidence 
from Dr. J. B. Danquah at a private sitting in Accra because 
of his legal and political experience with farmers grievances 
over the issue of Swollen Shoot.^  
Based on the evidence before it, the Korsah commission 
reported considerable opposition to the mandatory destruction 
of diseased trees and threats of violence against enforcement 
personnel from the Ministry of Agriculture. The committee 
submitted further that most farmers were not knowledgeable 
about the Swollen Shoot virus and were unwilling to accept any 
scientific explanations about how to control it. The farmers 
had indicated before the committee that alternative forest 
trees which harbored the virus should be removed but not the 
cacao.^  
The committee affirmed also that farmers opposed the 
cutting out order because the agricultural staff were ruthless 
when enforcing the policy. The use of police officers to 
compel obedience to the destruction of diseased trees and the 
arrest and conviction of recalcitrant farmers had damaged 
relations between cultivators and the disease control staff. 
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The farmers complained that while the government used the 
native authorities to implement the Swollen Shoot ordinance, 
they never worked through the farmers' unions and chief 
farmers in various districts. Worst of all, the farmers 
lacked confidence in the agricultural survey officers because 
they were not qualified agriculturists/^  
The Ministry of Agriculture came under fire for cutting 
out cacao that still carried pods. Most agricultural 
officers, according to the farmers, could barely recognize and 
identify virus-infected trees. This fact significantly 
contributed to the indiscriminate destruction of trees. 
Again, compensation payments for treated farms were 
unsatisfactory to most farmers. The majority of cacao growers 
demanded restitution at the rate of ten shillings per tree. 
Others completely rejected the cut out procedures and wanted 
no ex gratia payments.^  
Farmers opposed the spending habits of the agencies which 
controlled the plant virus epidemic. First, the Cacao 
Rehabilitation Department controlled diseases in the Special 
Area because of the extensive devastation of trees there. The 
Department of Agriculture on the other hand, held jurisdiction 
over the General Area, which encompassed the rest of the cacao 
belt.'' But instead of disease control, the Cacao 
Rehabilitation Division disbursed £120,000 on bungalows for 
their officers, £17,000 on road construction and £34,000 on 
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road-building machinery. As the Korsah Committee observed, 
"The farmers found it difficult to believe that the activities 
of these officers contributed to the farmers' benefit [and] 
who also operated under compulsory powers."^ ® Essentially, 
farmers refused to co-operate with the Cacao Rehabilitation 
Department, partly for such reasons. On the other hand, 
without the cooperation of the cultivators, past and future 
strategies to curb the Swollen Shoot menace would be 
unworkable. 
The committee criticized the colonial government's 
approach of forceful entry into farmers' lands to compel 
obedience to the disease control ordinance. Farmers who 
testified before the committee had threatened violence against 
anyone who might attempt to enforce the cut out order in their 
plantations. To defuse these grievances, the Korsah Committee 
recommended the abolition of the Cacao Rehabilitation 
Department and the placement of the Swollen Shoot control 
schemes under the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Watson and U. 
N. Swollen Shoot Commissions, the Korsah committee counter-
argued that in practice, "compulsory cutting out was so 
unpopular and so infuriating to the farmers that if the 
policy... were to be pursued further, there would be general 
unrest and possibly public disturbances in the country.The 
committee added though, that while some farmers accepted 
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cutting out, "the preponderance of opinion was against cutting 
out in any form. Cutting out was a drastic method of control 
and under any circumstances, it would be unpopular among those 
who lost their trees." On that account, the Korsah committee 
counselled the revision of the existing methods of enforcing 
the Swollen Shoot ordinance to forestall more public 
disturbances in the country.The method of forced removal of 
the affected trees should be re-structured to seek the 
farmers• co-operation. 
The Korsah committee also recommended a central advisory 
board consisting of the Minister of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, the director of WACRI and a representative of the 
cacao farmers to advise the government on how best to control 
the plant virus disease. Above all, the central advisory 
board would also give the farmers a voice in policy 
formulation on agriculture. The government on the other hand, 
should communicate information from this body through its 
regional branches to farmers association, the representative 
body of the farmers.^ " 
Meanwhile, to maintain good relations with the farmers, 
agricultural officers should defer the cutting out exercise to 
the post-harvest season. The Korsah committee counselled that 
rapport between agricultural officers and cacao growers would 
be possible if the government selected agricultural liaison 
officers in consultation with the farmers. Moreover, the 
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Ministry of Agriculture should disburse ex gratia payments 
only after farmers had rehabilitated their treated cacao 
farms. In that respect, replanting should be spaced at 5 x 5 
feet for Amelonado cacao, and 8x8 feet for the fast-yielding 
Amazonia variety. Canthium species and Cola Chlamydantha must 
be absent from rehabilitated fields since they might 
potentially harbor and disperse the Swollen Shoot virus. In a 
radio broadcast to the nation on 25 April 1951, Justice 
Korsah, the chairman of the committee stated that cacao was 
not a matter for political controversy and that all should 
help to overcome the difficulties.^  ^
The New Deal for Cacao Policy 
Based on the report of the Korsah committee, the quasi-
African government abolished the Cacao Rehabilitation 
Department in 1951, and placed its operations under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. This ministry, became solely 
responsible for the control of cacao diseases and the payment 
of replanting grants to affected farmers.^ " 
The C.P.P. administration also instituted the New Deal 
for Cacao policy. Kwame Nkrumah, then the Leader of 
Government Business, enunciated his New Cacao Deal policy in a 
radio broadcast to the nation on 28 June 1951.^  ^ The C.P.P. 
administration would pay ten, instead of two shillings for 
each cacao tree removed, with the proviso that the grant-
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recipient farmer should rehabilitate his field. By 
implication, farmers' would receive two shillings per tree 
annually until their re-planted trees started to bear fruit. 
The New Deal grants did not apply in the areas of mass 
infection or devastated areas in the Eastern Region. Areas 
deemed to lie beyond repair, were specified as the Akwapim 
hills, Nsawam, Krobo-Odumasi, Huhunya, western Tafo, Bosuso, 
Bunso, Amanfrom and Adeiso, but not Asamankese and Kibi.^  ^ The 
New Deal grant payments went into effect on 1 September 1951. 
Convinced that the cut out program was the only solution to 
the Swollen Shoot virus, the C.P.P. administration used local 
party functionaries and Community Development teams to 
persuade farmers to accept the compulsory destruction of their 
infected trees. The policy to cut out infected cacao was 
partly situational. During the temporary cessation of 
control, the plant virus epidemic gained ground.^ ® 
The problem of losing the main revenue base for the state 
if the virus was left unchecked was ever present. 
Historically, cacao had represented over 90 percent of Ghana's 
agricultural exports and 63 percent of domestic production.^ ' 
After the war, the crop's value had shrank to two-thirds of 
its pre-war worth'^ " If the Swollen Shoot could be contained, 
Ghana's major source of export revenue would be assured. This 
was crucial especially when post-war demand for cacao was 
high. An increased world demand coupled with poor crop 
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prospects, had propelled prices to average £402 per ton from 
1946 to 1954.^  ^
For introducing the New Deal for Cacao policy, the C.P.P. 
drew criticism for condemning the cutting out policy 
initially, only to pursue the same measures when the party 
assumed power in 1951.'^  In his autobiography, Nkrumah, the 
leader of the Convention Peoples Party government, explained 
his predicament over the problem. As he put it; 
[a] matter that called for careful handling but for 
definite action was the Swollen Shoot disease that 
was attacking cacao trees in the country. The 
disease...was threatening the future of our cacao 
crop, the country's most valuable export. 
Referring to the findings and recommendations of the Korsah 
Committee of Enquiry, Nkrumah, the Leader of Government 
Business added: 
Investigations into the matter confirmed my former 
fears that the only solution was to cut down the 
affected trees. I knew the farmers would kick 
against this for they could not understand that 
although the cacao trees were said to be infected 
with Swollen Shoot, they still produced apparently 
healthy pods. 
It was difficult to convince them that in a few 
years time the whole of their crop would fail.^  ^
The New Deal policy for cacao was urgently needed. Otherwise, 
it was conjectured, Ghana's cacao economy would eventually 
suffer a precipitous decline. Nkrumah's decision to remove 
diseased cacao trees, reflected considerations best 
recapitulated in this quote: 
This cacao problem is not a sectional nor merely a 
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farmers' problem since the economic life of the Gold 
Coast is at stake. The Swollen Shoot issue is really the 
prime test of the ability of African leaders to shoulder 
political responsibility.^  
The resolution of these political obstacles to the 
eradication of the cacao pathogens in the forest belt enabled 
the Ministry of Agriculture to fully implement the 
recommendations of the West African Cacao Research Institute 
in Ghana. After intensive scientific investigations into the 
causation and dynamics of the Capsid, Black Pod and Swollen 
Shoot cacao diseases, WACRI advocated the use of the chemical 
D. D. T. against Capsid insects.Fungicidal trials against 
the Black Pod disease proved ineffectual because they were 
costly and demanded the confluence of several variable 
elements to achieve results.The standard procedure on 
Swollen Shoot control was to cut out infected trees and those 
surrounding them.'® The use of disease resistant seedlings, 
early bearing and high yielding cacao progenies also figured 
highly in WACRI*s recommendations to Ghana's Cacao Division on 
how best to cope with cacao pathogens in Ghana.'' 
These then were the major determinants of the nationalist 
policies towards the vexed issue of containing the Swollen 
Shoot virus in Ghana's forest belt up to 1951. The anti-
Capsid spraying schemes and the cutting out policies and their 
results from 1952 to 1966, are analyzed in the subsequent 
chapters. 
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be carriers of the virus. In an infected plant, a virus may 
be localized or become systemic and spread throughout the 
host. If localized, the symptoms appear generally in the form 
of vein-clearing. When the effect is systemic, the virus 
moves through a particular tissue such as the phloem and 
invade all parts of the plant: see Bennett, T. B. R. (1940): 
427. 
viruses can grow and multiply inside the living cells of 
plants and animals: available in Frolich and Rodewald and 
Rodewald, Diseases of Tropical Crops (1970), 269. 
Some of the viruses were extremely destructive. Others 
were of intermediate virulence and others were mild. Most of 
the virus strains were present in the Eastern region of Ghana 
where the Swollen Shoot disease originated. The most 
prominent and virulent virus was the New Juaben Strain. In 
223 
1947, Posnette confirmed that this biotype produced swellings 
in the stem and on the tap and lateral roots of the cacao 
tree. The isolate also induced vein clearing, red-vein or 
chlorotic banding on the leaf and mottling on the cacao pod. 
Although this isolate occurred elsewhere in West Africa, it 
has been most devastating in Ghana's Eastern Region. See, A. 
F. Posnette, "Virus diseases of Cacao in West Africa. I. Cacao 
Viruses lA, IB, IC and ID," A. A. B.. 34 (1947): 388-401. 
Dr. A. F. Posnette, who identified the virus nature of 
the Swollen Shoot disease in the pre-war and wartime years, 
continued his research into the problem after the war. His 
numerous publications on the topic included, A. F. Posnette, 
Virus Diseases of West Africa," A. A. B.. 34 no.3 (September 
1947): 388-401 and A. F. Posnette, "Virus Diseases in West 
Africa," A. A. B.. 35 no.l (march 1948): 53-63; A. F. Posnette 
and J. McA. Todd, "Virus Diseases of Cacao in West Africa. IX. 
Strain Variation and Interference in Virus A.," A. A. B. 43 
(1955): 433-453. Supporting information on Posnette's work is 
available in G. K. Owusu, "A Suspected Virus From Soybean 
Infecting Cocoa Seedlings," Ghana Journal of Agricultural 
Science. ( Hereafter cited as G. J. A. S.^  4 (1971): 201-204; 
The original source of the Swollen Shoot virus complex 
were forest trees. Tests conducted in Ghana's forest belt 
between 1946 and 1954 revealed that the Bombax Buonopozense 
and Cola Acuminata trees developed virus-like symptoms when 
grafted to infected cacao. This information indicated that 
the virus originated from certain forest trees to infect the 
surrounding cacao plantations. The most probable trees were 
usually the ones the farmers left standing to provide shade 
and wind-breaks for the cacao seedlings. The virus spreads 
from these alternative forest trees to cacao plants and from 
one cacao tree to the next. 
Literature on the dynamics and causation of the Swollen 
Shoot virus and vectors in the field are extensive. See for 
example, J. McA. Todd, "An Indigenous Source of Swollen Shoot 
Disease of Cacao," Nature 167 no.4258 (June 1951): 952-953. 
See also, J. E. Van Der Plank, "The Relation Between the Size 
of Fields and the Spread of Plant Disease into them," E. J. E. 
&L 17, no.67 (July 1949): 141-147; A. F. Posnette, N. F. 
Robertson, "Virus Diseases of Cacao in West Africa. V. 
Alternative Host Plants," A. A. B.. 37 (1950): 229-240. A. F. 
Posnette, "Virus Diseases of Cacao in West Africa," A. A. B. . 
42 no.l (February 1950): 229-240. A. F. Posnette, N. F. 
Robertson, and J. M. A Todd, "Virus Diseases of Cocoa in West 
Africa: V. Alternative Host Plants," Annals of Applied 
Biology. (Hereafter cited as A. A. B). 30 no.229 (1950): 52. 
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T. W. Tinsley, "The Ecology of Cacao Viruses. I: The Role of 
Wild Hosts in the Incidence of the Swollen Shoot Virus in West 
Africa," The Journal of Applied Ecology (Hereafter cited as J\. 
A. E.). 8 no.2 (August 1971); 491-498; A. A. Brunt, and R. H. 
Kenten, "Mechanical Transmission of Cocoa Swollen Shoot Virus 
to and from Cocoa and other Hosts," A. A. B. 50 no.4 (December 
1962): 749-754. See also, A. Attafuah and T. W. Tinsley, 
"Virus Diseases of Adansonia Digitata L. (Bombaceae) and their 
Relation to Cacao in Ghana," Annals of Applied Biology 
(Hereafter cited as A. A. Biol.I 46 no.l (March 1958): 20-22. 
A. Attafuah and T. W. Tinsley, "Virus Diseases of Adansonia 
Digitata L. (Bombaceae) and their Relation to Cocoa in Ghana," 
A. A. B. 46 no.l (1958): 20-21; and WACRI Report for 1954-
1955. 31-32. 
The Swollen Shoot virus is dependent upon vectors to 
disseminate the disease through the cacao plantations. 
Mealybugs, an insect species with short legs, generally carry 
the virus. Because they secrete honey dew, Cremastogarine 
ants in return for this food source, protect the mealy bug 
vectors by building carton tents over them. The tents renders 
them free from attacks from rainfall, sunshine, and predatory 
insects. For studies into this natural phenomena, refer to 
the following sources; P. F. Entwistle, "Mealybug in Relation 
to Cacao in Ghana, T. G. F. 2 no.2 (May 1958); 64-69; P. F. 
Entwistle, "Mealybug IV - Their Relationship to Swollen Shoot 
Disease in Ghana," T. G. F. 2 no.4 (November 1958): 129-133. 
A. H. Strickland, "The Entomology of Swollen Shoot of Cacao. 
II. The Bionomics and Ecology of the Species Involved," B. E. 
R. 42 no.3 (1951): 65-103. A. F. Posnette, "Virus Diseases of 
Cacao in West Africa. VII. Virus Transmission by Different 
Vector Species," A. A. B. 37 (1950): 378-384. P. F. Entwistle 
and J. F. Longworth, " The Relationship Between Cacao Viruses 
and their Vectors: the Feeding Behavior of Three Mealybugs 
(Homoptera Pseudococcidae) Species." A. A. B.. 52 no.33 
(December 1963): 387-391; and Frolich and Rodewald, Diseases 
of Tropical Crops (1970), 272; P. B. Cornwell, "Movements of 
Vectors of Virus Diseases of Cacao in Ghana," B. E. R.. 51 
no.l (April 1960): 175-201; and Frolich and Rodewald, Diseases 
of Tropical Crops (1970), 271-272; and P. B. Cornwell, 
"Movements of the Vectors of Cacao in Ghana," B. E. R. 51 
(April 1960): 175-201. Report of the Sixth Commonwealth 
Entomological Conference:Congress Held in London 7-16 July 
1954 (London: Commonwealth Institute of Entomology, 1954), 
241-242; A. H. Strickland, "The Entomology of the Swollen 
Shoot of Cacao I: The Insect Species Involved With Notes on 
their Biology," B. E. R.. 41 no.4 (April 1951); 726 and 740-
742. See also. Cacao Research Institute Report for 1965-1968. 
36. M. J. Way, "Mutualism Between Ants and Honeydew Producing 
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Homoptera," Annual Review of Entomology. (Hereafter cited as 
A. R. E.^  8 (1963): 307-337. 
A comparative though different study of the same natural 
phenomenon in the United States is available in: Neal A. 
Weber, "The Neotropical Coccid-Tending Ants of the Genus 
Acropyga Roger, Annnals of the Entomological Society of 
America (Hereafter cited as A. E. S. A.) 37 no.l (March 1944): 
89-122. 
The West African Cacao Research Institute resorted to 
Predatory insects to rid the cacao farms of mealybug vectors. 
This failed for sundry reasons. P. B. Cornwell, "Some Aspects 
of Mealybug Behavior in Relation to the Efficiency of Measures 
for the Control of Virus Diseases of Cacao in the Gold Coast," 
B. E. R.. 47 no.l (March 1956): 137-166. 
The wind is a vector carried mealybugs from one section 
of the farm to another. An interesting discussion of this 
factor is available in, P. B. Cornwell, "Movements of Vectors 
of Virus Diseases of Cacao in Ghana. II. Wind Movements and 
Aerial Dispersal," B. E. R. 51 no.l (April 1960): 197-198. 
For the organizational structure and discussion of the 
field experiments that validated the Institute's research 
findings, see O. J. Voelcker, "West African Cacao Research: 
Field Experiments," Empire Journal of Experimental 
Agriculture. 16 no.64 (October 1948): 241-248. 
The West African Cacao Research Institute abandoned its 
international stature in 1961. It became known as the Cacao 
Research Institute of Ghana, operating under the Ghana Academy 
of Arts and Sciences. Its annual bulletins were renamed The 
Cacao Research Institute. 
Since the mealybugs themselves were dependent upon a 
special ant species to move them from one spot to another and 
for protection, the destruction of these protective ants, it 
was thought, would facilitate the elimination of the virus. 
See, A. D. Hanna, E. Judenko and W. Heatherington, "The 
Control of Cremastogasterine Ants as a Means of Controlling 
the Mealybugs in the Gold Coast," B. E. R.. 47 no.2 (July 
1956);219-226. WACRI Report for 1949-1950. See also, P. B. 
Cornwell, "Some aspects of Mealybug Behaviour in Relation to 
the Efficiency of Measures for the Control of Virus Diseases 
of Cacao in the Gold Coast," B. E. R. 47 no.l (March 1956): 
137-166. 
Because of the unpopular nature of the cutting out 
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policy, systemic insecticides attracted considerable attention 
in laboratory and field experiments in the period under 
review. These chemicals could be applied through the roots and 
then translocated through the sap stream of the plant for the 
mealy bugs to ingest and perish. Some of the procedures 
pursued in the various trials in the 1950s are available in, 
John Nicol, "Systemic Insecticides and the Mealybug Vectors of 
the Swollen Shoot Virus of Cacao," Nature. 169 no.4290 
(January 19 1952): 120; A. D. Hanna," Application of a 
Systemic Insecticide by Trunk Implantation to Control a 
Mealybug Vector of the Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus," Nature. 173 
no.4407 (April 1954): 730-731: A. D. Hanna and W. 
Heatherington, "Arrest of the Swollen Shoot Virus of Cacao in 
the Gold Coast by Controlling the Mealybug Vectors with the 
Systemic Insecticide, Dimefox," A. A. B. 45 no.3 (September 
1957): 473-481; and A. D. Hanna and W. Heatherington, "An 
Investigation into the Possible Control of the Mealybug 
Vectors of Cacao Swollen Shoot Virus by Trunk Implantation 
with Dimefox," B. E. R. 50 no.l (March 1959): 209-224. 
See also, A. D. Hanna, E. Judenko and W. Heatherinton, 
"Systemic Insecticides for the Control of Insects Transmitting 
the Swollen Shoot Virus Disease," B. E. R.. 46 no.3 (October 
1955): 669-710. J. S. Bowman and J. E. Casida, "Systemic 
Insecticides for Theobroma Cacao L. Their Translocation and 
Persistence in Foliage and Residues in Cacao Beans," Journal 
of Economic Entomology (Hereafter cited as J. E. E.) 51 no.6 
(December 1958):773-780. 
Like Capsid insect pests, WACRI attempted to introduce 
parasitic insects to destroy the insect vectors of the virus 
in Ghana. See, Report of the Sixth Commonwealth Entomological 
Conference. Commonwealth Institute of Entomology. 7-16 Julv 
1954 (London 1954), 242. Further discussions of this natural 
phenomenon are available in Anonymous, "Parasitism of the 
Mealybug Vectors of Swollen Shoot of Cacao," Nature. 163 
no.4133 (January 1949): 105-106; and V. B. Wigglesworth, 
"Biology and Insect Pest Control," SPAN. 5 no.3 (1962): 114-
117. 
An interesting experiment to control the mealybugs with 
fungi also occupied the attention of the West African Cacao 
Research Institute. See, S. Rojter, J. K. Bonney, and J. T. 
Legg, "Investigations into the Use of a Pathogenic Fungus 
(Cephalosphorum spp.) as a Means of Controlling the Mealybug 
(Pseudococcidae) Vectors of Swollen Shoot Virus in Ghana," 
Ghana Journal of Science. 6 (1966): 110-114. 
For the technical aspects of how Capsid lesions aid the 
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transmission of the fungus Calonectria Rigidiuscula in cacao, 
see P. D. Turner, "Leaf and Stem Infections of Theobroma Cacao 
L. in West Africa Caused by Phytophthora Palmivora (Butl. 
Butl.). T. A. 37 no.4 (October 1960): 321; and A. A. F. Brunt 
and A. L. Wharton, "Etiology of a Gall Disease of Cocoa in 
Ghana Caused by Calonectria Rigidiuscula (Berk. & Br.) Sacc.," 
A. A. B.. 49 no.4(December 1964); 723-734. 
Phytophthora Palmivora often assumed the form of a weakly 
parasitic fungus in dry seasons to await the wet season for 
full nourishment and activity. This phenomenon renders it 
difficult to eliminate it from the forest environment. See, 
Harold Owen, "Cacao Pod Diseases in West Africa," A. A. B. 38 
no.5 (September 1951): 716. 
In 1960, WACRI discovered that the Palmivora fungus has 
179 isolates in West Africa. About 57 of these came from 
Ghana: P. D. Turner, "Distribution of Strains of Phytophthora 
Palmivora from Theobroma Cacao in West Africa," F.A.O. Plant 
Protection Bulletin 8 no.5 (February 1960): 59; P. D. 
Turner," Complementary Isolates of Phytophthora Palmivora from 
Cacao and Rubber and their Taxonomy," Phvtopatholoav 53 (March 
1961): 161-164. For an earlier study of this subject, refer 
to, Anonymous, "Strains and Taxonomy of Phytophthora Palmivora 
Butler (P. Faberi Maubl.)," Transactions of the British 
Mycological Society (Hereafter cited as T. B. M. S. ) 14 no.2-
3 March 1929): 18-38; S. D. Crowdy, "Observations on the 
pathogenicity of Calonectria Rigidiuscula (Bekr. & Br.) Sacc. 
on Theobroma Cacao L.," A. A. B. (1956): 307-321. 
In 1962, the Institute observed that cacao seedlings were 
prone to Black Pod infections. The occurrence of this disease 
in young plant's usually reduced the sapling's root absorbing 
capacity. Defoliation and a decrease in stem length arises. 
This eventually reduced the weight of the raw cacao bean and 
subsequently its price. For a discussion of this problem, see 
P. D. Turner and E. J. A. Asomaning, "Root Infection of 
Theobroma Cacao by Phytophthora Palmivora, T. A. 39 no.4 
(October 1962): 339-343. The plant's ability to resist the 
fungus infection is discussed in: E. J. A. Asomaning, 
"Varietal Resistance of Young Clones and Seedlings of Cocoa 
(Theobroma Cacao L.) to Root Infection by Phytophthora 
Palmivora," T. A. 40-41 no.4 (1963-1964): 251-256. 
WACRI later noted that the giant African snail Achatina 
Fulica transmitted Black Pod sporangia in its feces, which in 
turn caused root rot among cacao trees. Apart from the 
Achatina, a special ant species Cremastogarine ants also 
dispersed the disease. These insects usually extracted the 
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outer layer of infected pods on the tree to build their tents. 
By this means, the insects infect healthy pods with the 
disease. See H. C. Evans," Invertebrate Vectors of 
Phytophthora Palmivora Causing Black Pod Disease of Cacao in 
Ghana," A. A. B. 75 (1973): 322; and H. C. Evans, 
"Transmission of Phytophthora Pod Rot of Cocoa by 
Invertebrates," Nature 232 (July 30, 1971): 346-347. 
For an earlier discussion of this problem, see Irving W. 
Bailey, "Some Relations Between Ants and Fungi," Ecoloav 1 
no.2 (April 1920): 174-178. Fungal infections are mainly 
caused by air-borne sporangia: C. A. Thorold, "Airborne 
Dispersal of Phytophthora Palmivora Causing Black Pod of 
Theobroma Cacao," Nature 170 no.4330 (October 1952): 718-719. 
During trial experiments at WACRI in 1961-2, Perenox, 
Carbide-Bourdeaux and Bourdeaux mixture were the most 
effective fungicides. For a comparative study of fungicidal 
trials, refer to C. A. Thorold, "Observations of Fungicide 
Control of Witches Broom, Black Pod and Pink Disease of 
Theobroma Cacao," A. A. B 40 no.21 (June 1953): 362-376. See 
also, J. Bowden," Responses of Cocoa to Copper Sprays in 
Ghana," T. A. (October 1961): 325-343; and J. A. R. McClean, 
"Some Chemical Aspects of "Black Pod" Disease in West African 
Amelonado Cacao," E. J. E. A.. 21 no.84 (1953): 340-349. 
Like Capsid pest diseases, WACRI attempted to use fungus 
resistant cacao progenies in Ghana as the solution to the 
Phytophthora Palmivora and other fungal pathogens, see, John 
A. Spence, "Probable Mechanisms of Resistance of Cocoa to 
Black Pod Disease Caused by Phytophthora Palmivora (Butl.) 
Butl.," Nature 125 no.192 (October 1961): 278. 
A^nother device meant to resist Capsid attacks was the 
recourse to disease resistant cacao progenies. See for 
example, A. F. Posnette, "Resistance of Theobroma Cacao," B. 
E. R. 53 no.l (December 1942): 214 and R. E. D. Baker, "The 
Botanical Programme," A Report on Cacao Research. 1945-1951. 
(Augustine, Trinidad: British West Indies, September 1953): 
10-11; and Anonymous, Resistance of Plants to Insect Attack," 
T. A.. 18 no.12 (December 1941): 229-231. See also, E. E. 
Cheeseman, "Recent Botanical Researches in Cacao," E. J. E. 
A.. 19 no.76 (October 1951): 242-252. The botanical program 
also made possible the hybridization of high yielding and 
disease resistant Amazonia cacao progenies in Ghana to 
rehabilitate the cacao industry. 
The use of virus resistant cacao progenies formed part of 
the devices employed in trial runs on virus control. See, 
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Anonymous, "Studies on Resistance and Tolerance to Cocoa 
Viruses in Ghana," A. A. B. 56 no.l (1965); 219-225. 
The initial attempts to develop cacao progenies occurred 
in the wartime period under the directives of Dr. A. F. 
Posnette, the virologist who first identified the virus nature 
of the Swollen Shoot disease. See, for example, A. F. 
Posnette, " Cacao Selection in the Gold Coast," T. A.. 20 no.8 
(1942); 149-153; for further discussions on the earlier 
aspects of the study outside of Ghana, see W. C. Price, 
"Acquired Immunity from Plant Virus Diseases," The QuarterIv 
Review of Biology. 15 no.3 (September 1940): 339-359; J. F. 
Longworth and J. M. Thresh, "The Reaction of different Cacao 
Types to Infection with Swollen shoot Virus," A. A. B. 52 
(1963); 117, 122 and 123; WACRI Report for 1945-1946. 17. 
See also, A. F. Posnette, "Progeny Trial With Cacao in 
the Gold Coast," E. J. E. A.. 19 no.76 (1951); 242-251; Alex 
Attafuah,and D. R. Glendinning, "Studies on Resistance and 
Tolerance to Cocoa Viruses in Ghana," A. A. B.. 56 no.l (March 
1965): 227-230; and R. Knight and H. H. Rogers, "Recent 
Introductions of Theobroma Cacao and Related Species," E. J. 
E. A.. 23 no.90 (1955); 113-125. T. A. Russell, "The Vigor of 
Some Cocoa Hybrids," T. A.. 27-29 (1950-1952); 102-106. 
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VIII THE ORGANIZATION AND TREATMENT OF THE CAPSID, BLACK 
POD, AND SWOLLEN SHOOT DISEASES IN GHANAIAN CACAO FARMS, 1952-
1965 
Between 1952 and 1965, Ghana's Ministry of Agriculture 
implemented WACRI's recommendations on disease control with 
remarkable intensity in the rain forest. The economic neces­
sity for these measures were clear. The crop averaged 90 
percent of the country's farm exports and accounted for two-
thirds of domestic farm production.^  Specifically in 1948, 
cacao amounted to 70 percent of the total value of commodities 
exported from Ghana and about 92 percent of farm exports.% 
Such was the seriousness of the government's disease eradica­
tion exercise that the entire operation became, "The biggest 
plant disease control campaign undertaken anywhere in the 
world. 
The Ghana government, through its Ministry of Agriculture 
and the Cacao Marketing Board, organized the Swollen Shoot and 
anti-Capsid disease control ventures throughout the cacao 
belt. The state also funded extension stations and provided 
farmers with a variety of services and information on disease 
control. The role of Ghana's Public Relations Department and 
Information Services along with those of the Community and 
Social Welfare Department were no less significant. The 
government of Ghana established an insecticidal factory and 
directly subsidized disease control inputs like chemicals and 
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sprayers. Farmers in addition, received high-yielding and 
early bearing cacao planting stock from state sponsored agri­
cultural stations. Each of these measures entailed substan­
tial effort. 
The Administrative Aspects of Disease Control 
The Ministry of Agriculture administered the overall 
cacao disease control project. The endeavor to extirpate 
cacao pathogens involved several state institutions and farm 
agencies in Ghana. Prominent among these were WACRI, the 
extension services of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Public 
Relations Department, the Ministries of Information and that 
of the Social Welfare and Community Development. In the 
Agricultural Ministry, the divisions of Cacao Disease Control 
and Rehabilitation (Cacao Division) and Soil Survey, directly 
implemented diverse strategies to combat the Capsid. Black Pod 
and Swollen Shoot pathogens in Ghana.* 
The Deputy Director of Agriculture, stationed at Accra, 
headed the Cacao Division. The Deputy Director had two assis­
tants, one of whom worked at the headquarters at Accra. The 
other assistant, stationed at the Bunso agricultural station 
in the Eastern Region, trained agricultural staff to execute 
the disease campaign in the field. This training emphasized 
cacao agronomy. The trainees maintained close links between 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the West African Cacao Re­
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search Institute.® In 1950, the Agricultural Ministry estab­
lished a training schedule at Bunso to instruct staff in all 
aspects of cacao farming. The duration of Agricultural Survey 
Officers' Course was three months. On the other hand courses 
in Swollen Shoot control, Drawing Office Assistants and carto­
graphical draughtsmanship ranged from four to six months. 
These latter study programs were needed because ex gratia 
payments under the revised grant payment scheme was based on 
assessment of acreage. The Agricultural Ministry also trained 
Field Assistants in cacao agronomy for two months to deal with 
cacao hybrid trials. A grant payment personnel operated as a 
special unit within the Ministry of Agriculture. A chief 
accountant based at Accra, headed this accounting section and 
disbursed payment to farmers who lost their trees during the 
treatment of the Swollen Shoot virus. 
Ghana, in the period under review, had forty agricultural 
districts in eight regions to implement important farm pro­
jects. The Ministry of Agriculture and a special agency, the 
National Agricultural Council and its district chapters, 
planned farm policy. Each region had a team of extension 
officers who advised farmers in each district down to the 
village level.* The Cacao Division focused much of its work in 
the forest belt where Ghana's cacao is located. 
To rehabilitate the country's cacao plantations, the 
Agricultural Ministry surveyed cacao soils in Ghana. This 
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procedure emanated from an earlier policy of the former Cen­
tral Cacao Research Station and WACRI. The Ministry of Agri­
culture designed these surveys to locate plantations infested 
with the virus, and to judge whether cutting out would be the 
most effective cure.^  The survey also aimed to gain reliable 
information on Ghanaian soils, their distribution and suit­
ability for profitable cacao production. The Soil Survey 
division of the Ministry of Agriculture, which came into being 
on 1 April 1948 undertook the survey. In preparation for this 
undertaking, the Survey division devoted its first year to 
staff recruitment and training, the assembly of equipment, and 
the survey of proposed agricultural stations.® By the of the 
year, the division had completed soil surveys of Ghana's 
entire cacao belt. In 1949, the number 82 squadron of the 
British Royal Air Force used Lancaster and Dakota aircrafts on 
a photographic reconnaissance of Ghana's rain forest.' The 
Department of Soil Survey also investigated the possibility of 
establishing cacao plantations in areas of secondary forest 
where soils would be suitable for permanent cacao cultiva­
tion.^ " The emergence of detailed survey records of all cacao 
areas aided Ghana's Ministry of Agriculture to appraise the 
extent and severity of Capsid damage, and the means to fight 
the Swollen Shoot disease. 
The field work to control diseases involved the four 
cacao growing areas of Ashanti, Western, Eastern and the 
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Trans-Volta regions of Ghana. Principal Agricultural Survey 
Officers (P. A. S. Os), and Senior Agricultural Officers (S. 
A. Os) took charge of field work in the regions. These farm 
personnel had the support of Agricultural Survey Officers (A. 
S. O.s) who worked in districts where the incidence of the 
Swollen Shoot was paramount.Each A. S. 0. surveyed, orga­
nized and implemented cacao rehabilitation programs in his 
assigned district. This officer certified the documents 
required to authorize grant payments in his locale. A staff 
of clerical and drawing office pèrsonnel and field assistants 
who directed laborers in field operations assisted the A.S.O.s 
in their duties. In addition each A. S. O. had liaison offi­
cers who formed the link between the field staff and the 
farmers.^  
In order not to miss any cacao and to avoid duplication, 
the A. S. Os divided their respective areas of operation into 
blocks. Depending on the density of cacao and incidence of 
the Swollen Shoot disease, the blocks varied in size from 50 
to 300 acres or more. Draughtsmen and surveyors measured and 
numbered each block and prepared a block plan on a scale of 8 
inches to the mile. The surveyors carefully demarcated and 
measured each farm within each designated block and produced a 
blueprint for each. Each plan became part of a farm record 
bearing the farm owners' name. After the liaison officer has 
ascertained the farmers' particulars, the field staff then 
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placed the farm's assigned number on record. The liaison 
officer then issued to each certified farm owner a numbered 
Farm Identity Card which he produced to obtain grant payments 
when his farm was treated 
The Treatment of Swollen Shoot Infected Plantations 
The Agricultural Officers implemented the disease control 
project from block to block. Before they brought down any 
tree, an Agricultural Officer other than the field personnel 
who first diagnosed it, had to confirm the plant was diseased. 
Only trees that bore definite leaf symptoms were destroyed. 
Rounded, instead of spherical pods, were accepted as evidence 
but not as definite proof of virus infection. 
The Agricultural field staff in each district adopted a 
standard cutting out procedure. In this effort, they cleared 
the soil away from the foot of the tree, severed its lateral 
roots and cut through the trunk below ground level. The staff 
meticulously felled the tree into the middle of other diseased 
trees. The fallen trees were then cut into convenient lengths 
and stacked together at the ends for easy checking.^  since 
the total number of trees removed determined how much to pay 
farmers for their treated farms, the agricultural officers 
maintained records of how many cacao trees they brought down 
in each plantation and then stated the figure in the individu-
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al farmer's record. These particulars were then retained in 
the office of the Agricultural Survey Department. 
After first treatment, the agricultural field officers 
re-inspected and re-treated diseased farms at regular bi­
monthly intervals. During such inspections, the farm officers 
carefully examined every tree located within a thirty yard 
radius of the nearest diseased plant. A Swollen Shoot out­
break was considered controlled if, on twelve consecutive 
monthly re-inspections, the agricultural officers did not 
uncover any other infected trees.This approach stood in 
dramatic contrast to the former policy of legal coercion to 
achieve results. 
Ghana's commitment to utilize the extension services 
emerged in 1946, when the then Secretary of State for the 
colonies selected a number of senior officers in Ghana's 
Ministry of Agriculture to tour Great Britain, U.S.A., Canada 
and Puerto Rico to observe extension techniques. Upon their 
return, the officers documented the main features of the 
extension services in each foreign country in order to define 
methods most likely to succeed under Ghanaian conditions. 
This information assisted the colonial government to frame its 
own extension policies. 
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The Role of Extension Services in Containing Cacao Diseases 
Extension was the means the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Ghana transferred the results of agricultural science research 
to farmers. The process enabled rural populations to adopt 
improved farming methods J® Extension served essentially as a 
form of informal teaching. Without adequate and efficient 
extension service to transmit research findings and their 
practical application to cultivators, cacao research would 
have remained unproductive. Agricultural research and exten­
sion in the period under review were mutually complementary.^ ' 
Extension workers used a variety of methods including 
personal visits, meetings, lectures, conferences and demon­
strations to transmit research information to cultivators. 
Literature in the form of books, pamphlets, journals, leaflets 
along with agricultural shows, the cinema, radio broadcasts 
and demonstration plots were among the devices the Ministry 
employed to transfer knowledge to the farmer in a form he 
could readily comprehend. The moving cinema proved to be the 
most popular and effective extension service tool in the rural 
areas because they reached wider audiences. 
To adequately serve cacao farmers with improved farm 
technologies on disease control, the Ministry of Agriculture 
built twenty agricultural stations in 1951.^  ^ The Agricultural 
Ministry also re-designed existing Agricultural Research 
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Stations to increase their capacity, and integrated them into 
farm extension work.^  ^ In the Eastern Region the Agricultural 
Ministry sited such stations at Bunso, Apedwa, Biene, 
Asamankese, Oyoko, Akwadum and Pankese. The extension sta­
tions for Ashanti included one at Juaso, and others at Poano, 
Fumso, Kwadaso, Jamasi, and Akumadan. Those established for 
the Western Region were Buaku, Assin and Asikuma, while the 
Kpeve Experiment Station, along with those at Akaa and Dodi 
Papase served the Volta Region. 
These research stations have since the 1950s, offered 
short term instruction to farmers on Swollen Shoot control, 
the demonstration of new farm techniques and opportunities to 
obtain improved planting material and spraying equipment. The 
agricultural sub-stations also instructed farmers on how to 
use spraying machines and anti-Capsid insecticides. By 1954, 
each of these stations possessed Farmer Training Hostels to 
board farmers who were on short courses.^ * 
In 1959, the Ministry of Agriculture recruited and 
trained 157 Spraying Superintendents for two months in Capsid 
control. An additional 500 Field Assistants received special 
instructions to visit farmers who requested advise on all 
spraying matters. Furthermore, the ministry held refresher 
courses of one month duration for its field staff to keep them 
abreast of recent farm trends and changes.^ ' The Ministry of 
Agriculture officially launched a Capsid trial control scheme 
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as a national project in July 1958. Also known as the Routine 
Gang Spraying Scheme, the ministry in collaboration with the 
United Ghana Farmers' Co-Operative Council covered 2,225,000 
acres of cacao farms that year. These spraying projects were 
extensions of an earlier spraying trial in 1951, that covered 
about 750,000 acres of badly damaged cacao plantations. 
The experience gained from these trials paved the way for 
what later came to be termed as the Expanded Routine Gang 
Spraying Scheme. To effectively implement the spraying pro­
grams, the Agricultural Ministry divided Ghana's cacao belt 
into 104 areas.From 1954, when the trial spraying of farms 
began, the Cacao Industry Division covered 1,125,000 acres of 
cacao farms. This trial spraying was achieved with the single 
mist-blower technique. In 1959, the Capsid control scheme 
became the, "largest extension exercise ever undertaken in 
this country and present progress indicates that it is likely 
to achieve its objective. 
However, subsequent consultations between the government 
and the United Ghana Farmers' Co-Operative Council led to the 
view that the Routine Gang Spraying Scheme would be difficult, 
costly and unproductive. A major obstacle was that cacao 
acreage in Ghana which were generally tiny were always jam-
packed with trees and interspersed with food farms. Besides, 
most plantations were irregularly spaced, a factor that pre­
cluded the use of the Routine Gang Spraying method. This 
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situation also restricted the use of tractor-drawn techniques 
which the Agricultural Ministry favored.^ ® Aerial spraying was 
equally difficult. Giant forest trees that towered above the 
cacao plantations rendered such an approach worthless. 
This peculiar cacao farming situation required portable 
spraying which the farmers could handle themselves.^ ' The 
advent of engine-driven machine, such as the Kiekens-Dekker 
mist blower, made it possible for the individual farmer to 
treat his plantation with insecticides for the first time in 
Ghana. The breakthrough was significant because cacao, a 
forest crop, was inaccessible to wheeled spraying vehicles. 
The Ministry of Agriculture therefore subsidized farmers to 
acquire spraying machines and insecticides for themselves and 
encouraged trained agricultural officers to help cacao growers 
to control Capsids on their farms.In 1959, the farmers 
officially became responsible for spraying their own cacao. 
State subsidies enabled them to acquire motorized hand spray­
ers from April 1959 at £14 each, or about 25 percent of their 
commercial value. In November 1962, the government directed 
that the country's imported stock of SOLO and KWH spraying 
machines to sell at £5 each and Mysto sprayers at fifteen 
shillings instead of £2.'^ * The state imported spraying ma­
chines at an average rate of 2,000 per month to meet farmers' 
demand. 
The government also subsidized Gammalin-20 anti-Capsid 
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chemicals. During the first year of the anti-Capsid opera­
tions, i.e. April 1959-March 1960, the Ministry of Agriculture 
sold about a quarter of a million gallons of subsidized insec­
ticides along with 20,000 motorized spraying equipment to 
cacao planters.^  without these subventions, the sprayers 
would have cost the farmer £50 apiece and raised spraying 
costs from £0.325 per acre to £1.05. The same measures ap­
plied to hybridized planting stock. From 1953 to 1962, gov­
ernment grants enabled farmers to replant 71,000 acres of 
devastated cacao farms in the Eastern Region. Government 
grants were indeed a major support to the overall cacao reha­
bilitation program in Ghana. 
To ensure a steady supply of Gammalin-20, the government 
in 1961 commissioned the Imperial Chemical Industry to open an 
insecticidal factory at the port city of Tema near Accra, to 
produce and supply the chemical to farmers. The Imperial 
Chemical Industries Limited was the first insecticide factory 
in West Africa. It was estimated that the factory would 
supply about 1,000,000 gallons of Gammalin-20 within three 
years.In 1962, the Ghanaian press reported that Gammalin-20 
so produced would spray over 3,000,000 acres of cacao planta­
tions successfully. The Ministry of Agriculture freighted the 
product from Tema with tankers to twenty centers in the deep 
cacao forest. Each center possessed storage tanks to hold 
20,000 gallons. Each unit also arranged the formulation. 
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package and re-distribution of the chemical to farmers.'^  
Public Relations Work on Disease Control 
The Public Relations Department (P.R.D.) also contributed 
to the fight against cacao diseases. The P.R.D. had seven 
sections - Reference, Administration, Cinema, Film, Press, 
Broadcasting and Distribution. The Public Relations unit 
distributed newspapers, books, booklets, posters and picture 
supplements to illustrate information pertaining to disease 
eradication to farmers. In 1946, the Department's film sec­
tion which operated from five cinema vans had only two films, 
one of which was titled "Swollen Shoot," and an un-named film 
strip for schools.^ ' In 1948, the cinema vans increased to 
fourteen, nine of which functioned in rural areas. 
These mobile vehicles disseminated information in cacao 
villages where the cutting out program was current. In 1950, 
the Public Relations Department expanded its regional services 
and its mobile cinema units gave a total of 1,268 shows that 
year. The P.R.D. maintained its fleet of travelling cinema 
vans which constantly moved throughout the countryside and 
visited towns and villages in the period under review.^ ' In 
1952, for example, the cinema vans toured 2,132 cacao produc­
ing villages for the purpose. With respect to cacao disease 
propaganda, the Public Relations Department advised what 
circuits its cinema vans should follow. The mobile units also 
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distributed bulletins and other printed matter the Public 
Relations Department and maintained a liaison with the press 
and local commercial cinemas to serve similar goals. 
The Information Services Department, the United States 
Information Services and the British Council periodically 
operated mobile vans to serve a similar purpose. Ghana's 
Information Services supported the role of the P.R.D., the 
U.S.I.A. and that of the British Council. In 1955, for exam­
ple, the Information Services with a fleet of 21 new cinema 
vans, toured 12,281 Ghanaian towns and villages. In this 
venture, the vans gave 11,343 cinema and talk shows to an 
estimated audience of 3,500,000 rural inhabitants.^  ^ Like the 
Public Relations Department, the Information Services produced 
pamphlets and booklets on cacao each month for cacao cultiva­
tors. The Department also supplied photo posters, and picture 
sheets on cacao diseases and publicized these in many places. 
One such poster was captioned, "The Golden Harvest-The Story 
of Ghana's Cacao Industry," and a popular booklet, Kofi the 
Good Farmer.In its programs, the Information Services main­
tained links with the local press to deliver illustrated 
feature articles, press releases and news on cacao disease 
control. 
WACRI in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture 
participated in the campaign to assist farmers to adopt modern 
practices of disease control. The Cacao Research Institute 
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regularly demonstrated the efficiency of D. D. T as an insec-
ticidal agent against the ravages of Capsid pests at the 
station's experimental farms. The demonstrations served to 
show that D. D. T. was both economical and simple to use and 
that cacao farmers should experience no difficulty in its 
application.^  
During the latter half of 1948, the Department stationed 
two of its officers at the Tafo research station to observe 
cacao disease control and rehabilitation techniques. The 
Department's officers in turn explained the nature, incidence 
of diseases and the means to control them to numerous chiefs 
and farmers who visited the research laboratory at Tafo. To 
emphasize their point, the officers of the Agricultural De­
partment usually accompanied farmers to tour devastated areas 
and rehabilitated cacao farms. 
The Department of Social Welfare and Community Develop­
ment also assisted the Ministry of Agriculture in the campaign 
against cacao diseases. The Social Welfare and Community 
Development used four film strips to show farmers the best 
techniques to identify cacao pests and diseases. The Depart­
ment also used colored posters printed in the vernacular and 
English to clarify salient features of the disease control 
project. The Community Development services registered its 
greatest impact at the village level. The Department spent 
ten months to train special propaganda units which they des-
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patched in teams of five to every cacao producing district. 
These teams visited each village according to a schedule which 
the Department of Agriculture approved. The visit to each 
rural setting took two to five days, depending on location and 
accessibility.^  
In each village, the teams held preliminary meetings with 
the traditional political authorities comprising of the chief 
and his elders. After the initial contact, the teams then 
organized a general meeting of farmers, farm workers and all 
interested rural inhabitants. At the meeting, the spraying 
teams discussed the key aspects of the anti-Capsid campaign 
and demonstrated the use of the Mysto Sprayer. Afterwards, 
the teams fielded questions and held discussions about Capsid 
spraying.^ " The general meeting with an entire village was a 
valuable public relations tool. It approached the farmer as 
an important person in his own community. Secondly, it recog­
nized his long experience in cacao growing, replete with his 
own ideas on the subject which the spraying team was publicly 
willing to discuss. This approach often generated interest 
and goodwill in the village. 
Early the following morning, when Capsids were active, 
the teams demonstrated the practical application of sprayers 
to farmers on nearby farms. The spraying personnel often 
collected the dead insect pests to convince and impress farm­
ers of the efficiency of the equipment. The Capsid hunt later 
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helped the farmers to identify such insect pests among their 
cacao trees. The teams also held discussions and transmitted 
instructions to groups of farmers and dealt with individual 
problems. 
The Social Welfare units used film strips during live 
talks to illustrate symptoms of cacao diseases. In this 
effort, the moving picture attracted rural folk more than 
static film strips. The cinema shows were by far the most 
effective in rural areas than all the various devices of the 
extension services because they reached more audiences. 
Mobile cinema vans showed special films in each rural area to 
illustrate the essential elements of the campaign in story 
form. The vans usually toured the area independently of the 
spraying teams because many villages were inaccessible to the 
vans. Moreover, only one van served a region and its dis­
tricts at a time. 
The teams used puppet shows in villages to demonstrate 
the dangers of cacao diseases. Sometimes, the team members 
enacted the stories themselves. Such themes centered on the 
bad farmer who consulted a magician to cure his ailing trees, 
and the good farmer who purchased a Mysto Sprayer to serve a 
similar purpose. As a teaching technique, the drama often 
impressed rural dwellers who could not read in English.^ ® 
After the spraying teams have visited an area, local farmers 
often acquired sprayers. This behavior was partly in response 
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to the policy of the Ghana government which made the farmers 
responsible for spraying their own farms. In these instances, 
the demand for sprayers often exceeded the supply. Again, 
when one farmer succeeded with the new ideas, other farmers 
followed suit. 
Most cacao villages requested more visits. Many farmers 
also realized that the first phase of the campaign required 
reinforcement because there was too much to grasp in one 
session. Many wanted a follow up from the spraying teams to 
obviate possible errors during the application of the spraying 
equipment in the plantation. The Mysto Sprayer seemed compli­
cated and most likely to malfunction without expert help.4? 
During the second phase or follow up campaign, the extension 
officers held "One-Day" schools for rural notables who could 
influence other village folks to adopt the farm equipments. 
The spray teams made available handbooks in the vernacular, 
explaining the proper use and care of the Mysto sprayer to the 
rural inhabitants. The expectation was that literates in the 
villages would read and explain it to illiterate planters. 
Illustrated farming calendars showing the farmer what to do 
each month of the year, were printed and disseminated in rural 
areas. 
Equipment Maintenance 
The Ministry of Agriculture established central depots 
and workshops in strategic centers to rehabilitate and service 
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motorized spraying equipment that malfunctioned or broke 
down.The central workshops were located at Swedru, Bunso, 
Kumasi and Bechem and Jasikan in the Volta Region. Some 237 
mechanics were also trained to service and repair spraying 
machines. Five agricultural survey officers received special 
training to supervise the maintenance of the spraying machin­
es. The central depots also received, checked and distributed 
throughout their respective regions all newly imported ma­
chines . 
These stations possessed the plants necessary to under­
take major repairs. A trained mechanic working under the 
supervision of a spraying superintendent resided in each 
district. These individuals served as mobile workshops who 
toured the more remote areas in the forest to repair farmers' 
machines.53 The spraying machines involved were generally 
listed as the KWH, SOLO, AYARESAFO, AKATEWURA and the MYSTO 
types. The period between 1952 and 1966 therefore represented 
a watershed in Ghanaian agricultural history. The state 
carefully orchestrated the control of cacao pathogens in the 
rain forest. 
The surveying, identification and treatment of all out­
breaks were costly in manpower and financial resources. Since 
the 1950s, the Swollen Shoot control has bulked largely in the 
operations of the Cacao Division, a division of the Ministry 
of Agriculture. The C. M. B. bore the full cost of cacao 
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rehabilitation. In 1960, it spent £27,000,000 on cacao re­
planting expenses out of which £14,000,000 went into the 
Swollen Shoot control program alone.The cost of Capsid 
spraying schemes which the C. M. B. financed, amounted to 
£2,500,000 a year. In the 1956-7 cacao season, the C. M. B. 
paid out £2,800,000 to the Department of Agriculture which 
administered the replanting scheme.^  The spraying of some 
2,250,000 acres against Capsids in 1959 cost the government 
about £12,000,000.^ 
It is clear then, that from 1952 to 1965, the government 
of Ghana maintained a steady program of disease control. The 
program was extensive and intensive involving several depart­
ments and state organizations. The bid to eradicate the 
Capsid and the Swollen Shoot virus entailed considerable costs 
in finance, manpower and resources. The final chapter con­
tains a critical appraisal of the impact of this project on 
Ghana's cacao economy. 
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IX THE RESULTS OF THE CACAO DISEASE CONTROL PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
The emergence of the Cacao Research Institute in 1944, 
the recruitment of international agricultural scientists, the 
years of research and intensive extension services produced 
mixed results. The Eastern Region lost its position as the 
world's most prolific cacao growing area. The Black Pod 
fungus disease could not be eradicated in the field. The 
control of the Swollen Shoot outbreak and Capsid ravages along 
with the creation of new plantations with high-yielding cacao 
progenies in the Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and Western Regions of 
Ghana almost doubled output. Yet world prices sagged and the 
country's export earnings were far worse than the depression 
years. Attempts to obtain favorable world cacao prices 
through a variety of measures brought no visible results. 
Faced with dwindling export revenues, the state withdrew 
inputs from disease control. Meanwhile the plant pathogens 
intensified. 
Discussion 
In the main, the Capsid control efforts substantially 
reduced the population of the Sahlbergella and Distantiella 
Theobroma Capsids Ghana up to 1966. The Agricultural Depart­
ment of the University of Ghana derived these conclusions from 
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tests it performed on its experimental farms at Kade. Sample 
surveys in farmer's plantations at Bowakum village in Brong 
Ahafo, and at WACRI plots at Tafo confirmed provided similar 
results. In 1966, though Capsids were detected in some farms 
at Koaso in Brong Ahafo and at Adiewoso in the Western Region, 
their population level was too low to pose any concern. 
The control of Black Pod pathogens was generally 
unsuccessful. Fungicidal applications under Ghanaian rural 
conditions encountered severe limitations. Copper-based 
fungicides washed off easily during rainfall in the forest 
where the disease was most serious. Moreover, the cost of 
fungicides was prohibitive to the average farmer. On balance, 
the official and private attention to the Black Pod disease 
was one of relative indifference. Compared to Capsid pests 
and Swollen Shoot, losses due to the Black Pod fungus were 
insignificant in Ghana. To date, Ghanaian farmers have made 
no significant effects to control the efforts of the Palmivora 
Phytophthora fungus in their cacao plantations. Though the 
Ministry of Agriculture has recommended monthly harvesting 
during the crop season, farmers have ignored the advise be­
cause of the extra labor and expense.^  
On plant virus control, the results were rather mixed. 
From 1946 to 1956, the Cacao Division removed a total of 
54,000,000 trees. Until 1966, the Cacao Division chopped down 
another 50,000,000 infected cacao plants. In 1953, and spe­
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cifically in 1960, the disease was reported to be under con­
trol. However, this plant virus devastated a quarter of a 
million acres of cacao plantations which farmers abandoned 
altogether.2 Because the disease was indigenous to Ghana, 
complete and permanent eradication of Swollen Shoot in Ghana 
cannot be expected. To quote one source, "It must in conse­
quence be regarded as certain that plantations of cacao will 
always be liable to infection and the essential point is to 
reduce this susceptibility so far as may be practicable. 
Consequently, few of the devastated farms were success­
fully rehabilitated. The Eastern Region which pioneered 
Ghana's cacao economy in the 1880s to lead the world cacao 
output in 1911, never regained its former production levels. 
In the 1936-1937 crop season, this region produced 43 percent 
of the total national output of 300,000 tons. The Ashanti 
Region with 30 percent of the total, took second place. The 
Western and Central Regions, with a combined production ton­
nage amounting to 27 percent of the national output, followed 
in that order. A decade later, (1948-1949), the Ashanti 
Region produced 125,866, or 45 percent of the total national 
production of 278,372. The Eastern Region with 79,727 tons, 
generated 29 percent, and the Western and Central Regions took 
the third place with a combined total of 72,779 and 26 percent 
of the national output.* 
The incidence of the Swollen Shoot disease and the incen-
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tive of favorable post-war cacao produce prices, induced many 
farmers to migrate to Ashanti, the Brong Ahafo and Western 
Regions of Ghana where they built new plantations right up to 
the border with Cote D'Ivoire.® The acreage expansion was such 
that Ghana's cacao economy by the early 1960s occupied some 
4,250,000 acres. The national output before then had averaged 
about 250,000 tons yearly. Thereafter, successful scientific 
research, effective government action, good weather, high-
yielding cacao planting stock, almost doubled yields between 
1960 and 1965 as shown in tabular form below.* 
This phenomenon has represented an expansion from exist­
ing holdings in eastern Ghana to newer and fresher areas in 
the west. To date, Ghana's cacao economy is centered in the 
Ashanti and Brong Ahafo Regions of the forest belt. Unlike 
the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries when farm 
land for cacao was abundant, now potential Ghanaian farmers 
face a situation of land scarcity. Many have had to migrate 
to remote inaccessible places to acquire land. The westward 
expansion of cacao plantations also meant that the oldest 
Amelonado tree stocks of the late nineteenth and early twenti­
eth centuries remained in the Eastern Region and eastern 
Year Yield.f 
1960-1 
1961-2 
1962-3 
1963-4 
1964-5 
432,000 
410,000 
422,000 
421,000 
590,000 
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Ashanti and parts of the Volta Region. The younger and early 
bearing Amazonian trees became concentrated in the Brong Ahafo 
and Western Regions. 
Bumper Cacao Harvests and Sagging World Prices 
Throughout the 1930s up to 1945, cacao production dropped 
because of the depression, wartime exigencies and the Swollen 
Shoot menace. The demand for cacao outstripped supply and 
cacao produce prices increased. Importing countries took 
austerity measures when cacao supplies dwindled relative to 
demand. For example, in April 1954, Switzerland, typifying 
most cacao manufacturing countries, increased the retail 
prices of chocolate up to 10 percent.® Cacao growing coun­
tries, on the other hand, received windfall profits. The 
Swollen Shoot epidemic contributed to, but was not solely 
responsible for the fall off in output and increased prices.' 
As stated earlier, wartime diversion to war-related activities 
and poor cacao produce prices were also responsible. 
But these shortfalls remained true only in the short 
term. From 1957, and particularly in the first half of the 
1960s, cacao output in Ghana rose substantially. D. E. Asafo 
Agyei, Ghana's Deputy Minister of Agriculture reported to the 
National Assembly that the nation's cacao exports rose from 
the 1957-1958 crop season by 109 percent during the 1960-1961 
agricultural year, an increase of 225,781 tons. To quote one 
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source, "The increase was remarkable because the acreage under 
cacao had not doubled since 1957 and Swollen Shoot took some 
toll of the cacao trees.Ghana's Central Bureau of Statis­
tics in its economic survey for 1961, affirmed that this 
figure was 36 percent higher than the previous year's total 
and until then the greatest yield ever. The output for the 
1960-1962 crop year was better still. In that year, a Ghana­
ian bulletin reported that, "it is already clear, that this 
year's crop which is about 400,000 tons, will beat all previ­
ous records."" The Foreign Agricultural Service affirmed 
that, "The crop was so large that there were not enough burlap 
bags for packing.In 1964-65, Ghana's output represented 38 
percent of total world production. By doubling production 
within a decade, Ghana maintained her position as the world's 
leading supplier of cacao. 
World prices, however, sagged from 23 cents per pound in 
October 1964, to 15 cents in January 1965, the lowest level 
since cacao trading resumed after World War ll/"* in the 
early months of 1965, world cacao yields exceeded world con­
sumption.^ " Since historically, an estimated 20 per cent of 
cacao always died from Capsid attacks, the impact of the 
spraying campaign substantially augmented production.^ " Again, 
the government's ability to stem the dangerous impact of the 
Swollen Shoot epidemic also contributed to the prolific 
yields. Martin Appiah-Danquah, the General Secretary of the 
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United Ghana Farmers Co-Operative Council, attributed the 
crisis of over-production and low prices to the fact that 
cacao spraying since 1958-1965 raised crop output from 195,000 
tons to over 556,000 in the same period, hence the downward 
price spiral."' 
However, the boom in cacao output derived from several 
variables. Yields increased because many of the high-yielding 
and early-bearing trees planted in the mid-1950s reached their 
profitable bearing years in the early 1960s. The average 
annual yield amounted to approximately 330 pounds per acre.^ ® 
The weather also contributed to over-production and subsequent 
low prices. Generally, crops vary considerably from year to 
year because of climatic changes and the extent of pest and 
disease attacks. Most often, weather and pest attacks are 
correlated. In damp weather, fungus growths have tended to 
destroy ripe pods extensively.^ ' But quite unlike the past, 
weather conditions for the 1964-5 crop year were exceptionally 
favorable to cacao growing in the tropics. Most cacao produc­
ing countries in West Africa also enjoyed optimal weather 
conditions that crop season and were able to increase crop 
yields. Cote D'Ivoire raised output by 44 percent compared to 
35 percent for Nigeria and 42 percent for Togo in that order. 
Although young trees contributed to the record crops of 1964-
5, it was the exceedingly favorable weather which made the 
greatest impact. 
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The surplus production led to a further stock build up of 
raw cacao beans in cacao manufacturing countries. Consumption 
from 1957-8 to 1960-1 failed to keep pace with production from 
1957 to 1960-1961.21 Because cacao is a luxury item, many 
consuming countries limited imports through high taxation. 
Import restrictions in cacao manufacturing countries contrib­
uted to the lower cacao price levels. 
While the three top producers, Ghana, Nigeria and Brazil 
expanded exports, other agricultural countries seeking to 
diversify their crop exports, took to cacao planting and 
helped to flood the world markets. Cote D'Ivoire, and to some 
extent. Eastern Nigeria, acting on the advise of the United 
States Agency for International Development and the European 
Economic Community in the 1950s, expanded cacao output for the 
first time. Similarly, Cameroonian farmers with E. E. C. aid, 
increased their plantings, while Togo augmented its cacao ex­
ports . The index of world production of cacao showed a 
continuous rise to about 33 percent from the 1953-4 and the 
1959-60 cacao seasons.2' In effect, while cacao output mounted 
in Ghana, large harvests were also forthcoming from new plant­
ings and improved technology in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon. 
Similarly, cacao yield in the Western hemisphere also 
increased. Production in Brazil and the Dominican Republic, 
for example, improved considerably because of exceptionally 
good weather.2^  Comparable successes also occurred among Asian 
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producers, along with those in New Guinea and Oceania. 
Ghana's cacao plantations, which at the start of the 1960s 
occupied some 4,250,000 acres, contributed 55 percent of the 
overall world supply.^ " Ghana's achievement did not translate 
into financial remuneration. As one source described the 
situation: 
The story of such rapid progress is dramatic. But 
what has this success meant to Ghana? Unfortunately 
over-production now threatens the basic economy of 
the West African producing countries and the worst 
affected of all is Ghana.^  
Diminishing imports from the United States in the 1950s, 
the world's greatest consumer of cacao, aggravated Ghana's 
worsening cacao export earnings. American cacao purchases 
from Ghana fell. For example, U.S. overall commerce in cacao 
trade from 1952 to 1956, was 11 percent lower than the quin­
quennial period of 1947-1951. Per capita consumption of cacao 
dropped from 4.7 pounds in the 1936-1940 period to 3.55 from 
1955 to 1958.^ ® In the 1963-4 crop season, the volume of 
American imports came to 91,650 tons compared to 113,000 in 
1962. 
In Western Europe by contrast, cacao imports from 1956 to 
1959 were 10 percent higher than those from 1952 to 1955. 
The combined imports from Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. from 
Africa increased from 28,000 In 1953, to 68,000 in 1957 but 
declined to 48,000 tons in 1958. The U.K., Japan, and the 
Netherlands were Ghana's best markets for cacao.But these 
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developments did not improve Ghana's earnings. The volume of 
imports from these countries were relatively modest compared 
to American purchases. 
Despite the major fall in the cost of their primary raw 
material, the cacao buying and manufacturing companies did not 
reduce produce price to the final consumer. For example, a 50 
percent fall in the price of the cacao produce reduced the six 
penny bar of chocolate in England by 0.75 percent of a penny. 
Gross profit margins which ranged from 18-26 percent of total 
costs, increased significantly in the 1960s. For example, in 
the United States, Hershey's surplus revenues rose from 23 
percent in 1955 to 31 percent of production costs in 1963. In 
1965 alone, Hershey's profit rose by a million dollars while 
the cost of its raw material sank from s53,000,000 to less 
than s40,000,000.^  
Ghana's Response to Shrinking Cacao Prices 
The drop in cacao export prices created a sharp verbal 
response from the then President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, 
whose one party government was entirely dependent upon cacao 
export revenues to underwrite current and recurrent items of 
state modernization programs. On 12 January, 1965, the Presi­
dent, stated before Ghana's National Assembly that: 
When the cacao crop was being ravaged by Swollen 
Shoot and cacao was in short supply, the manufactur­
ers appealed to us to do what we could to increase 
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supplies. We spent a lot of money to increase pro­
duction. The result of our efforts has been that 
production has almost doubled, but the manufacturers 
and the speculators in the cacao trade have taken 
advantage of this to depress the price of cacao.^  
According to Nkrumah, Ghana's Head of State, the results of 
these adverse conditions in international commodity trade were 
that; 
[0]ur overall export earnings have failed to show a 
proportionate increase. On the other hand the need 
to press forward with our development programmes has 
resulted in an increase in imports, especially im­
ports of machinery, plant and equipment from those 
very countries. The fall in our export earnings 
while our imports were increasing, has resulted in 
deficits in our balance of payments. 
The Ghanaian President announced his determination to 
forgo the hitherto bilateral commercial agreements with pri­
vate financiers and intermediaries and to demand hard currency 
for cacao, in order "to ensure [the] availability of liquid 
funds to finance development programs."5* Ghana responded to 
the ever shrinking cacao prices in several ways. The idea to 
diversify the economy which had hitherto hinged heavily on 
cacao received priority attention. Nkrumah, declared before 
parliament that, "The collapse in the world cacao price, the 
commodity which has hitherto supported about 66 percent of our 
total export earnings...should spur us on to a more aggressive 
export earning campaign. His administration later attempted 
to de-emphasize cacao production and to stress rubber, citrus 
and oil palm production. 
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Ghana in 1962, participated with other major cacao pro­
ducers, notably Nigeria, Brazil, Cote D'Ivoire and Cameroon in 
Lagos, the Nigerian capital to create the Cacao Producers 
Alliance.In 1964, this body came together to secure agree­
ments from cacao manufacturers to pay a minimum price of £190 
per ton for the produce. This effort, occurring at a time 
when record crops had boosted supply above demand, failed. 
Ghana and other cacao producing countries could not convince 
the major cacao importing countries from the West, notably the 
U.S., the U.K. and the E.E.C. members to participate in inter­
national agreements to stabilize prices and to reduce local 
taxes on chocolate products.^ ' International marketing agree­
ments for better prices also proved futile because of the 
declining consumption of chocolate in Western markets, espe­
cially, the United States and Sweden. In the period under 
review, chocolate manufacturers doubled their advertizing 
expenditure in order to maintain sales. In 1965, member coun­
tries in the Cacao Producers Alliance, (C.P.A.) obtained £90 a 
ton for their raw cacao, a price far lower than the worst 
slump years of the 1930s. 
The glut of cacao in the world market, led an F.A.O. 
study group to Accra in April 1961 to consider plans for price 
stabilization. The conferees suggested that producer coun­
tries should supply cacao on a quota system." When prices 
still deteriorated, the F.A.O and cacao producing countries 
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convened at the University of Ghana in 1964 under the chair­
manship of Krobo Edusei, Ghana's Minister of Agriculture. 
Here, the conferees resolved to utilize statistical techniques 
to forecast cacao output. The rationale, as Krobo Edusei 
announced, was to help stabilize cacao prices. To use his own 
words : 
We want to strengthen our bargaining position and 
remove the speculation on yield by speculators who 
plague the international market. We shall remove 
these parasites when the market knows that our fore­
casts are scientifically and internationally based. 
These forecasts predictably failed to ameliorate the poor 
produce prices for cacao. Cacao export prices continued to 
drop. Meanwhile, the C. P. A. considered other measures to 
resolve the problem of over-production. First, the Alliance 
attempted to divert a large tonnage of cacao beans into marga­
rine and soap production. Here again, this solution was 
unworkable. Cacao beans would compete with other fats and 
oils, and might fetch only 5 cents a pound, a price drastical­
ly below what is payable for the crop.^ i 
Ghana's Ministry of Trade meanwhile, searched for new 
export markets under the terms of the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (G. A. T. T.) This drive aimed to gain con­
vertible currency to underwrite the country's heavy develop­
mental commitments after independence. To quote Ghana's Trade 
Minister, F. K. D. Goka, "It is only by doing so that we shall 
be able to afford to continue to invest in this development 
268 
and to service the loans provided by the World Bank and [from] 
the Governments of other countries.Up to 1958, Ghana's 
cacao sold in sixteen countries. In 1959, Ghana shipped cacao 
to East Germany, Israel, Japan, and Yugoslavia and China in 
1960. In 1961, trade expanded to India, Czechoslovakia, the 
United Arab Republic and Poland.^ ' By the 1960-1 crop season, 
Ghana exported 409,968 tons to 24 countries. The government 
of Ghana hoped to create markets in Eastern Europe and to 
encourage greater consumption in Africa, Asia, Australia, 
Western Europe and the U.S.A. through an aggressive export 
drive. 
In comparative terms, however, the new markets in Eastern 
Europe were marginal compared to American and Western European 
demand for cacao. In the 1958-1959 crop year for example, the 
U.S. imported 142,000 tons of raw cacao beans. West Germany, 
ordered 70,745 in the 1959-60 crop season alone.The U.K. and 
Holland imported 53,730 and 57,429 in that order, while Italy 
increased its consumption from 14,525 in 1959-60 to 17,040. 
Ironically, therefore, the crash of cacao prices reflect­
ed the success of Ghanaian production. At independence in 
1957, Ghana had £450,000,000 in external assets. In i960, the 
government had accumulated growing deficits. Ghana's hard 
currency reserves dropped significantly in the 1960s partly 
because of a sustained drive in industrialization and modern­
ization programs.^ " When the meager cacao prices could not 
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replenish the national foreign currency reserves to sustain 
Ghana's heavy expenditures on development projects, the gov­
ernment curtailed non-essential imports to conserve foreign 
purchasing power. The administration only purchased investment 
goods such as machinery, plant and equipment, to produce 
import substitutes for local consumption.^ ' 
In order to influence world prices, Nkrumah's government 
warehoused cacao at Ghana's ports of shipment in a bid to 
withhold about 200,000 tons of the produce from international 
commodity trade. The government also built silos to store 
200,000 tons of cacao. As Nkrumah explained, "We increased 
our cacao production from 264,000 tons in 1956-7 to 590,000 
tons in 1963-4 and huge silos had been built to store half the 
cacao crop to enable us to restrict exports and so ensure a 
fair price for our cacao in the world market. 
Ghana offered some of its limited storage capacity to 
other West African cacao producers and built additional stor­
age facilities. Nigeria quickly erected six small storage 
sheds. Local stockpiling of cacao in Ghana could only offer a 
temporary solution. The practice added to production costs. 
Secondly, the rate of deterioration of primary produce in 
tropical countries, unlike temperate zones, was more intense 
and rapid. Conversely, the consumer countries usually stock­
piled cacao up to the equivalent of six months supply. 
The storage capacities of cacao manufacturing companies 
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abroad were more commodious and several times more extensive 
than those available to producer countries. For example, the 
Hershey Corporation of America alone possessed twenty seven 
large cacao warehouses in twenty-four states in the U.S. and 
five more in Canada. These facilities placed this manufactur­
ing company in a position to purchase and reserve cacao stocks 
when prices were low as in 1958, and to utilize these supplies 
when world prices rose again.For these reasons, the stock­
piling of cacao in Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa regis­
tered precious little impact on world cacao price movements. 
The Ghana government also established a factory to pro­
cess raw cacao into cacao butter and chocolate tablets.^ ' This 
endeavor aimed to add value to the crop in order to increase 
cacao export revenues.®" On 6 December 1965, the Ghana choco­
late factory which cost $5,280,000 to construct, opened at 
Tema. Dr. Noe Drevici, the general manager, observed that the 
factory was the first of its kind in continental Africa, and 
that, "the world cacao market would think twice before dictat­
ing prices."51 However, these ad hoc measures failed to regis­
ter the desired effect. 
With the fall in world cacao prices, the government 
withdrew its support to disease control in order to cut costs 
and to avoid further production increases and subsequent world 
surpluses." Paltry cacao revenues imposed severe foreign cur­
rency constraints making it difficult for Ghana to sustain 
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inputs into cacao disease control. The administration dis­
solved the Cacao Division in 1962 and left the responsibility 
of controlling the Swollen Shoot disease to the farmers' them­
selves. The cacao growers, however, failed to destroy the 
infected trees as aggressively as government-paid labor gangs 
working for the Cacao Division. The policy to leave the 
cutting out of infected trees to farmers subsequently led to a 
dangerous build up of infection.In 1966, the re-constituted 
Cacao Division conjectured that a backlog of infected cacao 
trees had to be destroyed at the rate of 5,000,000 trees per 
year to keep the disease under control. 
A similar fate befell the government's anti-Capsid spray­
ing program. The government placed import restrictions on 
spraying equipment and removed subsidies for chemical and 
spraying equipment. The evolution of Capsid strains resistant 
to the cyclodienne insecticides of which Gammalin-20 is one, 
further worsened matters. Capsid resistance to chemical 
sprays was most prominent in the Eastern Region where spraying 
had been carried out the longest.^  
The reduction in government extension services exerted a 
deleterious impact on cacao farming. On 9 February 1966, J. 
K. Baffuor Senkyire, a parliamentarian, drew the attention of 
Ghana's National Assembly to the degraded quality of agricul­
tural extension work in Ghanaian cacao villages. According to 
him the Ashanti Region, for example, had only twenty-three 
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trained extension service personnel to a total of 275,008 full 
time cacao farmers. This broke down to a ratio of one exten­
sion officer to 11,957 farmers. A cacao farmer, by impli­
cation, had to wait for fifteen years after his first service 
to receive further research information or practical aid from 
another extension personnel. What was worse, most extension 
officers had no facilities such as insecticides and depart­
mental vehicles with which to operate. 
Meanwhile, the nation's insecticidal factory at the port 
city of Tema, near Accra, deteriorated. The Imperial Chemical 
Industries (I. C. I.) manufactured Gammalin-20, Ghana's most 
popular capsidicide. The Ghana Supply Commission had hitherto 
offered the pesticide to farmers through the United Ghana 
Farmers Co-Operative Council at subsidized rates. With fall­
ing cacao export revenues and a run down in the nation's hard 
currency reserves, the government on October 1, 1965 removed 
the subsidy on Gammalin-20. The I. C. I. found it difficult to 
obtain regular raw material inputs from overseas suppliers. 
These developments culminated in a situation which 
severely hampered Capsid spraying in the 1965 cacao crop 
season. The I. C. I. factory itself closed down periodically 
for several weeks at a time, facilitating the resurgence of 
Capsid attacks on cacao output particularly in the 1967/8 
production period.®® On 4 February 1966, G. E. Mensah, the 
parliamentary member for Nkawkaw, in the Eastern Region, drew 
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the attention of the National Assembly to the shortage of D. 
D. T. in cacao villages. On that day, he remarked; 
It is very pathetic for someone who is interested in 
cacao to travel along the Accra-Kumasi road-and see 
the condition of the cacao trees. If nothing is 
done about it, not only will the country have some 
slight fall in the yield itself but the yield will 
come to the bare minimum. If it so happens, I do 
not know what will be the result and so I am appeal­
ing to the Government to do all it can to get some 
Gamma lin for the farmers.®' 
A summary of the cacao disease control program after decolo­
nization in 1957 reads; 
In short, the rapid expansion in output by Ghana's cacao 
farmers... contributed to falling world cacao prices, a 
severe strain on Ghana's balance of payments situation, 
food shortages and rising food prices, a drastic reduc­
tion in farmers' real incomes, and finally to curtailment 
of Government efforts to combat diseases which threatened 
the industry itself. 
Ultimately, it was the Ghanaian cacao growers who bore the 
brunt of low cacao prices the most. The raison d'etre of 
Ghana's Cacao Marketing Board after its inception in 1947 had 
been to guarantee a price ceiling to farmers regardless of 
international cacao price movements. In 1954, for example, 
the government pegged cacao prices at £3. 12s. Od. (per load 
of sixty pounds) at a period when cacao prices stood at £500 
per ton.^ * In 1965-1966, the government slashed real cacao 
produce prices. The price per headload of 60 pounds fell from 
£4 in 1957 to £2 in 1965-1966. Ghana's cacao production and 
corresponding producer prices since independence is set out in 
tabular form below. 
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Year Producer prices in £. s. d.*^  
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
4 
2:14 
2:14 
2:10 
2:10 
3:12 
3:12 
3 
3 
The farmers' response to poor producer prices conformed to the 
pattern of the post-World War I period, the depression years 
and the Second World War. When faced with the discouraging 
prices, the farmers' impetus in cacao farming slackened. Most 
of them made no serious attempt at cacao rehabilitation. A 
considerable amount of cacao trees died from old age. Black 
Pod and Capsid diseases along with termite damage and a gener­
al lack of farm maintenance.'^  
Abandoned plantations either reverted to thicket or 
secondary forest. Some cacao planters resorted to food farm­
ing since this was more profitable. Accordingly, the staple 
food crops of maize, cassava, cocoyam, yams, plantain, bananas 
and vegetables became prominent. Occasional tree crops such 
as cola, oil palm, citrus and coffee were encouraged.^  In his 
critical evaluation of the sudden decline in cacao produce 
prices, Ghana's President, Nkrumah, whose government adminis­
tered the cacao disease control programs from 1951 to 1966, 
wrote: 
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Both Ghana and Nigeria in the post-independence 
period enormously developed their production in 
cacao. This result has not been obtained by chance. 
It is the consequence of heavy internal expenditure 
on control of disease and pests, the subsidizing of 
insecticide and the spraying machines provided to 
farmers and the importing of new varieties of new 
cacao seedlings which are resistant to the endemic 
ills which previous cacao trees had developed. By 
means such as these, Africa as a whole greatly in­
creased her cacao production, while that of Latin 
America remained stationary." 
The President then posed the rhetorical question: 
What advantage has Nigeria or Ghana gained through 
this stupendous increase in Agricultural productivi­
ty?... In other words, Ghana and Nigeria have trebled 
their production of this particular agricultural 
product but their gross earnings from it have fall-
The utter dependency of the world's primary producers 
upon the vagaries of international commodity trade which 
favored industrialized nations was not lost on the President. 
A continental African Union government, in Nkrumah's percep­
tion, represented the solution to the adverse terms of trade 
which historically has assailed nations dependent on agricul­
ture for their sustenance. To quote Nkrumah, "A continent 
like Africa, however much it increases its agricultural out­
put, will not benefit unless it is sufficiently politically 
and economically united to force the developed world to pay it 
a fair price for its cash crops. 
Unification of the African continent would certainly not 
be the answer to the issue. Primary products deteriorate 
rapidly under tropical conditions. Storage as a means to 
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withhold supplies from the world market could only serve as a 
temporary expedient, and not a permanent solution to the 
problem of over-production. With its immense agricultural and 
mineral resources, industrialization programs in Ghana and 
elsewhere in Africa, emphasizing an import substitution pro­
gram deserve more attention. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of plant pests and diseases is yet to carve its 
niche in African historical studies. The absence of research 
into government initiatives to suppress biological hazards • 
that have afflicted Ghana's cacao economy, has promoted the 
persuasive but untenable perception that the state offered no 
contributions to the evolution of the world's biggest 
plantation system in Ghana. This study has synthesized data 
from a variety of government and international documents along 
with scientific journal publications, experiment station 
reports and material from the social sciences to demonstrate 
the significance of the government's long struggle with cacao 
plant pests and diseases in Ghana. As an operational 
definition, the state or government in this analysis, 
encompassed decision makers in the legislative and executive 
branches of government who formulated policies, enacted legal 
statutes, utilized bureaucratic institutions like the 
Department of Agriculture and the Social Welfare Services, or 
created specific institutions like the Cacao Research 
Institute to combat cacao plant pests and diseases. 
The government used botanic stations and travelling 
inspectors initially to promote cacao cultivation for export 
in Ghana. However, it was in the realm of disease control 
that the state made its most signal effort to preserve Ghana's 
cacao economy from plant pests and diseases. Government 
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attention to mycological and entomological hazards to the 
cacao crop originated as an incidental adjunct to the primary 
official policy to promote export agriculture in Ghana. Once 
began, state involvement in disease control proceeded 
gradually over an extended time frame. The gravity of the 
problem of plant pathogens compelled bureaucrats in the 
colonial Department of Agriculture to build and strengthen its 
technical manpower division, albeit slowly over time, to 
research and eradicate the disease-causing organisms from 
Ghana's rain forest. 
Between 1910 and 1935, it was the colonial Department of 
Agriculture and its technical staff of mycologists, 
entomologists and travelling instructors who worked to help 
protect Ghana's cacao economy from pathogenic attacks. These 
efforts were directed primarily against the Capsid and Black 
Pod diseases. With the outbreak of the Swollen Shoot epidemic 
in 1936, the state created an international cacao agricultural 
and research and experiment station in Ghana. This 
institution carried out biological research, and with the 
support of government bureaucratic mechanisms, extended 
research findings to farmers to curb cacao morbidity. 
The colonial Department of Agriculture, in the 
preliminary phases of these initiatives, exhibited several 
weaknesses. From 1910 to 1936, bureaucrats in the Department 
advised cacao farmers to suppress fungal and entomological 
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problems without the services of a viable agricultural science 
research station. It is true that the colonial government 
created the Central Cacao Research Station in 1937 to pursue 
research work on cacao pathogens. But none of the station's 
scientific findings, especially on plant virus control, could 
be implemented owing in part to the depression of the 1930s 
and mainly because of the Second World War. The era between 
1910 and 1943 may therefore be characterized as the period 
when the state initiated directives on cacao disease control 
but left the farmers to their own devices to implement them. 
This study maintains that the impact of technocrats and 
bureaucrats in suppressing cacao pathogens in Ghana was 
marginal up to World War II. But their efforts provided a 
valuable foundation and guideline to biological research which 
the Cacao Research Institute, created in 1944, followed with 
remarkable consistency thereafter. The government's impact on 
cacao diseases after World War II, represented a significant 
turning point in Ghanaian agricultural history. Over the 
years, therefore, an unwritten partnership came to exist 
between rural Ghanaian cacao growers and the state, whose 
joint, although independent efforts led to the emergence and 
preservation of Ghana's cacao economy from plant pathogens. 
In this interaction both the farmers and the government acted 
in self interest. Cacao growers responded to market 
mechanisms for incomes to support their livelihood. The state 
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on the other hand, protected the cacao economy from pathogenic 
onslaughts because government revenues derived largely from 
cacao export taxes which financed state apparata and socio­
economic improvements. 
Had the government failed to perform this vital research 
service, (which lay beyond the skills and financial resources 
of rural inhabitants) Ghana's cacao plantations along with the 
financial health of the state would have faced extinction. 
Historical precedents of plant devastation by diseases in the 
earliest cacao economies of the western hemisphere provided 
strong support for these assertions. This work has evaluated 
the historical role of the state in promoting agricultural 
research and extension services to benefit Ghanaian rural 
farmers in the colonial and immediate post-independence 
period. The perception, therefore, that the colonial state 
neglected Ghana's cacao economy requires serious modification. 
This work has revealed and presented new opportunities 
for research. Historical topics in Agricultural Science are 
feasible over the entire extent of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. Specific aspects of this study on cacao pathogens in 
Ghana demand further in-depth investigations in their own 
right. These themes include cacao warehouse diseases, the 
enforcement of plant quarantine laws in Ghana, and the 
environmental impact of anti-Capsid spraying schemes in the 
countryside. But it is probably the role of Swollen Shoot 
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control politics in Ghana which requires top priority 
attention. 
This research effort has highlighted the contribution of 
Ghanaian rural politics to the rise of mass agitation against 
British rule after World War II. This line of interpretation 
is significant historically because it helps to clarify two 
issues. An evaluation of rural politics in the era of 
decolonization explains why Ghana, a major dollar earner for 
the British, became the first to achieve political autonomy in 
sub-Saharan Africa, while Britain's other less resource-
endowed dependencies remained much longer under colonial rule. 
Preliminary findings suggest that the cacao virus diseases 
from Ghana's forest belt created a series of political 
convulsions which mobilized rural inhabitants behind urban-
based nationalist politicians in Ghana. This unique 
experience enabled the Gold Coast, among other factors, to 
emerge as the first independent Black African nation. 
In essence, this analysis has demonstrated the need to 
examine the interaction of both urban and rural politics 
before and during the process of decolonization in Africa. 
The existing historiographical literature has presented an 
elitist bias purporting that the independence process in Ghana 
was uniquely urban in character. Rural discontent under 
colonial rule and beyond, deserves closer research 
consideration. Such an approach would offer realistic 
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interpretations of African rural politics, economy and society 
during the colonial and post-colonial era. Further studies of 
this subject in Ghana and elsewhere in Black Africa would be 
illuminating and intellectually fulfilling. 
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EPILOGUE: GHANA'S CACAO DISEASE PROBLEM: 1967-1991 
Ghana's cacao economy began a headlong decline in the mid-
1960s when the state withdrew inputs from disease control. 
Before then, Ghana the world's most prolific cacao producer, 
contributed an average of 30.5 percent of global supplies. 
The nation reached its production peak with 590,000 tons in 
the 1964-1965 crop season representing 38 percent of world 
output. A different picture emerged in the 1968-1969 crop 
year when Ghana produced 339,300 tons of cacao and only 27.4 
percent of world output. The downward trend has persisted. 
For example, in the 1979-1980 crop season, the country's cacao 
exports amounted to 271,000 and 18.1 percent of global cacao 
stocks. In 1981-1982, Ghana, with 225,000, contributed only 
13.0 percent of total exports. In 1983-1984, Ghana's cacao 
plantations yielded only 158,000 tons and slipped from the top 
cacao producing nation in the world to the fourth in the 1987-
1988 crop season. The leading cacao exporting countries today 
are Cote D'Ivoire, Brazil and Cameroon in that order.^ 
Under army rule, Ghana has since 1972, devised measures 
to revitalize the sagging cacao economy. Colonel Ignatius 
Acheampong's regime (1972-1979), in its time, initiated a 
five-year blue-print from 1976 to 1980 to contain the Black 
Pod disease which has traditionally destroyed 20 percent of 
Ghana's production tonnage over the years. The plan 
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emphasized frequent harvesting of all ripe pods. The regime 
rationalized that the incidence of the Black Pod fungal 
disease was too low to justify expenditure on fungicidal 
treatment. On insecticides, the government's policy aimed to 
substitute "Afrocarb" for Gammalin-20 because of Capsid 
resistance to the latter. The program also stressed seed 
multiplication and planting stock that was resistant to the 
Black Pod and Swollen Shoot diseases. Specifically on Swollen 
Shoot, the standard procedure of hewing down infected trees 
and replacing them with hybrid seedlings formed a strong part 
of the government's agenda. The state planned to renew all 
cacao inputs especially spraying machines, insecticides and 
extension services.% 
In effect, the Cacao Production Division of the Ministry 
of Agriculture embarked upon a cacao improvement project in 
Suhum in the Eastern Region at a cost of six million dollars 
in 1970 with world bank loans. Targeted for completion in 
1977, this undertaking aimed to replant 36,000 acres in the 
plan period. In the second phase, which started in the 1978-
1979 crop year, the government highlighted the replacement of 
25-30 year trees with high-yielding varieties. 
These policies fell far short of their mark. In a survey 
conducted in 1977, cacao inputs such as insecticides, spraying 
machines, seed and seedlings proved inadequate. Though cacao 
planters required a total of 4.5 million liters of 
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insecticides, the state supplied only 875,000 or 19 percent 
of the total. In the 1970s, the supply of Gammalin-20, the 
most popular insecticide in Ghana, came up to 20 percent of 
the estimated demand. It was only in the 1976-1977 crop year 
that 56 percent of the required quantity could be satisfied. 
In 1977-78, Ghanaian cacao growers demanded an estimated 
98,000 units of sprayers. In actuality, only 37,000 spraying 
machines in working order were available in the country. The 
quality of cacao seeds and seedlings obtainable from 
agricultural research stations was totally inadequate. Of the 
farmers interviewed, 60 percent reported that they produced 
their own seed and seedlings, which were not the usual high 
yielding Amazonia variety.' 
In fact, Ghana's declining cacao economy reflected a 
general deterioration in the nation's fiscal programs. After 
independence in 1957, President Nkrumah's one party state 
spent intensively on modernization programs. The importation 
of equipment and machinery to construct roads, the harbor and 
township of Tema, several import substitution industries, a 
hydro-electric dam at Akosombo, numerous secondary schools, 
and two modern universities along with a policy of fee-free 
compulsory education ate deeply into Ghana's financial 
resources and foreign currency reserves. Moreover, the 
national budget also supported free medical care for all. 
These items of state expenditure were undoubtedly costly. 
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When cacao produce prices dropped drastically in the 1960s, 
the run down in Ghana's external purchasing power could not be 
replenished. 
In 1966, the Ghana police and army uprooted President 
Nkrumah's government partly for reckless financial commitments 
and expenditures. Political instability, resulting from a 
military coup in 1972, another in 1979 and yet again in 1981 
derailed the continuity of sound economic planning. The 
military junta under Colonel Acheampong, 1972 to 1979, was 
extremely profligate in its use of scarce national resources. 
Inputs into cacao disease control under this regime, if any, 
were indeed minuscule/* 
Cacao farmers lost the incentive to produce when they 
received poor producer prices from the 1960s. Ghana's 
traditional cacao diseases namely the Black Pod, Swollen Shoot 
and Capsid pests made severe inroads into many farms. Labor 
shortage also jeopardized the cacao economy. Most cacao farms 
were built with family labor. After independence, the 
accessibility to education enabled most farmers' children to 
accept urban employments. Meanwhile most cacao growers aged. 
The dearth of family labor could not be redeemed with hired 
workers which was expensive. The nation's extension services 
deteriorated. When cacao trees aged and died, cacao growers 
did not replace them due to lack of superior planting stock 
but mainly because low produce prices provided no incentive to 
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effort.S 
To gain better incomes, some cacao planters aggressively 
smuggled their produce for sale at higher prices in 
neighboring Togo and Cote D'Ivoire. Ghana experienced balance 
of payment difficulties when faced with constrictions in cacao 
export revenues. Meanwhile, state attention to the cacao 
economy remained static. A World Bank study report for 1984, 
observed that, "In spite of its importance, there does not 
appear to have been constructive government cocoa policies," 
and that "unless producer prices and insecticides are 
increased production would decline to less than 150,000 tons 
by the end of the 1980s. 
This assessment could not have been more accurate. 
After a coup d'etat of December 31, 1981, the new 
military government under Flight Lieutenant John Jerry 
Rawlings instituted an Economic Recovery Program to revive 
Ghana's economy. The government increased producer prices 
from 12,000 cedis ($34.00) in 1982-1983 to 165,000 ($471.00) 
in 1988-1989, and then to 224,000 cedis ($640.00) in 1990 as 
an incentive to production. The newly created Cocobod 
(formerly the Cacao Marketing Board) introduced more 
seedlings, machetes, and spraying insecticides into cacao 
producing villages. These inputs and financial incentives 
boosted the farmers' efforts. Smuggling abated and production 
jumped to 300,000 tons for the 1989-1990 crop season.^ 
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However, as in the 1960s, world cacao prices slumped. 
The producer price per ton which stood at $2,602.75 in 1980 
dropped to $998.55 in 1989, a fall in export price by 61.6 
percent. Ghana's estimated loss in export revenues amounted to 
$200,000,000. Overseas cacao manufacturers benefitted from 
the low produce prices. Wrote a London based African news 
magazine, "At the same time, the manufacturers of chocolate 
and its allied products reaped huge profits with chocolate 
prices for the same period increasing from $544.65 per ton in 
1970 to $7,593.74 in 1989." Due to sagging export prices, the 
government of Ghana, as a remedial measure, considered 
processing cacao into high quality cacao liquor to improve 
earnings. 
In Ghana, cacao plant diseases have persisted as a 
permanent menace. Yet still, their control have often led to 
higher output levels which automatically results in declining 
prices. Under-production on the other hand, have always 
produced less than an opposite effect. Unstable cacao prices 
therefore conform to the unwritten axiom that primary 
producers must industrialize in order to guarantee a measure 
of economic viability. Economic diversification stressing the 
production of several competitive cash crops in modest 
quantities might probably offer a viable substitute to a 
monocultural economy such as Ghana's cacao economy. 
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